



Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-94-196
Tuesday
11 October 1994

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11 October 1994

NOTICE TO READERS: Effective 1 October, the processing indicators appearing in brackets at the start of each item in this publication will be changed. All new indicators will begin with "FBIS" to make the material more easily identifiable in databases. Some will also indicate whether the item has been translated from the vernacular or transcribed from English.

All material in this volume previously disseminated in electronic form.

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Ministry Protests Greek Refusal of Entries

AU0710203494 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 7 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] A press spokesman for the Foreign Ministry reports that today, 7 October 1994, Mrs. Katerina Nasika, second secretary of the Greek Embassy in Tirana, was summoned to the Albanian Foreign Ministry and was handed a protest note, which states among other things:

The Foreign Ministry expresses its protest over the recurrent acts by Greek police authorities to stop the circulation of Albanian citizens supplied with valid documents and visas, who were travelling to Greece on personal business. Thus, between 28 September 1994 and 6 October 1994, the Greek police refused entry of 20 Albanian nationals at the Kapshtice border crossing point. Albanian nationals were all supplied with valid entry visas issued by relevant Greek authorities before 9 September 1994.

The note states that the Foreign Ministry asks the Greek Embassy in Tirana to intervene with the relevant Greek authorities to take the necessary measures to end such recurring cases of preventing Albanian nationals supplied with valid entry visas from entering Greece.

Berisha: Five Ethnic Greeks Not To Be Expelled

AU1010180394 Paris AFP in English 1735 GMT 10 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, Oct 10 (AFP)—Five members of the ethnic Greek minority in Albania jailed on charges of spying for Greece will not be deported, Albanian President Sali Berisha said here Monday [10 October].

Berisha told a press conference that Albania would not use "the methods of Brezhnev" in dealing with the case—a reference to expulsions of political prisoners from the former Soviet Union when Leonid Brezhnev was president.

Last week the five had their jail sentences reduced on appeal to terms of five to seven years. Relations between Greece and Albania have been in crisis since the trial opened in mid-August.

Berisha stressed that the five men were Albanian citizens. He said that their deportation, suggested recently in Greek political circles, would affect "the sovereignty of Albanian institutions." He said the ethnic Greeks were "today Albanian citizens in prison, and tomorrow they will be free Albanian citizens."

The president repeated an offer to hold talks with Greece over the matter. "We are ready for a face-to-face bilateral meeting, but we will also accept mediation," he said. Albania had "no preference" in the choice of a mediator,

said Berisha, adding that Greece had rejected an offer of intercession from United Nations Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali.

In Athens Monday Greek Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias said he was "not disposed" to meet his Albanian counterpart Alfred Serreqi.

Official: Athens Trying 'To Hamper Reforms'

AU0710195194 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1330 GMT 7 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Asked by an ATA reporter about the latest meeting of the Economic and Finance Commission of the European Union [EU], where Greece has again used its veto to block 35 million ECU in EU aid to help the balance of payments in Albania, Deputy Foreign Minister Arian Starova said: The repeated veto of Greece once again testifies to the non-European spirit with which Greece is behaving toward its neighbor. Unfortunately, Greece is deliberately not joining the consensus of EU members and their repeated appeal.

At the same time, this act by the Greek Government follows a persistent demand for dialogue by the Albanian Government. I am personally most indignant about this repeated stance, Starova said. Athens policy toward Albania is incomprehensible from the point of view of contemporary Europe, and all that remains is to realize that the Greek blockade of EU aid for Albania is being used as a means to hamper reforms in Albania.

Berisha Discusses Cooperation With Italian Group

AU0810161694 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 7 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Albanian President Sali Berisha today received a Liga Nord delegation from Italy.

Albania pays great attention to relations with Italy and is grateful for the assistance Italy rendered at difficult moments, President Berisha told the delegation members. Albania wants to strengthen friendship and sees numerous cooperation possibilities with Italy. The encouragement of Italian investments in Albania is one of the most useful ways to assist Albania on the road of profound reforms on which it has already embarked.

For their part, the Italian delegation members assessed the achievements on the road of reforms in our country and expressed their readiness to encourage cooperation with Albania.

Berisha Thanks FRG Official for Support, Aid

AU0910163694 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 6 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Albanian President Sali Berisha today received the visiting German economic delegation.

Albania is grateful for the assistance and unsparing support that the German Government and people have given and continue to give in implementing the reform, as well as the political support they have offered to assure Albania's approach to the European Union [EU]. President Berisha told State Secretary [at the Ministry for Economic Cooperation] Haertl.

Albanians assess your visit as one made by a precious friend who is close to them at a difficult time, when they are engaged in a process of reforms and at a time when difficulties created by regional conflicts and nationalist attitudes in the region have been added to internal problems.

You are from a friendly country that supports Albania and you have come at a time when our EU aid has been blocked by Greece. We would have liked the other EU countries to respond to the blockade by increasing their cooperation and solidarity with Albania. At the same time, we ask them to try to put an end to this blockade and not allow that the benevolent aid of the European taxpayers be blocked by a state in order to achieve its destabilizing and nationalist aims.

I am deeply grateful for the additional aid that Germany has granted to Albania in these difficult times. We would also welcome such acts from other EU countries. We have insisted and will continue to do so in order to resolve our disagreements with Greece through dialogue. However, the setting of conditions by Greece is an unacceptable intervention in the internal affairs of the Albanian justice and state, something that directly attacks the independence of courts and the core of the new Albanian democracy.

Your visit has provided a special impetus to the very good economic and political cooperation between our two countries. We particularly welcome the attention that you have given to the problems of the water supply system. I would also like to take this opportunity to ask for your support in encouraging German investors to come to Albania as another effective way of cooperation.

For his part, Mr. Haertl said that he was astonished by the country's achievements and stated that Albania is progressing on a leading road in implementing the reforms. I would also like to confirm, he said, the overall support that the German Government and people have decided to give to Albania. My visit here is an expression of the desire and will to implement our unlimited cooperation. Alongside the projects to be implemented, there exist possibilities for new projects in important sectors such as telecommunications, highways, etc.

Opinions were later exchanged on the regional situation. Mr. Haertl said that he fully agreed with the analysis that President Berisha had made regarding many regional issues.

President Berisha asked Mr. Haertl to convey the gratitude of the Albanian people and his warmest thanks and greetings to Chancellor Kohl, Foreign Minister Kinkel, and Economic Cooperation Minister Spranger.

Albanian-EU Agreement on Durres-Kapshtice Corridor

AU0710195524 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1330 GMT 7 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The EC has granted 20 million ECU to rebuild Albania's infrastructure. The Ministry of Construction, Housing, and Area Planning and the EC signed an agreement today for the construction of the Durres-Kapshtice corridor link. For details, over to our correspondent:

[Correspondent] Last year, the EC donated to Albania assistance worth 20 million ECU, approximately \$25 million. It will be used to implement projects to construct the Durres-Kapshtice link, which will have four road sections: Durres-Rrogozhine, Rrogozhine-Elbasan, Pogradec-Kapshtice, and Kakavije-Gjirokaster.

Mr. Elio Germano, the EC ambassador, explains:

[Begin Germano recording, in English fading into Albanian translation] It is evident that the economic development of a country goes beyond national limits. At the European Parliament's initiative, the European Union has provided the financial means to implement projects that aim to develop areas bordering the EC countries. The program, which is drafted in agreement with Albania, Greece, and the EC, determines the development of infrastructure, putting the stress on road axes east-west and north-south. In 1994, priority has been given to the Durres-Rrogozhine and Pogradec-Kapshtice links, and also to Gjirokaster-Kakavije. [end recording]

[Correspondent] For the Albanian side, Construction Minister Ilir Manushi states:

[Begin Manushi recording] The cross-border program connecting EC member countries with those countries that are not EC members, such as Albania with EC countries Italy and Greece, has to do with improving the infrastructure situation and is very important. We hope that the program will progress further and the projects will soon start to be implemented. [end recording]

[Correspondent] According to Mr. Germano, the program will also continue to be implemented in 1995, including marine border countries such as Italy. In fact, the project is scheduled to continue till 1999 and is intended to be implemented through foreign firms or joint ventures with the Albanian side.

Zhelev Plans To Dissolve National Assembly 17 Oct

AU1010170194 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 10 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] In a statement to the national media carried by the Khorizont Program of Bulgarian National Radio, President Zhelev said it was his impression that during the last few days all the political forces have declared their desire and readiness to hold early parliamentary elections. The parliament will have to decide whether we are to have a new government or early elections, the president said. If the Ludzhev cabinet is not elected, President Zhelev said, by the end of this week at the latest the National Assembly will have to provide the money for the elections and pass the necessary amendments to the Electoral Act that will guarantee honest and democratic elections. In this situation, on 17 October 1994 President Zhelev will issue a decree dissolving the 36th ordinary National Assembly.

Proposes Ludzhev for PM

AU1010174194 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 10 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Today President Zhelev issued Decree No. 207, under which he proposed to the 36th National Assembly that it should elect Dimitur Ludzhev as prime minister [PM] of the Republic of Bulgaria. At a meeting with journalists, the head of state expressed the hope that the National Assembly issue its verdict on the proposed government by Thursday, 13 October. President Zhelev made no comment on any of the names included in Dimitur Ludzhev's proposed cabinet, but assessed the proposed government program as a good one.

Following his meeting with the prime minister candidate, the head of state made the following statement for the national media:

[Begin Zhelev recording] In accordance with the Constitution, the prime minister candidate submitted his proposals for the membership of the Council of Ministers. This provided me with grounds to propose to the National Assembly that it should elect Dimitur Ludzhev as prime minister.

During the last few days, all the political forces have declared their desire and readiness for early parliamentary elections. Whether we will have a new government or early elections is a matter for parliament to decide. In the event of it choosing the second course, by the end of this week at the latest, the National Assembly will have to provide the money for the elections and pass the necessary amendments to the Electoral Law to guarantee the holding of honest and democratic elections.

If everyone really wants Bulgaria to have early elections before the end of this year and the Constitution to be followed, this week must be the last working one for the

current parliament. If this is so, on 17 October 1994 I will issue a decree dissolving the 36th ordinary National Assembly. [end recording]

'Malfunction' Halts Kozloduy Reactor; No 'Danger'

AU1010114694 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 6 Oct 94 p 1

[Report by Lyubomir Yordanov: "Malfunction Shuts Down Kozloduy's Fifth Reactor"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The fifth reactor of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant was switched off on the night of 4-5 October because of a malfunction, sources at the plant reported. The 1,000-megawatt reactor had been restarted only last Friday [30 September] following repairs that lasted five months and a thorough inspection by the experts. Five days after the reactor was restarted, however, a steam leak was discovered in the reactor's machine hall, and the reactor was shut down. There is no radiation danger, because the malfunction is not in the nuclear installation, experts said. The repair is expected to last two days and will be completed 9 October, when the fifth reactor will be restarted at 80 percent of its capacity.

This report has not been confirmed by the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant official spokesmen, because DEMOKRATSIYA reporters could not locate any of them on the evening of 5 October.

More on Kozloduy Status

AU1010114794 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 5 Oct 94 p 6

[TRUD report: "Five of Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant's Six Reactors Are Operating"]

[FBIS Translated Text] BTA reports that the Kozloduy Nuclear Plant reactors no. 4 and no. 5 have been restarted following continuous repair. The Committee on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Power allowed the reactors to be restarted and connected to the country's grid after the second inspection, when the experts were convinced that the repair had been completed in accordance with requirements and that the safe operation of the reactors was ensured. On 4 October reactor no. 4 operated at 35 percent of its capacity, and reactor no. 5—at 50 percent. The capacity of the two reactors will gradually be increased in the next few days, sources at Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant said. Reactors no. 1 and no. 2 are operating at nominal capacity, and reactor no. 6—at 50 percent. Repairs of reactor no. 3 in accordance with the program to increase its nuclear and exploitation safety continues. The five functioning reactors are supplying the country with 200 megawatts [figure as received] of electricity.

Berov Advises Assembly of Need To Update Budget

AU0710133094 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 7 Oct 94

[Report by Antoaneta Puncheva

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[FBIS Translated Text] This morning the National Assembly heard a brief report by outgoing Prime Minister Lyuben Berov on the fulfillment of the state budget to date. On the revenue side, 89 percent of the budget has been fulfilled, while the expenditure side has been 85 percent fulfilled. As compared with the planned deficit of 33 billion leva, the deficit at the moment amounts to 27 billion leva, that is, it is still within the projected figure. However, the troubles will start as of now, the prime minister pointed out. As a result of increases in the interest payable on the domestic and foreign debts, the state will have to pay about 30 billion leva more under this heading. The Army is urgently awaiting 3 billion leva, the Interior Ministry wants 1 billion, and the pensions fund at least 3 billion. The holding of elections before the year's end will cost 1.2 billion leva. Prof. Berov is hoping to receive a loan to finance the elections from the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB), but this loan will have to be repaid out of the 1995 budget. The issue of the loan cannot be decided without the participation of the BNB governor and the finance minister, who are out of the country at the moment.

In the heated debate that followed, economists from the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) pointed out that the budget will be exceeded because of social welfare provisions and the payment of interest on the foreign debt. They noted that inflation is running at a higher rate than expected and that the pensions and incomes that people receive from the budget-spending ministries have not been updated. We face a complex situation, one speaker said from the benches. If the new cabinet fails to gather the required number of votes on 12 October, the president will have to dissolve the National Assembly, in which case we will not have any institution with the

powers to update the budget. Furthermore, it was pointed out that the government cannot ask for money to finance the elections until the constitutional procedure for forming a new cabinet has been concluded.

According to National Assembly Chairman Aleksandur Yordanov, this is a legal vacuum. He said that if the cabinet is not elected, parliament will have to function for a further two weeks, to update the budget, provide money for the elections, and, possibly, pass amendments to the Electoral Act. These issues will be discussed at the meeting that the National Assembly chairman has with President Zhelev early this afternoon.

'Patriotic Unity of Action' Declaration Signed

AU0710171594 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 7 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] On 7 October in Sofia six [figure as heard] political formations—the Bulgarian Liberals Party, the Fatherland Labor Party, the Volya (Will) Movement, and the Union for the Fatherland—signed a declaration on patriotic unity of action and cooperation. After signing the document the leaders of the six organizations pointed out that in uniting their efforts they are solely led by the urge to save Bulgaria's national cause.

According to them, what the country needs now is new elections through which the people, as the country's supreme sovereign, will elect an active parliament capable of forming a strong government.

The declaration points out that the achievement of these goals is possible only by creating a patriotic union for common actions, and joint participation in the elections.

Ex-Foreign Minister Views Slovak Election

AU0710200794 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in
Czech 4 Oct 94 p 12

[Commentary by Jiri Dienstbier, chairman of the Free Democrats and former Czechoslovak minister of foreign affairs: "Slovak Choice and Czech Interests"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The results of the Slovak parliamentary election has aroused consternation among some Czech observers, while others are maliciously satisfied that we have rid ourselves of "those Slovaks." Those who significantly contributed to the division of Czechoslovakia can easily succumb to a peculiar self-satisfaction. It is as though the election results vindicated in retrospect and once again a political act that still conceals many riddles and over which we may still feel dizzy.

We have plenty of time to be worried. First, it is still not clear what government will be formed. Not even Meciar's possible third coming to power will necessarily mean the fulfillment of the gloomy prognoses. Even he still has the chance to lead Slovakia in such a way that it might integrate into advanced Europe.

The Slovak economic potential is not as bad as has become a habit to think. At any rate, it is closer to the level of the other Visegrad countries, or Slovenia, than to the situation farther east. Despite all of the dramatic developments on the political scene, the fundamental political rules have thus far been respected. Every reasonable Slovak politician knows that transgression of those rules would mean national suicide. It would mean the loss of any prospect of becoming integrated into the European economic and security structures. But, even if Vladimir Meciar is prepared, on the basis of this realization, to implement a consistent democratic and transformation policy, and if he manages to form a government with a solid majority that would ensure stability for a longer period of time, Slovakia's situation will still not be easy.

First, there are the substantive problems of the Slovak economy. It is true that everyone has some problems. Unfortunately, however, on the international scene, there is a certain distrust of Slovakia's ability to carry out transformation and of Meciar in general. It is pointless to debate whether this distrust is justified. It simply exists, which often has a greater impact in politics and in economic and financial relations than bare facts. They say that money is the greatest coward. It does not like to go where there is no absolute certainty that it will come back. Moreover, after the division of Czechoslovakia, Slovakia is often left off lists of possible candidates for membership in the European Union and NATO. Even quite recently, an important European politician spoke in private of three countries. It was only when I asked whether he really meant three countries that he replied, with some hesitation, that there was Slovakia, too,

because its absence would have serious consequences for the whole of Central Europe and, consequently, for Europe as a whole.

The danger of populism lies, among other things, in the fact that, today, it is difficult for it to choose a subject other than nationalism, all the more so because Meciar's and Luptak's unfounded promises of quick prosperity, employment, and a higher standard of living for everyone will be difficult to fulfill. The success of the Slovak National Party is a warning signal, particularly if it remains a prisoner of the intolerance represented by Zilina Mayor Slota. Even today, the Hungarian minority has no choice other than to establish a national coalition that brings together thinking Hungarians with Hungarians of Slota's ilk.

It is ominous that Hungarians with a civic orientation did not find a coalition partner among the Slovak parties, which were obviously afraid that such an alliance would lose them votes.

We will have to wait for an overall evaluation until a Slovak government is formed and we know on what principles it is based. If, however, some Czech politicians are expressing joy that the Slovak choice is being implemented in another, foreign country, this proves that they do not understand the Czech situation in Europe. A stable political scene in Slovakia is one of the foremost Czech interests. The illusions indulged in by some of our officials that the world's admiration for the wonderful Czechs will be enough for us, and only us, to quickly become part of the world to which we have always belonged in history are dangerous. In the debates on the integration of other countries into the European Union and NATO, a key role will be played by stability and a peaceful and positive development in the entire Central European region. Any tension could therefore also damage our chances.

Comment: Government 'Impossible' Without Meciar

AU0/10161494 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in
Czech 4 Oct 94 p 12

[Commentary by Jiri Leschtina: "Sound Currency Called Meciar"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vaclav Klaus reached the very limit of the diplomatic principle of not interfering, when, as the results of the Slovak elections were announced, he stated that the strongest party—that is, Meciar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]—should form the government in Bratislava. At the same time, however, the prime minister only articulated an inexorable truth, which the Prague diplomacy must take as solid currency at its face value: It is impossible to govern in Slovakia today without the political diehard Meciar.

The landslide HZDS electoral victory proves a lack of foresight on the part of some of our politicians, who appealed to the prime minister after Meciar's fall to

support Moravcik's "summer" cabinet by some ostentatious gestures. Meciar's temporary conquerors eventually proved themselves to be unprepared as politicians for any fundamental agreement with the Czech Republic. At home, they were not even able to bring privatization to a point of no return or take any other step that would benefit the transformation of Slovakia and secure their political positions at the same time.

No doubt, Meciar is an unrestrained demagogue who managed, just hours before his second fall, to declare that the former Czechoslovak Army was preparing an attack on Slovakia. On the other hand, it was impossible not to notice that the HZDS Slovakia leader kept the anti-Czech card up his sleeve during the election campaign.

No doubt, Meciar's usual weapons in the domestic arena are lies, blackmail, and vicious intimidation. On the other hand, we still have vivid memories of Meciar's painstaking efforts, during the partition of the state, to keep all of the agreements with Vaclav Klaus, who is the only person of the Czech set he, to a certain degree, respects.

Even after this election, a stable Slovak government, for which our politicians have been calling so entreatingly, will remain an unattainable dream. It is a bitter paradox that, even in this clouded situation, a strong Meciar at the head of the cabinet would be a more predictable partner than the colorless coalition of his shaky adversaries.

Uranium Mining Resumes After 3-Month Suspension

AU0810195494 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 4 Oct 94 p 2

[Article by "sa": "Mining in Uranium Mines Resumed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ceska Lipa—All 2,500 employees of the Chemicka Tezba [Chemical Extraction] plant at Straz pod Ralskem and the GEAM plant at Dolni Rozinka in the Czech-Moravian Highlands reported for work yesterday morning. The forced three-month suspension of work in the uranium mining and processing operations of the DIAMO state enterprise [of which Chemicka Tezba and GEAM are part] thus came to an end. This was confirmed to HOSPODARSKE NOVINY by Jan Kafka, head of the DIAMO director general's office.

The suspension of work for one-quarter of a year was caused by unclear supplier-user relations between DIAMO and the CEZ [Czech Power-Generating Works] shareholding company. This year DIAMO counted, for example, on delivering the first insertion [vsadka] of uranium concentrate for the Temelin nuclear power station. This order has been shelved, however. This is why the management of the state enterprise ordered one-third of its employees to take regular annual leave, and, until the end of September, DIAMO was paying

them 60 percent of their average wages. NEA, the international organization monitoring uranium mining, estimates that 500 metric tons of uranium will be extracted in the Czech Republic this year. This is less than 20 percent of the amount extracted 10 years ago.

U.S. Citizenship Excludes Property Restitution

AU0710161194 Prague RESPEKT in Czech No 40/3, 9 Oct 94 pp 4-5

[Article by Martin Kontra: "Restitution Chess Move Ended in Stalemate"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The lawyer of the Novotny family, which emigrated to Sweden years ago, will have a lot of work soon. On 1 November, a Constitutional Court ruling will enter into force, under which the requirement of permanent residence will be deleted from the so-called restitution law. All emigres who are Czech citizens and live abroad will thus again have the opportunity to reacquire their lost property. Because of one provision in the restitution law, however, this will not be easy for many of them.

There Will Be No Amendment

As a result of emigration, the Novotny family lost a villa in Prague-Barrandov. The villa went first to the Kratky Film Prague company, and, after its privatization, it was purchased for 30 million korunas by one of the Harvard Capital and Consulting companies. If the original owners reclaim their house after 1 November, their situation will not be enviable. They can, in fact, only evict the existing owner by taking him to court. The first possibility is to try to prove that the present owner did not acquire the house in "good faith." According to lawyers, however, this procedure is doomed to failure. A second, seemingly more feasible, possibility is to become reconciled to the "privatization" of one's property and claim compensation for damages from the state, or, more precisely, from the Finance Ministry. Even in this case, however, the Novotny family will first have to obtain a court decision: The original legal deadline for submitting an application for financial compensation expired a long time ago (April 1992), and, following a Constitutional Court decision, compensation can be claimed only on the basis of a court decision.

Of course, the easiest way would be to appropriately amend this provision of the law. This, however, would have to be done by parliament. As of the end of September—that is, roughly 30 days before the deadline expires—it is certain that such an amendment will not be passed: Work on it has not even started. According to Government Spokeswoman Klara Pospisilova, no signals are to be heard in the Government Office that would indicate any activity in this direction. Even though Deputy Justice Minister Cyril Svoboda, LL.D., does not deny the danger of nonsensical and a priori obvious court cases, he has reportedly received no instructions from his chief to undertake anything in this regard.

Justice Minister Jiri Novak (Civic Democratic Party) is terse: "This is not our business. No such demand has been raised at government meetings." The hope that the amendment might be proposed by deputies is also futile. Restitutions are too hot a topic, and, according to Marek Benda (Christian Democratic Party), a member of the Constitutional and Legal Affairs Committee, "Every attempt to adopt the amendment would lead to attempts to de facto overturn the Constitutional Court verdict."

Tens of Thousands or Only Thousands?

What will happen after 1 November, then? According to statisticians, some 400,000 people left the Czech Republic during the communist rule. No responsible official dares estimate how many of them will reclaim their property and what part of this property has already been privatized. Dr. Jaroslav Anđel, chairman of the Association of Czechoslovak Political Prisoners in Exile, estimates the number of emigres who will reclaim their property at about 10,000. However, the estimate by Deputy Marek Benda, who assumes that "1,000 to 2,000 people, at most, will be involved," seems to be more realistic. The Finance Ministry, which will provide the compensation—10,000 Czech korunas in cash and the

rest in shares of the Restitution Investment Fund—has no "expert estimate," according to its spokeswoman, but it is supposedly "prepared for a flood of applications."

People who had left for the United States constitute a special category among emigres. As a consequence of a 66-year-old treaty concluded between the foreign ministers of the United States and the then Czechoslovakia, all those who have acquired U.S. citizenship automatically lost their Czech citizenship. Therefore, most of our U.S. compatriots do not have even the theoretical chance to get their property back after 1 November. They can deal with the problem in only two ways. The first is to renounce U.S. citizenship and regain Czech citizenship. This alternative is not very attractive, of course. Since the establishment of the Czech Republic, only 55 people have applied for it, and, since the Constitutional Court verdict, only three more have expressed an interest in Czech citizenship. The second possibility is that opted for by Dr. Anđel. Several weeks ago, he sent a demand to the Constitutional Court in Brno that the requirement of citizenship be deleted from the restitution law. "If the Constitutional Court does not satisfy us, we will take the case to the European Court in Strasbourg," Jaroslav Anđel says.

Economy Minister Leaves for 2-Day Visit to Iran*AU1110114794 Bratislava SME in Slovak 8 Oct 94 p 2*

[TA SR report in the "Day in Brief" column: "Magvasi to Iran"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Economy Minister Peter Magvasi departed yesterday at the head of a delegation on a two-day official visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran. A solution to settling Iran's outstanding claims against the Slovak Republic, opportunities for cooperation between enterprises, and other issues are on the agenda.

Meciar Examines Election Results, Situation*AU0710143094 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 5 Oct 94 p 4*

[Statement by Vladimir Meciar, chairman of Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, during a visit to the SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA editorial office in Bratislava on 4 October, followed by an interview with him "recorded by" correspondents Eva Zelenayova, Viera Urbanova, and Peter Strelinger: "The Current Electoral System Is Not a Guarantee of Political Stability"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Despite the announcement in our daily that Vladimir Meciar, chairman of Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], would attend a meeting with SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA editors, reporters from several editorial offices gathered in the place where the meeting was to be held. They reacted indignantly to the pronouncement that this was an interview for our daily; however, we were pleased by the interest shown by them, despite the fact that they do not normally present V. Meciar in a good light. Vladimir Meciar thanked the editors of SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA, who were the only ones in Slovakia to comment realistically on events in the Republic and whose views were confirmed by the recent election.

It Is Important That There Was an Election

V. Meciar also spoke about the election: In the election, we managed to clear up our situation from the 1992 election. The election was important from several points of view. First, because it was held at all. We know that the strategy banked on was the complete destruction of the HZDS and the Slovak National Party [SNS] as effective entities in parliament, with the proviso that a different mode of government and a different model for the structure of the central bodies were to be introduced. Because we were unable to withstand this pressure, we called for an early election. That was the first victory because the other parties did not want an election. J. Moravcik has also admitted this.

Unfortunately, the very procedure for the course of the election was inconsistent because not only was the law violated during the election campaign, but also, for example, the registers of voters were imprecise, the records were incorrect, there were breaches of discipline

at polling stations, and a container [kazeta] was lost. So, we believe that up to 3 percent of citizens were, perhaps, excluded from the election by these manipulations. Furthermore, we still consider the participation of the Democratic Union [DU] in the election to be illegitimate. We intend to ask the Constitutional Court to investigate whether it had any right to take part in the election. We will dispatch our request before the end of the week. We proceed from the premise that DU did not furnish proof that it gathered 10,000 valid signatures or that the people who signed these petition sheets intended to support DU in the election because sometimes they submitted these sheets as registers or other documents with a different name. Understandably, we will consider DU to be a legitimate partner until the Constitutional Court hands down its decision.

The Citizens Are Not Indifferent

The election results have disclosed some negative and positive things. The high number of citizens who took part in the election is one of the positive things. This shows that they are not indifferent to what is going on around them. Furthermore, they expressed themselves unequivocally in favor of the existence of the Slovak Republic. As far as the Republic's orientation in the foreign policy sphere is concerned, it has emerged that there is no disparate policy among the political parties with regard to the Western European Union, Western European integration, and NATO. At the same time, however, cooperation in an eastward direction is not being ruled out, either. With regard to the situation in society, the election demonstrated that, in the economic sphere, citizens acknowledge the orientation toward domestic resources and not toward foreign ones as the bedrock for their lives. With regard to the political structure, it has been shown that, while Western states have emphasized a certain model that would merely be analogous with theirs—that is, the traditional left and right wings only—in the postcommunist countries, the center plays a dominant role and will continue to play one for a long time, obviously until society's social structures acquire a particular profile. It has become apparent that the equivalent to the Polish and Hungarian models has been rejected because the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] has emerged from this election as a severely damaged party, a party that suffered the most overwhelming defeat. This is the party that, at the beginning of the year, still had ambitions of winning this election by a wide margin. The election was also significant in that it confirmed the Slovak Republic's fundamental national-democratic development because the HZDS and the SNS achieved a clear victory in this regard.

The System Is Still Polarized

Of course, the election also brought some mixed feelings. For example, the Slovak Republic is still polarized, and whether this polarization will lead to further complications in stabilizing the political system has not been

addressed. If the HZDS and the SNS together have 70 seats and the current governing coalition (which is just as damaged as the SDL) is ranged against them, the position of the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS] and the Hungarian Coalition will be crucial. Furthermore, Slovakia's polarization verifies that there are two ambiguously defined entities in parliament: the ZRS and DU. The ZRS is more or less built on a social foundation and, at the moment, wants to remain in opposition to everyone. Then there is DU, which goes to show that almost 10 percent of Slovaks are willing to accept betrayal and corruption. This is also a fact. It has also become apparent that part of the Hungarian population has not adopted a clear profile and that it orients itself exclusively on the grounds of nationalist interest. It forms the voters' base for the Hungarian parties, and, although it does not agree inwardly with irredentism, it has actually confirmed it. It is surprising to us that a large number of Slovaks living in the ethnically mixed areas are either indifferent to this or have come to terms with it.

An Incompetent Coalition

The election also provided a reaction to the model of broad coalition government. It has shown itself to be incompetent. If the experiment initiated by President Michal Kovac in March had been feasible, the governing parties would have emerged victorious from the election. But, if we take into consideration how many votes all of the parties won together, we will discover that this is quite a profound crisis. The 1994 election also pointed out the nonviability of the proportional representation system. This has exhausted itself internally, despite the fact that there is a 5-percent safeguard clause. In spite of this, 16 political entities have won seats in parliament, and this means that there are possibilities for political instability. Obviously, it will be necessary to transfer to either a majority system or a combined one—that is, a majority or a proportional one. Otherwise, there will not be the necessary stability in parliament. This parliament also has the prospect of permanent change encoded in it. Let us take a closer look. The HZDS has brought the Farmers' Party into parliament, the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] has brought the Permanent Conference of the Civic Institute, the SDL has four factions—the social democrats, the greens, and the farmers' movement—and the Hungarian parties are a foursome, although they declare officially that they are only a threesome. So, with the inclusion of the unprofiled ZRS and DU, which is looking for, but lacks, a membership base and an organizational structure, we can conjecture that it will be necessary to stabilize parliament and that it will be very problematic. We also have to take other factors into consideration. For instance, we know that the president is interested in ensuring that the current governing coalition carry on. Therefore, he did not address the election winner.

A Coalition—But a Conditional One?

Incidentally, all of the political entities have stated that they want a coalition, but the conditions they have set in fact mean that they do not want one. Such entities create policy-related instability in the government because, for example, the programs of the KDH and the SDL are incompatible. They pointlessly assert otherwise. If the program of one of them begins to be implemented, the other has to make concessions in its program. The SDL paid the price for this when, in essence, the KDH's program started to be implemented. Therefore, the decision on government stability is incredibly complicated and comes up against two main tendencies. In the economic sphere, development requires stability in the most senior posts. It is possible to begin economic growth next year. However, in the social sphere, 1995 will be a year of shocks and 1996 a year of stabilization. What does this mean? So that these elections went with a bang, the provisional government concealed facts about the formulation of the 1995 budget from the public—that the state budget deficit amounts to 54 billion [currency not specified] and that everything promised by the education and health ministers, Prime Minister Moravcik, Deputy Prime Minister Kovac, and others, at preelection meetings cannot be fulfilled in 1994. The 1994 election campaign was the most expensive in history because, on account of it, salaries for the state administration were adjusted and certain interventions were made on behalf of education and health care, but no systemic changes were made. This was charitable largess by the state, handing out as much as possible before the election, regardless of the state budget deficit after it. The discrepancies that arise in compiling the budget for next year will stem from this. We can expect a year of social tension.

Future development presents several unknowns. It involves not just how the coalition is formed in accordance with the number of mandates in parliament, but also how compatibility in the electoral base develops. This situation is very difficult for us; we are searching for an answer. So far, we have not found one, and, therefore, are also discreet and do not wish to comment.

[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA] What do you think of the reaction by Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus to the Slovak election results?

[Meciar] Vaclav Klaus is a democrat. He upholds the democratic principle. If I were to violate democratic principles, he would be just as opposed to me as he is to those who have violated them. Klaus does not want an analogous situation to unfold on the Czech political scene.

[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA] Why did no trade union functionaries figure on the HZDS's slate?

[Meciar] A very interesting situation has developed within the trade unions. Some functionaries told us that

they wanted to campaign for the HZDS, but we did not accept their offers. The other political entities used their personal contacts, which, for example, Roman Kovac or the SDL functionaries had. At the same time, they did not give the trade unionists a good place on the slate, so they had no chance of getting into parliament. If we had proceeded in the same way, the trade union center would have disintegrated within three months. It is questionable whether it is worth breaking up the unions for a couple of thousand contentious votes. In my opinion, connections between trade unions and parties are unfortunate. Employers throughout the world have a single party that lobbies for them. If they are on several slates, it could happen that they would provoke the government at all costs simply because they represent a party that is not currently in power. I was surprised by the stance adopted by the trade unions. If, under my government, they made a lot of noise and got good conditions in the agreement for 1994, they did not utter one word when the Moravcik government did not invite them to the negotiations on the new General Agreement. Instead of the trade unions' center standing up for the interests of the people, the bosses withdrew from their demands for political reasons.

[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA] In view of the election results, a great deal will depend on the stance of the Association of Workers of Slovakia. What is the HZDS willing to offer the Luptakites in return for possible support?

[Meciar] Talks are under way. Our programs are the closest to each other. The HZDS is closer to the ZRS than the SDL. The HZDS's social spirit is more sincere and more meaningful than that of the Weissites. Peter Weiss is also attempting to woo the workers so he can cover up his electoral failure. Jozef Moravcik is also negotiating with the ZRS—he is offering tacit support. We expect that the president will also try to get them on the side of our opposition.

[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA] Changing the electoral system to a majority one will take a long time. In your opinion, how could conditions in parliament be stabilized for the mediate future?

[Meciar] A law on a majority system may have a motivating effect on political parties; small parties will realize that they have no chance. Two or three parties will get into parliament. This system also operates preventively. A draft law has been prepared according to which, with proportional representation, a mandate would belong to a party. A deputy is the executor of the mandate, not its owner. This proposal could be passed because other political entities are also afraid of breaking up. No one has any guarantee of internal party stability. A new parliamentary agenda could also stabilize the situation.

[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA] A minority government will not solve the domestic political crisis in Slovakia. Can you envisage a majority government?

[Meciar] This is a question of the price it is necessary to pay. We are willing to reach agreement with everyone, but this must be a bilateral compromise and agreement. There must be a guarantee that it will last for some time. An HZDS-led government that could collapse for a third time, if there is no expectation that the government will hold together, is not an attractive prospect. We want stable partners and a stable agreement. We may have responsibility, but we do not have enough mandates to enforce responsibility. The situation would be different if the Constitutional Court were to recognize that the DU is in parliament illegally. Then we would have a simple majority. However, we also envisage a majority government.

[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA] How can Slovakia's property be protected so that it is not sold off?

[Meciar] You have referred to this in your articles in SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA, by the way. The provisional government held a large clearance sale. If you consider who is interested in privatizing the gas enterprises and the chemical and power-generating industries, you will reach an answer: Prevent those who do not take Slovakia's interests into consideration from governing. The policy is formulated as the policy of manipulating people who let themselves be manipulated. However, it is impossible to manipulate me through money. If I were a little less Slovak, everyone would certainly commend me.

[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA] The Hungarian deputies in the Slovak parliament are still playing the same tune, however. We will agree; just give us autonomy.

[Meciar] The Hungarian deputies obviously are going to continue to make this demand. They are putting it to those who may accept it. They know that neither the HZDS nor the SNS will accept it. Autonomy as they express it not only refers to the educational and cultural spheres, but is also a territorial demand. That is, education and culture cannot be administered without territory. This is nonsense. It is not done that way. The struggle over the signpost law was a struggle over demarcating borders. Autonomy is the biggest evil for all those who live there [in the ethnically mixed regions]. A conflict of interest between the ethnic groups or by another conflict could be next. For God's sake, no one wants that!

[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA] Assuming that you form the government, what future do you see for the customs union?

[Meciar] The customs union should be maintained. It is a form of cooperation for both sides that is economically advantageous. A special regime has to be introduced in trade in foodstuffs, however, like the one that operates among the countries of the European Union.

Prime Minister Defends President's Conduct

LD0710164194 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 7 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] There are varied opinions regarding the 4 October meeting between the president of the Republic and representatives of parliamentary parties and movements and their coalition partners. That is why Michal Tvarozek [Radiozurnal editor in chief] opened the interview with Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik and put precisely this question to him.

[Begin recording] [Tvarozek] The week started with consultations between representatives of parliamentary parties and movements that the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] described as being in their own way unlawful because the president should not be involved in politics. You are a lawyer, and you said what you think about it. Despite this, where do you draw the line between political involvement and responsibility for future developments?

[Moravcik] [Passage omitted] The HZDS argues that the constitution does not provide for consultations between the president and political entities. This means that, in line with the Constitution, the president is able to execute his powers only in the manner outlined by the law. This is quite an absurd argument because political and constitutional life places a lot of emphasis on tradition. And the tradition is that the president should ask the party that won the election to form a government. [passage omitted]

The tradition is to conduct consultations with political parties. No one can ban the president from doing this. It would be laughable if something of this kind happened in a country with democratic traditions. [passage omitted] [end recording]

STV Council Says STV Broke Electoral Law

AU0710200094 Bratislava SME in Slovak 5 Oct 94 p 2

[Statement issued by the Slovak Television Council following extraordinary session in Bratislava on 4 October: "Television Is Responsible for Violating the Law"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Despite the recommendation by the Slovak Television [STV] Council, which came out of its extraordinary session on 21 September 1994, the STV management did not take effective measures to guarantee the objectivity of broadcasting and has not manifested any legal and moral responsibility for the violation of the Law on Elections to the National Council of the Slovak Republic, the Law on Slovak Television, and the Law on Radio and Television Broadcasting. In spite of the recommendation by the STV Council, violation of these laws, on the contrary, almost became the norm in the second half of September and reached its peak immediately before the election and on their first day.

The STV Council emphasizes that the STV management violated the Law on Elections to the National Council and its own directive of 5 August on broadcasting the election campaign by making it possible for senior officials from the political parties to appear on STV when the election campaign had come to an end.

During the election campaign, Slovak Television did not provide equal access to public-legal television for all of the parties' campaigning, and, in its evening news program about the course of the first day of the parliamentary election, it put itself indirectly at the service of one political entity and thus abused its mission as a public-legal institution.

The STV Council once again asks the STV management to accept the responsibility for violating the laws and STV's internal norms, norms that safeguard the objectivity and independence of public-legal television.

ASV Calls For Referendum on President

AU0810201694 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA
in Slovak 6 Oct 94 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Referendum on President"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Association of Slovak Soldiers (ASV) congratulates all political entities on their victory in the election. [sentence as published] It expects from the winners that, after the election, more than ever before, they will feel responsible for the Slovak nation, whose members had given them their mandate at the ballot boxes. The ASV, aware of its share of responsibility for the fate of Slovak soldiers, is of the opinion that contribution to enhancing Slovakia's political stability would be made by the calling of a referendum by the head of state on the citizens' confidence, or no-confidence, in the president of the Slovak Republic, rather than by various conjectures and words of political representatives.

HZDS Deputy Anticipates SDL Coalition

AU0810195194 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 6 Oct 94
pp 1-2

[Article by Pavol Vitko: "They Will Not Accept a Government Without Guarantees"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—"The primary precondition of government formation and one of the main issues of the coalition talks will be the creation of a system of guarantees for the new government," Sergej Kozlik, deputy chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], told us yesterday at a meeting with representatives of some mass media. He added that, in a period of economic transformation, in particular, the formation of a government without sufficient guarantees would be tantamount to political suicide.

Kozlik emphasized that guarantees given to the government with regard to the president are of primary importance. "We remember what he caused before. It is thus

not surprising that we follow with certain distrust his attempt to assume some kind of patronage over the coalition talks right at their beginning." In the end, he admitted, however, that, if the talks did not head toward results and if the political scene became too volatile, the president could come out with some kind of bipartisan "calming moment." According to Kozlik, however, this is not necessary at this stage. At any rate, the HZDS will only accept what emerges from the coalition talks. Regarding yesterday's walkout by HZDS Secretary Ivan Lexa and HZDS Deputy Chairwoman Olga Keltošova from a meeting with the president of the Slovak Republic, Kozlik said that this was a mere episode. It did have a dramatic thrust at that moment, but, one week from now, we will supposedly view it differently. The HZDS deputy chairman considers Lexa's statement that the president should step down to be only one of the political options concerning the head of state. He noted that there also exist other possible alternatives, such as amending the duration of his term of office or setting limits [ramcovanie] to his appearances on the political scene.

The deputy chairman described conjectures about a certain part of the HZDS, including Vladimir Meciar, preferring to stay in opposition as unnecessary noise. He conceded that differences of opinion exist within the movement, but, in view of the results of the early election, the HZDS considers it its duty to form the government. It should be a coalition government, and its prime minister should be Vladimir Meciar. The HZDS has already established four contact groups that have started the first round of coalition talks. Kozlik is convinced that Lexa's statements addressed to the president have not closed the doors for the HZDS to talks with either the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] or the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL]. Regarding a possible agreement with the SDL, he signaled, however: "While I believe that 90 percent of the SDL members' base is inclined toward a coalition agreement with us, the reactions from a part of the leadership of this party do not bear this out. Should a change in the SDL leadership occur, the new leaders might show a real and pragmatic interest in a coalition agreement. The representation of this party in the Slovak parliament in terms of deputies need not, however, conform with this interest."

Existence of 'Two Streams' in HZDS Denied

AU1110093694 Bratislava SME in Slovak 6 Oct 94 p 2

[TA SR report: "I. Gasparovic: Television Only Did What It Had To Do"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—"I do not mean to become Slovak prime minister. My decision is almost definite. I am a member of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], and its leadership and our members must make this decision." This was how National Council of the Slovak Republic [NR SR] Chairman Ivan Gasparovic replied to a question on

whether he would, if such is the case, accept the Slovak president's authorization to form a government. He does not believe that the HZDS is composed of two streams. "The HZDS has its own program, and it is our duty to defend it." in connection with the 4 October consultative meeting involving representatives of the parliamentary parties and the president, Gasparovic said that M. Kovac "brought about" the situation himself because "his recent statements have not been well-considered." HZDS voters "consider the Slovak president to be a sore point, someone who is polarizing our political society. What happened yesterday came as a result of demands made by the voters."

In reply to a question on the objectivity of television news coverage during the election, the NR SR chairman said that "television did not do anything other than what it should have. It found out that the election law was being violated in a specific place at a specific time, and, therefore, I consider the evening news report to be a normal function of television news coverage," said Gasparovic.

SNS Chairman Offers To Resign Over Election

AU1010202494 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 7 Oct 94 p 2

[TA SR report: "Slota Has Offered His Resignation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Slovak National Party [SNS] Chairman Jan Slota does not consider the results achieved by his party in the parliamentary election to be a failure. The SNS won more votes per se than the Party of the Democratic Left because it went into the election alone and not in a coalition. However, because he had declared before the election that the SNS would win 10 percent of the vote, he has offered the SNS Central Council his resignation. Slota was convinced that the SNS would win at least 0.1 percent more than the Hungarian Coalition. "It is sad for this 5-million-strong nation that its only national party won just 5.4 percent of the vote, while the 570,000-strong Hungarian ethnic minority has three or four nationalist, chauvinist parties that won more than 10 percent," added Slota.

Hungarian Organization in Slovakia Airs Protests

94CH0436A Bratislava UJ SZO in Hungarian 6 Sep 94 pp 1-2

[Unattributed report on press conference held by the national executive committee of the Cultural Association of Hungarians in Slovakia: "Open Attacks and Insinuations Against the Cultural Association of Hungarians in Slovakia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At a news conference held yesterday at CSEMADOK [Cultural Association of Hungarians in Slovakia] headquarters in Pozsony [Bratislava], CSEMADOK Chairman Gyoza Bauer and Secretary General Laszlo Vegh briefed reporters in the spirit of the

resolutions that the organization's national executive committee had adopted at its meeting.

In his introduction, the secretary general outlined the topics that had been on the agenda of the national executive committee's latest meeting. First, the association's finances were discussed. Then the operations of the regional committees and professional societies were reviewed.

The phenomena that surfaced in conjunction with the "Here We Coexist" exhibition, organized by the Dunaszerdahely [Dunajska Streda] Regional Cultural Center, were analyzed in detail. Chairman Gyozo Bauer revealed that the 10.5 million korunas obtained from the state budget would not be enough to finance the association's national functions scheduled for this year. Therefore, charges made by certain Matica Slovenska leaders that CSEMADOK's subsidy from the state budget was excessive were unfounded. In conjunction with this, Gyozo Bauer said that they would like to close the whole Dunaszerdahely affair. On the basis of their talks with Matica Slovenska leaders, they were willing to participate at any time in organizing similar functions, provided the functions were organized on the basis of plans agreed upon in advance and not the way it was done in Dunaszerdahely. Admittedly, CSEMADOK had agreed in principle to the idea two months earlier but had not expected its name to simply be put on the posters, without being consulted and without its cooperation. Moreover, Matica Slovenska's Mr. Bajanik even sent the text of the speech, which Laszlo Vegh was supposed to read in Hungarian. Such conduct was nothing other than a new attempt at cultural centralization.

In addition to all of this, the national executive committee objected to several other occurrences that curtailed the culture of Slovakia's ethnic Hungarians or infringed on their right to education in their native language. It protested against the establishment of merely an institute rather than a faculty of ethnic minority cultures at Nyitra [Nitra] University. That violates the Slovak parliament's law establishing Nyitra University, and also the University Law—namely, only a faculty may issue diplomas; an institute may not. That was another attempt to make it impossible to train ethnic Hungarian teachers. The national executive committee protested against new attempts to stress the Slovak language's dominance in the cultural life of regions with ethnically mixed populations. A glaring manifestation of such attempts was that functions organized by regional cultural institutions in bilingual regions actually served to strengthen Slovak unilingualism and the dominance of Slovak culture. Against the proposal that had become known as the concept of alternative instruction, CSEMADOK was always ready to launch national protests if the ministry and the government persisted in their refusal to heed the views and reservations of the professional organization of ethnic Hungarian teachers in Slovakia. The fact that its state subsidy was not being disbursed according to schedule was causing considerable hardship in the management of CSEMADOK's finances.

After the press briefing, Gyorgy Bauer announced that the association would not be participating in the election campaign. Members could exercise their civil rights and support various political parties, but CSEMADOK as an institution, as a cultural association, was not committing itself to politics. Unlike the cultural institution [Matica Slovenska] attacking it, that institution had become a very strong player in the Slovak political arena.

Socialist Party Congress Reelects Horn Chairman*LD0810193394 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1900 GMT 8 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] Gyula Horn continues to be chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party. He was the only candidate for the post at the party's congress.

Ivan Vitanyi continues to be the chairman of the national executive as he received more votes than Gyorgy Janosi. Janos Csintalan is the new executive deputy chairman. There was another candidate for the post, in the person of Vilmos Fedor.

Horn on Modernization Plan*LD0810142394 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 8 Oct 94*

[Report by correspondents Kata Peli Nagy and Atila Kert on the HSP congress in Budapest]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Nagy] Hungarian Socialist Party [HSP] Chairman Gyula Horn is of the view that his party must make use of the unique opportunity of the HSP having gained an absolute majority in parliament in the very middle of an unfinished change of system. They will use this situation to implement a so-called modernization. This also means the creation of the conditions for establishing a bourgeois society.

In his speech, which lasted more than an hour, Horn analyzed the political processes of the past two years and spoke about his party's plans for the future. In its governing position the HSP wishes to implement the modernization program. The first draft will be made by the beginning of next year. According to Horn the following political conditions have to be met in order to implement the modernization program:

[Begin Horn recording] It is already clear that if we fail to start to draw up and implement the modernization program then this country will inevitably drop back. The fact that in May 1994 the number of the party's electors, its electoral base, grew fourfold indicates in itself that compared to 1990 the party's electoral base has significantly increased.

Cooperation with the coalition partners belongs to the political conditions. I think that it cannot be questioned that the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] is fundamentally interested and is our partner in modernization, bourgeois development. It is obvious that this coalition represents a correct agreement between different interest groups, a so-called marriage of convenience. This coalition is practically valid until the end of the election cycle.

There are, as a matter of fact, occasional hitches in cooperation with the coalition partner, but these hitches can be averted in the framework of genuine dialogue and debate.

A special feature of the cooperation is the fact that the relationship and cooperation between the ministers of the two parties are indeed harmonious, occasional hitches emerge in party relations and various other areas. I would very much like to hope that we will be able to avert them. All this can be due to the fact that coalition cooperation, too, has to be learned. We obviously do have to learn it.

I would like it very much if we could create harmonious cooperation and a relationship between the two coalition parties in issues related to modernization.

The policy and attitude of the opposition are also among the political conditions. Certain parties that were forced to opposition seem to continue today where they stopped in May 1994, and, sadly, sometimes it seems as if the former governing parties had not lived here for four years. At least that is how they are acting. [end recording]

[Nagy] The chairman reacted to opposition charges that the government was creating a coalition dictatorship. According to Horn, the opposition has been granted a more favorable situation than it would be entitled to on the basis of the election results. He mentioned as an example the distribution of seats on parliamentary committees. Objecting to the passing of the law package on local governments the opposition cannot claim that earlier the parliamentary political forces outside the coalition had a greater say.

Power relations in parliament have changed. The government does not need and it has no time for daily political bargaining.

Speaking about major economic tasks, Horn supported [Finance Minister Laszlo] Bekesi's policy aimed at creating a financial balance, but he attributed the same importance to agricultural, industrial, and infrastructural development.

[Kert] [Passage omitted] Deputy Chairman Janos Gyorgy warned that the HSP had lost some of its popularity. Not everyone took it seriously that financial problems cannot be solved overnight just because the HSP got into power. A distinction must be drawn between promises and making promises, he added. He also stressed the significance of maintaining the movement's character. [passage omitted]

Bekesi Addresses Congress*LD0910124194 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 9 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] Minister of Finance Laszlo Bekesi delivered a speech today at the Hungarian Socialist Party [HSP] congress. According to Bekesi, there is no alternative to his radical economic policy. The finance minister said regular compromises are only good for playing for time and do not serve the aim of resolving issues. Kata Peli Nagy reports:

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[Peli Nagy] Gyula Horn did not make a speech or contribute to the debate over the party statutes when the possible establishment of the post of a deputy chairman was discussed.

It is likely that the coordination mechanism between the coalition parties, characterized by Alliance of Free Democrats Chairman Ivan Petoe and HSP Deputy Chairman Imre Szekeres, will lose balance with the weakening of Imre Szekeres's position within the party. Observers say that Imre Szekeres's balancing role within the party will also lose effect.

Laszlo Bekesi asked leave to speak in today's congress debate. The gist of his speech is that the party needs to decide if it wants to preserve its popularity or to implement its program consistently. In his view it is impossible to make policies without informing the public fully about the socioeconomic situation in the country. The situation is that it is impossible for Hungary to provide for 1 million people on state monies.

Laszlo Bekesi said if the party does not follow the road which includes his economic policy then the country can only keep going for one year. If someone has a different programme which is better than this one it should be put on the table, and if necessary he would step aside.

Procedural Issues Decided

LD0810141994 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0600 GMT 8 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Hungarian Socialist Party [HSP] will not have a deputizing chairman [altalános elnökhelyettes] after all, the delegates of the fourth HSP congress decided last night. They also created rules of incompatibility. Attila Kert reports:

[Kert] According to the decision made late last night, the presidium will decide on the deputizing of the party chairman. The delegates explained the rejection of the introduction of the post of deputizing chairman by saying that it would be wrong to make the party leadership too hierarchical.

The congress also decided that, at most, one-third of the members of the National Presidium can hold a post in the government or parliament, and no holder of such posts can be an executive deputy chairman or cashier.

The delegates also tightened the conditions for becoming a party member. In the future, only members of a primary party organization can become party members, as opposed to the previous practice of just signing an entry form. It is also a significant change in the statutes that officials of county organizations and members of their leading bodies will require at least a year's HSP membership and national leaders will require at least a two-year membership.

The scope of authority of the national executive was significantly extended and that of the presidium reduced. [passage omitted]

HSP Congress Ends

LD0910183094 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 9 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The fourth congress of the Hungarian Socialist Party [HSP] has ended, but it has not been closed. The delegates will continue next year at the same venue. Attila Kert and Kata Peli Nagy report.

[Kert] In his closing speech, the party chairman found it necessary to call the delegates' attention to the fact that the HSP had won the elections. Later, he explained it by saying that he did so because several contributors painted too dark a picture of the party's situation and possibilities. Gyula Horn pointed out that the HSP leadership had fulfilled the promises it had made to the membership. It restored the party and made the left-wing a part of politics that cannot be bypassed.

[Begin Horn recording] What are we promising now? I, together with my colleagues, government, and parliamentary group members, promise to take this country into the EU [European Union]. We are working on it and will create the economic, political, cultural, educational, and all other possible conditions necessary for this.

We can be called to account in the year 2000 or after 2000 whether we have kept this promise of ours. [end recording]

[Nagy] Gyula Horn again supported Bekesi's policy for creating economic balance. He denied that the government's economic policy had become less tough as a result of agreements concluded with interest representations. However, besides implementing it consistently, the party's social plans must be met, too.

[Begin Horn recording] Laszlo Bekesi is doing what he has been authorized to do by the government. He is doing what he is expected to do, namely that the conditions of balance and stability must be created by all possible means. [end recording]

[Kert] According to the statement adopted by the congress, the greatest challenge for the party is that it cannot immediately begin to implement a welfare program in a governing position. Therefore, the document supports the continuation of open politicizing and moderate tone.

[Nagy] The fourth HSP congress has not ended with today's closing speech, because the delegates decided to continue the political debate next year. A comprehensive political program will be adopted at the next party congress due in 1996.

Leaders on Unity, Alliances

LD1010231394 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1730 GMT 10 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Are there any—and if yes, how deep are the—fault lines, that seemed to appear in the weekend congress of the Hungarian Socialist Party [HSP]? [passage omitted]

When HSP Executive Chairman Imre Szekeres was not elected to be the deputizing chairman at the weekend congress, many people started talking about a crack in the HSP. [passage omitted]

Ivan Vitanyi, chairman of the HSP National Executive, not only contended with Gyorgy Janosi. He openly professed that he would like to make the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] a natural ally. He said that—within 10 to 20 years—they should work together, not only on an ad hoc basis. [passage omitted] First, you can hear Ivan Vitanyi, who has been reelected as the chairman of the party's National Executive.

[Begin recording] [Passage omitted] [Unidentified correspondent] Let us try to define the scale of these differences. Let me ask it sharply: In a critical situation would this lead to a split within the party?

[Vitanyi] At the moment I do not see a critical situation that could lead to this. Some kind of new situation would have to evolve for this. I cannot see this. I would not like to reduce this difference either, since we are not talking about a conflict of two views, or a personal conflict. The Socialist Party consists of various people, various groups, and various trends. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] How many people support, for example, you?

[Vitanyi] I cannot tell you. There has never been a vote of this kind.

[Correspondent] On the contrary, you won against Gyorgy Janosi.

[Vitanyi] Gyorgy Janosi does not necessarily represent something else, other than me. [passage omitted] Some said that I should not be there any more, and the fact that 60 percent voted for me—and I expressed my opinion quite clearly in my address to the congress, there was no doubt about what I represent—it shows that this 60 percent is, at least, friendly toward the views I represent. [passage omitted] At the same time, naturally—and this is a very positive fact—party members do not want any kind of split to develop from this. [passage omitted]

In my view the two parties [HSP and SZDSZ] must be substantial allies in Hungary. Perhaps not everybody shares this view in the HSP. But I have been working on it, and therefore, it is not all the same to me. I hope that we are moving in this direction and, despite all disputes between the two parties and the coalition partners, things are moving in this direction, as far as I see it. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Imre Szekeres, the HSP's newly-elected deputy chairman. Are there any serious conflicts between the HSP's liberals and the pragmatists who, let us say, belong to the circles of Gyula Horn.

[Szekeres] I do not see such a conflict. The only difference is, and let us use Ivan Vitanyi's words, that he imagines an ideological alliance with the SZDSZ—which

I, personally, do not know what to do, since we are a left-wing party and the SZDSZ is a liberal party.

[Correspondent] Are you talking about only a tactical alliance?

[Szekeres] We can only talk about a political alliance and not an ideological one, since it would be a mutual renouncement of our views, and it does not make any sense at all. A political alliance, in itself, is already a rather serious matter. [passage omitted] There is a disagreement on this issue that is represented by Vitanyi and others.

[Announcer] How serious is this disagreement?

[Szekeres] Time will show. I do think that the hitherto prevailing sensible cooperation within the HSP would be broken up by a disagreement of this kind. Any kind of split within the party is out of question. [passage omitted] In my view there will be no party split of any kind. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Horn Views Need for 'Economic Rationality'

AU0710171694 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 7 Oct 94 pp 1,7

[Interview with Prime Minister Gyula Horn by Tibor Moldovanyi; place and date not given: "We Adjust to People's Tolerance Level—Gyula Horn on the MSZP Congress To Begin Today, His Party's Fault Lines, and That He Also Feels a Populist National"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Nearly 800 delegates will decide on the election of officers and amendments to the Hungarian Socialist Party's [HSP] statutes at the HSP's three-day congress opening today. Although the preparations in the past few weeks do not permit us to expect anything extraordinary—apart from the significance of the topics on the agenda—some statements indicate that clarifying debates and clashes on personnel issues can be anticipated. [passage omitted]

[Moldovanyi] Can we see the HSP's congress opening today as some kind of a milestone? Which events would you highlight in the party's five-year history?

[Horn] [Passage omitted] The HSP will hold this congress in a new situation. The left wing has never before gained an absolute majority in Hungary. We have to determine our future activities and the main directions of the HSP's development in this respect. In my political report, I mainly wish to talk about my understanding of the country's modernization and the program that we need to implement this. In my view, this is the key issue both for myself and for the congress. [passage omitted]

[Moldovanyi] What relationship do you have with Executive Deputy Chairman Imre Szekeres, the HSP parliamentary group leader? Do you have any conflicts?

[Horn] Our relationship is particularly good and constructive; we understand each other easily. Szekeres

works hard and has a sharp intellect. He also has a pragmatic way of thinking. He makes good statements, which means that he faithfully represents his views in the media. [passage omitted]

[Moldovanyi] There is special interest in the election of the deputy chairman, the executive deputy chairman, and the executive committee members. What do you expect from the election of these officers?

[Horn] It is very important to make the party even younger. On the basis of the nominations, this will be possible. [passage omitted] In addition to the HSP's victory, it is also a major achievement of the elections that the new democratic left wing—which is represented solely by the HSP in Hungary—has been given a chance to become firmly rooted in society. This is needed in the same way as the European right wing is needed, because it is only possible to represent the various interest groups in politics on the basis of the pluralism of forces. [passage omitted]

[Moldovanyi] In an interview with MAGYAR NEMZET, Executive Committee member Jozsef Geczi said that there is a fault line in the HSP between the long-term political and the technocratic way of thinking. Do you see this fault line?

[Horn] I cannot see any fault line and I would name something else as the source of the debates. The country has a great need for economic rationality to prevail in economic policy and for removing the subjective elements from economic decisions. Bad or missing decisions are causing enormous damage to the country. If something cannot be dealt with by economic rationality then politics has to take it into consideration and make the necessary steps. Fiscal-monetary viewpoints are closely related to economic rationality and, considering the country's domestic deficit and balance problems, this is justified. At the same time, we need to think in terms of the real sphere, for example employment. In my view, the restoration of the balance is a means rather than an end. For me, it is unacceptable for someone to try to experiment at society's expense. We have to adjust to people's tolerance levels and needs. It is a major question how the burdens can be more justly distributed. We cannot make a step forward without hurting the interests of some group. The differences between economic and political rationalities have to be reduced in the short term. In this sense, there is some truth in what Geczi is saying, but I do not see this as a fault line. The government's two and a half months in office also shows that various approaches can be and, in fact, have to be combined. [passage omitted]

[Moldovanyi] Of the trends in the HSP, you had most "trouble" with the populists. How do you get on with the populists in your party, namely Matyas Szuros, Ferenc Kosa, and Jozsef Annus?

[Horn] I do not have any problems with them. I am on very good terms with Kosa and Annus. I have always had

and probably will have differences of views with Szuros. When tension arises between us, the usual reason is that I believe that once we agree on a political issue then everyone has to keep to it. I do not think that anyone could mention any occasion from the past five years when I deviated from the party's lines. This does not mean that I am a disciplined party soldier, rather it means that all statements have to be carefully considered in politics. The party's political image is basically determined by the left-wing line. Apart from this, some people are attracted to the liberals and others to right-wing parties. During my nearly four years as chairman, I attempted to strike a balance between these trends, which, in daily politics, meant that I did not allow the party to be dragged in either direction. It is essential for all parties to preserve their individual image, otherwise they dissolve and lose the voters' confidence. [passage omitted]

[Moldovanyi] When a party wins an election, the number of people who wish to be associated with it suddenly increases. Since the HSP came to power, have former functionaries reappeared in Koztarsasag Square [HSP headquarters]?

[Horn] Many people are coming to us, but they are not members of the former nomenklatura. Those people have "vanished," most of them finding jobs in the private sector and others are simply pensioners. I do not know of any leading officials who have come to the party as a result of our election success. People coming to us tend to be entrepreneurs or public officials.

[Moldovanyi] According to the political scientists, people voted like a pendulum in May. Are you not worried that this pendulum will swing in the other direction at the local government elections?

[Horn] In my view, we have good reason to hope for similar results to the parliamentary elections at the local government elections. In spite of all the difficulties and problems, I believe that the country and the political atmosphere have become much more liberated compared with the past four years. Today, no one has to be worried about government policy. People are not categorized according to whether or not they are populist-nationalist. By the way, I should note that I also feel like a populist nationalist. This term has been abused just to create differences between people. We do not judge people according to their affiliations to ideologies or trends; we handle the issues in a practical way and people can see this. Even if certain measures do not always meet with understanding. This is probably our fault. We may have spent less time than necessary on shaping our image because we believed that our actions would speak for themselves. According to this, we should explain more carefully why we do certain things. The government's work is not yet perfect. [passage omitted]

[Moldovanyi] At the elections, the National Federation of Trade Unions in Hungary [MSZOSZ] appeared very close to the HSP. It seems that the HSP is keeping the

trade unions further away from politics than had been expected. Is it possible that you are keeping Sandor Nagy [MSZOSZ chairman] in reserve?

[Horn] Not at all. I participated in the consultations of the MSZOSZ's socialist and social democratic platform, and then in the trade union meeting. We often exchange views with Nagy; therefore, I do not feel that I am neglecting the trade unions. In addition to this, the parliamentary group also has regular contact with the trade unions. [passage omitted]

Horn Interviewed on Slovak Elections, Economy

LD0710105594 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 2000 GMT 6 Oct 94

[Interview with Prime Minister Gyula Horn by unidentified program moderator and Imre Kerta, editor-in-chief of SOMOGYI HIRLAP; Attila Kristof from MAGYAR NEMZET; Ilona Kocsi, deputy editor-in-chief of MAGYAR HIRLAP; and Laszlo Homonyecz from NEPSZABADSAG; questioners are not identified individually; from the "Five Plus One" program—live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Moderator] [Passage omitted] I propose to start today's conversation with a somewhat international issue because it is very timely. Although one can only speculate at this stage, it is probable that Vladimir Meciar will form the government in Slovakia. He is not exactly known for making friends with Hungarians, or for his wish or efforts to have good relations. [passage omitted]

What can we expect, what kind of government will be formed, and, in view of that government, what kind of relations will the Hungarian Government be able to form with Slovakia?

[Horn] I cannot say what the composition of the government will be. [passage omitted] Presumably Meciar will form the government. Well, we accept whatever happens there. We do not choose the governments of neighboring countries. In August I held a long discussion with Meciar—longer than with any other representatives of the then Slovak opposition parties—and he assured me that if he should gain office again he will do everything to improve bilateral relations. Of course, others say that too....

[Questioner, interrupting] Did you take Meciar seriously when he said that if he becomes the next prime minister it would be possible to cooperate with such a head of government?

[Horn] Look, it is more important for me—and for the Slovak Government, the Slovak parliament, for the EU and other European integration bodies it is even more important—that a European style policy is acceptable. In other words, it is in the interest of Slovakia, the Slovak

powers that be, and the Slovak Government to find a common language with Hungary. And this can be the decisive factor.

[Questioner] At a press briefing at the end of the IMF plenary session it was said that Hungary has not suffered sufficiently yet to escape hard measures. What could the IMF leaders have in mind? [passage omitted]

[Horn] In my speech to the National Assembly 27 September I too conveyed the IMF leaders' view that they require really tough decisions from us. [passage omitted] My view is that the economic balance is extraordinarily important but it is not the aim, the ultimate aim—it is only a means for stabilizing economic life and starting on the road to growth. [passage omitted]

My observation is that the country, taken as a whole, is growing richer despite all the difficulties. However, at the same time, the state is fast becoming poorer and this is reflected in the budget problems. An appropriate balance must be found here. Those who say that the growth of consumption must be treated discerningly and that those tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of entrepreneurs who operate with greater or lesser hiccups represent the true way for the country out of the difficulties are right.

[Questioner] [Passage omitted] What kind of consumption are they really talking about? Popular consumption, consumption by public institutions, or by large enterprises?

[Horn] In 1994 a unique situation developed in that the rise in net wages is so high that even real wages, incomes which are not paid for by appropriate growth in production have also grown. [sentence as heard] The largest growth took place in the consumption by public institutions and that is why it must be treated differently. On the other hand, even in the various groups of the population the growth of consumption or real wages is not the same. There are certain [social] categories, groups—among the public employees and elsewhere too—whose wages have not kept up with the rise in prices. This is another reason why it is not a good thing to speak generally about excessive rise in consumption. It must be examined stratum by stratum, population group by population group, and according to various consuming categories. [passage omitted]

[Questioner] Pardon me, Mr. Prime Minister. I see a contradiction again. You said that the previous government delayed what you have to implement now—to raise energy prices, among other things.

[Horn] Yes.

[Questioner] And you said that it had some reason. What was this reason?

[Horn] Presumably it did not want to take an unpopular measure.

[Questioner] Without any malice, is not it possible that the current government does not want to take this unpopular measure either?

[Horn] Excuse me, but we will increase energy prices from 1 January. Today is 6 October. It is rather close.

[Questioner] But people do not feel it before the prices are increased.

[Horn] People will feel it....

[Questioner, interrupting] But they will not be voting then....

[Horn, interrupting] This has nothing to do with the local government elections. This has merely economic and social considerations. [passage omitted]

[Questioner] You are starting a congress tomorrow. The number two man of the Socialist Party will be elected. Whom do you consider to be the favorite, because the number of candidates beside Imre Szekeres is continuously growing?

[Horn] There are no other candidates. He is the sole candidate.

[Questioner] What about Imre Janosi and other names....

[Horn, interrupting] As far as I know, he is the sole candidate. [passage omitted]

Foreign Minister Interviewed on Role of CSCE

LD1110108694 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 10 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] There may have been only a few people who thought that the CSCE too played a role in the peaceful change of regimes that took place at the end of the 1980's. However, this was the view expressed by Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs at the Budapest forum of the conference. Istvan Kulcsar interviewed him. [passage omitted]

[Begin recording] [Kulcsar] At its birth the CSCE had—if I remember rightly—34 signatories. Now it has 52. [passage omitted] Is this expansion not likely to lead to the organization's becoming ineffective? Let me also ask, Minister, about the CSCE's relations with other international organizations, with the United Nations, for example. Will the CSCE itself not become a little United Nations? In any event, how will it be able to fulfill its new role within these new frameworks?

[Kovacs] The CSCE's expansion is not a geographical one, as a matter of fact, because the original 35 signatories reflected the principle of universality ranging from Vancouver to Vladivostok. [passage omitted] The current number of 52—and with Yugoslavia, 53—participants only reflects the break-up of the Soviet

Union and Yugoslavia. It has not therefore changed the geographical span of the CSCE, so I do not see a danger of watering down.

Naturally, it is more complicated to come to an agreement when the number of participants is greater. While in the past Moscow decided on behalf of the entire Soviet Union, now there can be and there are differing views in all the capitals of the successor states about security, or all-European cooperation.

Regarding CSCE relations with other international organizations and the United Nations, we consider it to be very important that we should not try to create a kind of superior-subordinate relationship. Such an attempt would have no chance; it would run into great resistance. The essence here is to establish an efficient division of labor. All organizations should concentrate on what they are most competent in.

The CSCE has no means to enforce decisions, whereas NATO has such means. The United Nations is a world body whereas the CSCE is only an all-European organization. We perceive a division of labor between CSCE and the United Nations in which crises on the territory of the CSCE member countries would be dealt with by the structures and institutions of the CSCE process, and only if these bodies fail would we turn to the United Nations.

[Kulcsar] There are other ideas too. For example, Russian leaders have made public a concept which would blur—almost completely—the difference between the CSCE and NATO. Alternatively, within CSCE a kind of organ would be created which could make decisions obligatory for the signatories. [passage omitted]

[Kovacs] I think it perfectly understandable that Russia is looking at the CSCE from a different angle because Russia is a signatory to the CSCE but is not a NATO or Western European Union member. Furthermore, although Russia is not a global power in the sense the former Soviet Union used to be, it still has continental and indeed intercontinental interests. The fact that other CSCE member states hardly, if at all, share this Russian view, is another matter.

[Kulcsar] The CSCE is much criticized for having failed to prevent local conflicts—which are the most serious and important problems of Europe today—especially on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and for being unable to manage these appropriately. [passage omitted]

[Kovacs] [Passage omitted] What the CSCE can do in the future is to pay greater attention to preventing and forecasting crises rather than making attempts to manage them. [passage omitted]

[Kulcsar] You have mentioned before that it is intended that the institution of the CSCE presidency should have a greater importance; it is intended that it be strengthened. As is known, from December this year Hungary—and on its behalf the Hungarian foreign minister—will

hold the CSCE presidency for a year. What are your intentions and concepts for this period?

[Kovacs] We think that it provides a very good opportunity for Hungary to play a greater role in European politics. Naturally, I would like to make use of this opportunity to the benefit of Hungary and Hungarian foreign policy. Of course, mixing the considerations of the CSCE with Hungarian foreign policy interests is out of the question but, nonetheless, this position offers the possibility for Hungary to play a greater role in, for example, the prevention or management of crises and this in turn will, ultimately, strengthen Hungary's international prestige. [end recording]

Defense Ministry Training Funds To Shrink in 1995

LD0710135094 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2000 GMT 5 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The Defense Ministry staff will be reduced by 10 percent over the remaining two and a half months of the year. This reduction will take place despite the fact that the ministry's tasks are increasing; caring for disabled servicemen and their relatives has now become a ministry duty.

At the session of the ministry's college it was also said that in 1995 there would be even less money for training; virtually not one filler will be available for technical development of the Army. Even maintaining the existing standard could come under threat.

Government Devises Plan 'To Save' Arms Industry

AU0710174994 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 7 Oct 94 p 5

[Unattributed report: "Program To Save Military Industry"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to a government proposal to save the armaments industry, the 51 relevant domestic enterprises could satisfy the 15-billion-16-billion-forint demand of the Armed Forces in the coming year to year and a half without development or investment. Colonel Janos Isaszegi, head of the Military Industry Office of the Industry and Trade Ministry, has informed the Military Industry Sub-committee of Assembly's Defense Committee about the state of this sector and its expected future.

Based on preliminary analyses, Col. Isaszegi said that, if the budget fails to provide the one-time 15-billion-16-billion-forint fund, the Armed Forces would be forced to resort to imports. The budget would thus lose an accumulated net income of about 40 percent of the price (taxes, allocations, etc). In addition, the budget must face a surplus expenditure of about 10-12 percent, because domestic jobs would be lost because of the imports, and unemployment benefit would have to be paid to the redundant personnel.

Isaszegi pointed out that the drop in military industry production began as early as in 1989, with a 30-percent fall in production; a similar fall took place in 1990. This continued as a result of the drastic decrease in domestic and foreign orders. In 1988, military industry enterprises employed more than 30,000 people and manufactured products worth 21 billion forints, of which two-thirds was for export. Today, the number of employees has fallen to 5,000, and production to 6.7 billion forints, with exports worth 1.4 billion. Some of the military industry enterprises have gone bankrupt because of the prolonged lack of markets; a much smaller number of such enterprises have been or soon will be privatized.

Isaszegi told the committee that the 51 enterprises involved in development and production activity will prepare an analysis of the expected domestic effects of the military industry action program based on the immediate demands of the Armed Forces by 31 October 1994.

Ambassador Says Iraq 'Does Not Want War'

*LD1010180394 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1704 GMT
10 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 10 Oct—Troop movements within a country's own territory are the internal matter of every state. Iraq does not want war and is not contemplating an attack against Kuwait, but it wants the lifting of the sanctions imposed by the United Nations upon Iraq four years ago, otherwise Iraq may break off its cooperation with the Security Council, Muhammad Rif'at al-'Ani, the ambassador of Iraq to Poland, said at a news conference in Warsaw on 10 October.

"We must put an end to the suffering of the Iraqi people," the ambassador said. He stressed that no UN sanctions applied before had included food and medicines, as has been the case with Iraq.

Olechowski on Importance of Joining NATO, EU

*LD0810140294 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in
Polish 1300 GMT 8 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] Our entry into NATO and full membership in the European Union [EU] have been of utmost importance in Poland's foreign policy, Foreign Affairs Minister Andrzej Olechowski said in his speech to the participants of the Poland-East Economic Forum in Krynica. According to Olechowski, if we do not move from the peripheries of Europe to the center, we will have no influence on decisions made there, nor will we have access to the world market. We will, however, remain a country that will have to conform to Europe's political decisions.

Addressing the representatives of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, Olechowski stressed that Poland's attempts to join NATO and to become a member of the EU should not be received by these countries with suspicion and indifference. He reasoned that these countries should support our aspirations because our integration into the European institutions is in the interest of Russia, Western Europe, and the whole world.

Pawlak Denies Any Conflict at Defense Ministry

*LD0710133494 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1243 GMT
7 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] Lublin, 7 Oct—Asked by journalists today about a conflict at the Ministry of National Defense [MON], Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak said: "There are no facts, there is no conflict."

While asked to comment on his visit to Strasbourg, the prime minister said: "The Council of Europe has been the institution that opened itself to Poland first, and now it inspires international cooperation, particularly that open to the East. I think this is an important message to us, to be able to understand our specifics and our

conditions. Poland is a country that should work extensively for wide cooperation between the East and the West. This is our great chance, which we should use."

The prime minister answered questions by journalists after the inauguration of the new academic year at the Agricultural Academy in Lublin.

Kolodziejczyk 'Has No Intention' of Resigning

*LD0810092094 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in
Polish 0800 GMT 8 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] National Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk has no intention of stepping down, Ministry spokesman Janusz Grochowski has said.

Minister Kolodziejczyk held talks with Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak yesterday. He also met with Aleksander Kwasniewski and Tadeusz Mazowiecki, leaders of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] and the Union of Freedom [UW], and admitted that a group of high-ranking officers refused to obey him during recent military maneuvers in Drawsko Pomorskie. The SLD and the UW leaders assured the minister of their support.

President Lech Walesa and Prime Minister Pawlak will discuss the situation at the Defense Ministry on Monday. It is possible that Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk and General Tadeusz Wilecki, chief of the General Staff, will report to the Sejm National Defense Commission on what happened in Drawsko.

Minister Waiting for Elimination of 'Confusion'

*LD1010171794 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1548 GMT
10 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 10 Oct—Minister of National Defense Piotr Kolodziejczyk does not envisage a possibility of tendering his resignation until the "confusion that has arisen around the Ministry of National Defense" is completely sorted out, Janusz Grochowski, press spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense, said on 10 October. On 10 October, the president asked Kolodziejczyk again, this time in writing, to tender his resignation.

According to press reports, during a training exercise in Drawsko Pomorskie on 30 September, where the president was present, a group of generals refused to obey Kolodziejczyk's orders and demanded his resignation. Today, for the first time since then, the president's spokesman Leszek Spalinski issued a statement saying that, in Drawsko, Lech Walesa had asked Kolodziejczyk to tender his resignation from his post in connection with an intention to entrust him with another responsible post. Leszek Spalinski said that the president had informed the prime minister last week about his intention to dismiss the defense minister.

Until another meeting with Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak is held (one such meeting was held on 7 October)

and another with the Sejm National Defense Commission takes place, the defense minister will not comment on the situation that has arisen, Grochowski said.

According to the Government Press Office, there is no meeting between the prime minister and the minister of national defense scheduled for Monday, 17 October. However, according to Ministry of National Defense sources, such a meeting will take place as early as Monday evening or Tuesday morning.

Army Made No Demand for Kolodziejczyk's Dismissal

LD0910194194 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1800 GMT 9 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] Lieutenant Colonel Zdzislaw Czekierda, the press spokesman of the chief of General Staff of the Polish Army [WP], has told our program that, at the meeting between President Lech Walesa and National Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk with the General Staff of the WP, which was held a few days ago in Drawsko Pomorskie, no demand was made for the minister's dismissal. In his opinion, there can be no question of a rebellion by the generals against the ministry's civilian leadership.

[Begin recording] [Czekierda] There is no rebellion, there was no rebellion. These are just press facts. [passage omitted] But the Army is asking if the budget is sufficient for training or if there are legal regulations allowing everyday tasks to be carried out smoothly and without conflict. We are answerable to the whole of society, after all.

[Correspondent] Do the generals think Minister Kolodziejczyk should go or not?

[Czekierda] It was not even considered. There was a meeting with President Lech Walesa, the supreme commander of the Armed Forces, who expressed great recognition for the chief of General Staff, the General Staff, and the entire Armed Forces for executing their tasks well—and these are no run-of-the-mill tasks because the external security of the state depends on them. [passage omitted] [end recording]

[Announcer] Lt. Col. Czekierda expressed the view that the president's actions concerning the Army had no political basis but resulted only from the president's constitutional responsibility for the country's security.

Politicians Comment on Dismissal of Kolodziejczyk

LD1010220194 Warsaw TVP Television Network in Polish 1830 GMT 10 Oct 94

[From the "Wiadomosci" newscast; passages contained within quotation marks are recorded; relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] According to the majority of the parliamentary floor groups, there is no reason to dismiss Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk.

[Wladyslaw Medwid, Polish Peasant Party] "So far, we have assessed the minister positively, and I think this assessment is still valid, at least if we take into consideration the proposals he has submitted to the Sejm for discussion."

[Bronislaw Geremek, Freedom Union] "In a democratic country, the Army cannot be an instrument for a political game. The whole game connected with Drawsko, with statements made by the chief of the General Staff or by individual generals, corresponds to a specific political intention of the president and is an element destabilizing the political scene."

[Jerzy Wiatr, Democratic Left Alliance] "I think the prime minister should not accept Minister Kolodziejczyk's resignation, if the minister tenders such a resignation, because this will be tantamount to an admission of the right of forces outside parliament and government, including forces inside the Army, to dictate who can and cannot be minister of national defense."

[Tomasz Nalecz, Labor Union] "The civilian control of the Army means that the staffing of political posts is decided by politicians who have the trust of their electorate and not by generals. I do not think that any arguments put forward by generals could result in a situation where we would start filling state posts in response to their position."

[Announcer] The Sejm Defense Commission will hear explanations by Minister Kolodziejczyk and Tadeusz Wilecki, chief of the General Staff, on 11 October. They have refused to comment on the matter before this meeting takes place.

[Correspondent Katarzyna Koleda-Zaleska] Thanks to the amendment passed by the U.S. Congress yesterday, we have obtained access to U.S. military equipment surpluses. What is more, we have been given a signal that Poland's membership in NATO is close. However, if the crisis surrounding the Ministry of National Defense continues and if the Army is drawn into the campaign preceding the presidential election, we could lose this chance, despite the favorable attitude by the West.

Right-Wing Criticizes Walesa's Presidency

WS1010123594 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 10 Oct 94 p 2

[Article by I. Zalewski and P. Zaremba: "Minister Wachowski Is Not the Heart of the Matter"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Presidential Aide Mieczyslaw Wachowski is not the greatest hindrance to the right wing's possible support for Lech Walesa in next year's presidential election. "The problem is Walesa himself," leaders of right-wing parties say.

The rumor about the possibility of Mieczyslaw Wachowski's leaving the president's entourage has already surfaced on several occasions. A few days ago, even Wachowski himself spoke about the issue. He declared that he was ready to go, if this would improve the lives of the working people.

This would certainly not help the working people. However, would Wachowski's removal from the political limelight help Lech Walesa in the presidential election? Will it be enough to part with the controversial minister to break the ice with the post-Solidarity groupings, which are not favorably disposed toward Walesa? Could "the sacrificing of Wachowski" prove to be Walesa's wonderful weapon in his fight for reelection? Such suggestions could be heard in the statements of some rightist politicians.

For the Union for Real Politics [UPR], Wachowski's departure would have no significance. "We are criticizing Walesa not for personnel reasons but for substantive ones," explains Rafal Ziemkiewicz, who is the group's press spokesman. "He has drifted too far from what he declared in the presidential campaign, when we supported him."

A similar stand has been taken by the Conservative Party, UPR's ally in the 11 November Alliance. "Even if Wachowski left, there would still be reasons for us to be very critical of Lech Walesa's presidency," believes Conservative Party General Secretary Robert Stepien.

"We are interested not in personnel matters and recalls but in the program," says Ryszard Czarnecki, head of the Christian-National Union, a party that is said to be not too "anti-Walesa." "President Walesa's policies carried out over the past few years should be analyzed, and questions should be asked about the implementation of the electoral promises. We do not like such behavior—when, if something happens, the blame for all mistakes is put on one's aide. The myth of a good czar and a bad Wachowski is not for us."

A statement with similar overtones has been made by Jaroslaw Kaczynski, leader of the Center Accord, which is the most "anti-Walesa" party within the Alliance for Poland. "There is not a problem of Wachowski; there is a problem of Walesa. At most, Wachowski adds a very depressing esthetic dimension to this entire issue," Kaczynski evaluates. According to him, Walesa is not qualified to run for president—with or without Wachowski.

"Wachowski is not a problem to me at all," says Solidarity Senator Zbigniew Romaszewski curtly. "To me, Walesa himself is a problem—Walesa with his incompetence, his lack of any goals, which were replaced a long time ago by concerns for his own interests, by the greed for pure power, which does not serve anything."

Columnist Views Walesa's Strategy of Drawing Attention

WS1010153494 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
8-9 Oct 94 p 4

[Article by Kazimierz Groblewski: "President Is Looking for Work"]

[FBIS Translated Text] He is almost everywhere in the newspapers. He is dealing the cards, hiring and firing. He will deliver a speech, he will make "dangerous, firm decisions." The world is revolving around Lech Walesa. This is exactly what was to be achieved.

The president's tactics are not changing. He himself creates problems, and, after that, when he makes a situation extremely complex, he decides to intervene. He warns that things are not going well, that he is dissatisfied, that he will take matters into his own hands. This is when he has an opportunity to show how necessary, indispensable, and irreplaceable he is.

Well, I have not become president to rest, as he himself will say. He will not take money for cutting ribbons. "He became president to work." Therefore, whenever there is no work to be done, when nothing extraordinary is happening, just the usual routine—the parliament is passing laws and the government is governing—the president "speeds up" and finds some work for himself. He will either recall or at least criticize someone, which occupies him for some time. In addition, Polish political life becomes more colorful: Sluggish politicians turn into energetic defenders of democracy against the president's authoritarian attempts. They make statements, consider options. There is a clash of statements, stances, protests. The air in the Sejm, in the government, and in party headquarters becomes thick with "fundamental principles" and "interests of the state." When Lech Walesa finds himself some work to do, politicians also have something to do—a chance to show up on television, before their electorate, to show their faces, full of concern for the country's fate.

In line with unofficial information, Lech Walesa is profoundly convinced that he will be reelected president, that he will be president for a second time. He does not consider the possibility that this will not happen.

The president's idea is simple: to turn weakness into strength. He is alone. He does not have any political backing. He has antagonized most of his former sympathizers and political friends. "If you do not want to, I will let you have your own way. I will show you something. There will come a time when you will come to me of your own accord," Walesa might say today.

He wants to achieve what he failed to accomplish at the time the severity of the antiabortion law was to be lessened. Then he would have stood before the State Tribunal alone. He would have been right in the center of the spotlight. He failed because the Sejm did not reject his veto.

Walesa does not want to be just one of the many candidates for president. He wants a situation in which he will be on one side and all of the other candidates on the other. He will make moves to stir up emotions among politicians, he will set parties at odds, and then he will act alone against everyone. He will be above the parties, against the entire political class. Let them take away votes from each other. All of them will be alike in at least one respect: They will all criticize Lech Walesa.

He realizes that he has already lost whoever was destined to be lost. If another 1 or 2 percent of the people turn their backs on him, it will not matter. Perhaps he will gain. He heard all the time that he might regain support if he did something, if he surprised the people with "dangerous, brave decisions." Therefore, he is doing just that.

By causing the commotion surrounding the National Council of Radio and Television [KRRiT] and the Army, Lech Walesa has called the parliament and the governing coalition to the board. He is provoking parliament. He wants to draw it into the war he is waging. He is imposing "subjects"; he keeps "anticipating." The political life is to turn around his ideas. He does not really like being forgotten.

It was no secret that parliament was working on a law that preserved the present hierarchy in the Army: The head of the General Staff is subordinated to the minister of defense and not, as Walesa would like, to the president. In a normal situation, the law would be passed in the usual procedure. However, now that the president has managed to cause such a great commotion over the Army, he will be able to accuse the parliament of wanting to limit his powers.

Lech Walesa likes crisis situations. This is when he has options from which to choose. Then he is also certain that everyone will think about which option he will choose. When the parliament takes to passing the aforementioned law or to amending the law on KRRiT (in line with the draft law prepared by the Democratic Left Alliance—SLD), Walesa will accomplish what he has wanted: Parliament will be drawn into his war. He will be able to announce that the coalition has breached the agreement it reached with him. That is, he will also feel relieved of responsibility to observe it. Then he will really have a lot of options from which to choose.

It must be recalled that, in approximately a month's time, the draft law on next year's budget will find its way to the Sejm. Sooner or later it will be submitted to the president for his signature. It is possible that the president is already preparing the appropriate atmosphere (for a conflict with the SLD), so as not to sign the law. Then a crisis would arise that might end up, for example, in an attempt to dissolve parliament.

Lech Walesa is no longer playing small games. He has no time left for legislative changes—for example, for attempts to legally force the concept that the head of the

General Staff be subordinated directly to him. He wants to have his own man as head of the Army, a man who would be entirely devoted to him and who would be loyal. He also wants influence over television—just in case.

Possible Formation of Broad Right-Wing Coalition

WS1110075194 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in
Polish 8 Oct 94 p 4

[Article by Igor Zalewski: "UPR in Coalition With Solidarity"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Union for Real Politics [UPR] hopes that by the end of the year both right-wing blocs—that is, the Alliance for Poland (Center Accord [PC], Christian-National Union [ZChN], Peasant Accord, Movement for the Republic [RdR], Conservative Coalition) and the 11 November Accord (UPR, Conservative Party [PK], Party of Christian Democrats [PChD], Christian-Peasant Alliance, and National Democratic Party) will become one. One of the UPR leaders, Rafal Ziemkiewicz, suggests the formation of a group resembling the Republican Party in the United States. The specific parties would not lose their identities, and their members would pay double membership fees—to their home parties and to the larger, overall structure. Every dues-paying member would have the right to vote, and decisions would be made in votes that would replace consensus and compromise agreements. The bloc's leadership would be authorized to issue orders to all party structures.

The political spectrum of such a group would be very wide, ranging from Zbigniew Romaszewski to Krzysztof Kawecki, according to Ziemkiewicz (Kawecki is a nationalist who broke away from ZChN).

UPR does not exclude an agreement with Solidarity ["S"]. The first meeting between UPR and "S" took place at the home of writer Waldemar Lysiak a few days ago. The ice was broken by Ziemkiewicz and Stanislaw Michalkiewicz on the one hand, and by Andrzej Gelberg, editor in chief of TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC, on the other.

It is worth remembering that Zygmunt Wrzodak suggested Waldemar Lysiak for president behind the scenes of the "S" convention in Mielec. According to our sources, however, the renowned writer was not interested in the offer.

According to Ziemkiewicz, the role of "S" within the bloc could be similar to that of the All-Polish Trade Union Agreement in the Democratic Left Alliance. "Perhaps one could match fire with water, and the resulting steam might burn the communists," says a politician from UPR, a party known for its antiunion positions. Ziemkiewicz says that his idea of creating a Polish equivalent of the Republican Party did not meet with enthusiasm. However, we were unable to confirm this. "I

have never heard of such an idea," we were told by Robert Stepień of the PK. "The joining of opposition forces should rather focus on a mutual presidential candidate." The vision of joining forces with "S" also does not appeal to Stepień. "I do not see why we should cooperate with the trade union and not with the Freedom Union [UW]."

Another right-wing politician claims that UPR's ideas are simply consecutive blows in the party's fight against the PC. UPR aspires to become the major right-wing force, and is thus doing everything it can to eliminate its major contender—namely, Jarosław Kaczyński's party [PC].

Indeed, relations between both parties are tense. UPR would gladly draw in Romuald Szeremietew and his group, which has engaged in a conflict with other parties within the RdR over their attitude toward relations with the Belweder. In yesterday's *RZECZPOSPOLITA*, Szeremietew wrote about a concept similar to Ziemkiewicz's idea. The Great Right-Wing Congress would simply elect its leaders in a democratic vote.

PC Deputy Chairman Ludwik Dorn deems these suggestions as highly improbable. "Such a party would be so incoherent that it could function only in U.S. conditions. The United States is a federation, and the government is not responsible to parliament," he claims. He believes that the concept of a Right-Wing Congress is sabotage, a stumbling block for the right wing on the path to unification on rational terms.

"If Kaczyński continues to behave the way he did during the election for president of Warsaw, he will cast himself as an outsider," says Ziemkiewicz. "We will sooner make a deal with 'S' than with the PC."

Meanwhile, the PC Presidium issued a statement accusing UPR of supporting postcommunist agreements and undermining the Polish right wing. The PC is outraged with UPR's alliance with the SLD, which led to Mieczysław Bąk's being elected president of Warsaw.

PC politicians have appealed to the remaining center-right groups to react to the ideological treachery committed by UPR.

Poll Shows SLD, PSL Maintain Support

WS1010141594 Warsaw *GAZETA SWIATECZNA* in Polish 8-9 Oct 94 p 4

[Article by "(opr. dom)": "CBOS on Parliamentary Chances of Various Parties; Political Oscillator"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The coalition is doing fairly well; the Freedom Union [UW] is losing; the Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN] is not in the Sejm, having been replaced by Solidarity ["S"]. These, according to the Public Opinion Research Center [CBOS], would have been the results of the parliamentary election if we had gone to the polls in September.

Over half of all respondents (54 percent) would definitely have gone to the polls. To obtain seats in the Sejm, a party must win at least 5 percent of the vote.

The coalition parties have more or less the same support they had in the last election. UW's support in the middle of the year was 13 percent, but as early as September it had already shrunk by 5 percent. This party's drop in popularity was the greatest of all groups. "This may be linked to the aggravating dispute between the left and the right wings of UW," the CBOS speculates.

Right Wing Down as Well

In July, the Alliance for Poland (Christian-National Union, Center Accord, Conservative Coalition, Movement for the Republic, Peasant Accord) stood a chance of getting into parliament. The CBOS explains the drop in the coalition's popularity in September by the fact that another rightist bloc was given a lot of publicity—the Secretariat of Center Right Groupings (such as Jan Paryś's Movement for the Third Republic, Christian Democracy-Labor Party, Polish Union, Party of Faithfulness to the Republic, and their sympathizers, Jan Olszewski and Antoni Macierewicz). Thus, in September, the right wing would have had a slim chance of entering parliament.

If the election were held today, the KPN would probably be voted out of the Sejm, being replaced by "S." The trade union benefited from the campaign of collecting signatures in support of its draft constitution.

Who Supports Whom?

The electorate of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] consists primarily of middle-aged people with a university education, management cadres, and the intelligentsia. They are not churchgoers, their incomes are high, their evaluation of their material situation is good, and they are interested in politics. Two-thirds of SLD supporters declare leftist views.

UW is supported by the inhabitants of large cities, educated people, management cadres, intelligentsia, and private entrepreneurs. The difference between the SLD and UW is that the latter also has many supporters among school and university students, which the SLD cannot boast. Moreover, UW voters most often declare center rightist and centrist views.

The same is true of the Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reforms [BBWR]. Just as with UW, this grouping has many supporters among school and university students, inhabitants of large cities, people with a university degree, private entrepreneurs, white-collar and blue-collar workers, low-level managers, and the intelligentsia.

Potential voters for the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] are entirely different: They are inhabitants of rural areas, with elementary and vocational education, peasants, and

unskilled workers. The peasants are often backed by the poorest members of society and people who are not interested in politics.

The Union of Labor [UP] attracts people with secondary-school education, low-level white-collar workers, unskilled workers, people who are dissatisfied with the situation in the country, and people from various social groups with leftist views.

In addition, "S" has many supporters among people with elementary education and people dissatisfied with their material situation, who go to church and declare rightist views.

Even though the SLD and the PSL have such different electorates, they are linked by the fact that, for these voters, "the situation in our country is developing in the wrong direction."

***** The CBOS study was conducted between 2 and 5 September 1994 on a 1,219-person representative random sample of adult Poles.**

For whom would you vote in the parliamentary election?

	Jul 94	Sep 94
	Percent	
SLD	20	22
PSL	15	20
UW	13	8
UP	9	8
"S"	7	8
BBWR	6	6
Alliance for Poland	6	4
KPN	3	4
11 November Alliance	5	2
Secretariat of Center Right Groupings	NA	2

Kolodko Stresses Cooperation With East

LD0810145094 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1308 GMT
8 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Krynica, 8 Oct—At a meeting of the Poland-East Economic Forum in Krynica, Grzegorz Kolodko, deputy prime minister and minister of finance, declared, on behalf of the Polish Government, full readiness to develop active economic, trade, political, and cultural cooperation and to expand trade exchange with eastern partners—Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, in particular.

"It was the only optimistic and very promising statement for us by the Polish side," a representative of the Russian Federation's delegation remarked.

Kolodko said that Poland's strategic goal was unequivocal—that is, full membership in the European Union. At

the same time, however, opportunities for trade with the East, which have been wasted in recent years, should be compensated for. Eastern markets have currently been strongly infiltrated by German, Italian, Austrian, Japanese, and Korean capital, while Polish companies used to be present there. They did not have to be forced out.

"These were political errors. We should have come out of the CEMA structures in a different fashion, without brutally destroying all links and economic, financial, and cooperation connections," Kolodko said.

According to the deputy prime minister, Poland, Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine should tighten the existing contacts and undertake joint economic ventures, with the participation of western capital, "not because it is better but simply because there is more of it," and should utilize Western experience in banking, finance, and marketing.

Polish-Austrian Trade Statistics Discussed

94EP0095C Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish
23 Aug 94 p 4

[Article by U.K.: "Polish-Austrian Cooperation: Evening the Balance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Austria is 10th in Polish total export and seventh in import. According to Austrian statistics, Polish exports to Austria came to 1965 million Austrian schillings [S] through May of this year, which was 8.5 percent more than in the comparable period last year. In this same period, Poland imported from Austria goods valued at \$2,288 million, which is 15.3 percent less than last year. As a result, announced Jozef Najdek, economic adviser in the Office of Trade Counsel in Vienna, the balance of trade, negative for Poland, declined from \$889 million in 1993 to \$323 million after the first five months of the year.

Polish exports are at present enjoying success in Austria; the numbers would be still better if not for the dramatic decline in coal supplies. The value of coal exported to Austria in the first five months of this year came to \$326 million, 30.8 percent less than a year ago. The export of chemicals also fell, but not as swiftly as last year.

The Austrians buy from us more and more semifinished goods. The export of colored metals grew by 138.4 percent, from \$35 million to \$80 million; the export of steel mill products by 130.5 percent, from \$30 million to \$70 million; the export of prefabricated constructions by 92 percent; and the export of tires by 78 percent. The most successful completed products we sold Austria included shoes (growth of 102 percent); furniture (64.4 percent-growth); and clothing (61 percent). The export of fruit also grew, by 66 percent.

Imports from Austria to Poland, on the other hand, are falling. That of consumption goods is especially declining. The leaders in goods bought by Poland include oleaginous seeds, minerals, and semifinished goods—leather, paper, and sheet metal. The Austrian Union

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Chamber of Commerce estimates that the decline of Austrian exports to Poland will come to approximately 22 percent in the first half of the year.

The most important imported goods continue to be machines for building railway lines, specialized trucks (like garbage trucks), cleaning products, cosmetics, and aluminum.

Polish-Austrian Trade, Jan-May 1994
(in millions of Austrian schillings)

	Polish Export		Polish Import	
	Value	Percent Change	Value	Percent Change
Food	112.1	+ 16.5	116.5	- 65.8
Beverages, tobacco	0.9	+ 45.1	8.0	- 61.1
Raw materials	221.4	- 6.2	42.8	+ 31.1
Fuel, energy	705.3	- 9.5	9.5	- 40.0
Fats	-	-	2.2	-
Chemicals	96.2	- 12.5	350.4	- 2.3
Semifinished products	306.3	+ 59.1	622.4	+ 18.4
Machines and vehicles	192.4	+ 24.7	798.0	- 18.4
Finished products	330.0	36.6	337.9	- 20.8
Total	1,964.6	+ 8.5	2,287.7	- 15.3

SITC [Standard International Trade Classification]

A new trade cooperation agreement between Poland and Austria was initialed in May 1994. It is expected to be signed in October. Like the agreement on the free trade zone between Poland and EFTA [European Free Trade Association] and the Polish-Austrian agreement on agricultural concessions, it will certainly encourage the development of mutual economic ties.

The agreement signed by the chambers of commerce of Styria and Torun also promises more vigorous two-sided economic contacts, including the exchange of economic information, the organization of contacts between firms, and symposia and conferences.

Austria is among the most active investors in our country; its share in foreign investments in Poland comes to 6.9 percent. At the end of 1993, capital invested by Austrian firms reached a value of \$292 million. There are now 450 Polish-Austrian joint ventures active. This is 4.2 percent of all corporations with a share of foreign capital. Austrian capital has been invested almost entirely in the building of hotels and in banking.

Industrial Lobby: Goals; Oil, Defense Positions

94EP0095A Warsaw GAZETA BANKOWA in Polish No 35, 27 Aug 94 p 19

[Article by Grzegorz Lys: "An Armed Lobby: A Great Force Lies in Spontaneous Social Movements"]

[FBIS Translated Text] From its beginnings last March, the headquarters of the Polish Industrial Lobby [PLP] have been located in Warsaw's Kasprzak factory. The catastrophic demise of that company, however, also caused the loss of the space rented by the lobbyists. A delegation did try to get a meeting with Minister Pol, but nothing concrete could be done for Poland's electronics industry, so the problem of new headquarters remains.

"We do not base our hopes on intervention in particular cases," explains lobbying group coordinator Dr. Pawel Soroka. "We are not yet a group of buddies, and we deal with systemic solutions."

In accordance with such a plan, Kasprzak's bankruptcy induced the PLP to address the problem of loopholes in the bankruptcy law and to form a group that would concern itself with the problem of the decline of the Polish electronics industry. The lobby will now most likely be located in the Naftoprojekt building, as a result of the PLP's work with that firm, begun in connection with the coming reform of the oil industry.

First of All, Sovereignty

The Polish Industrial Lobby, which has been among the most consistent critics of all plans concerning the fuel industry so far, including the Olechowski plan, has recently produced its own conception of the transformation of that industry. It envisions the creation of a holding company, "Polish Oil," in which 51 percent of the shares would remain in the hands of the state, 30 percent would be sold to domestic investors, and 20 percent could be bought by foreign firms. It is the division of shares that divides this plan from the most recent government proposals. "We do not share the position of the Interministry Group on the need to attract strategic foreign investors in order to privatize the oil sector," the lobbyists explain. This principled position on the oil question, which envisions full state control over the sector, is the result of the PLP's conviction that our economic sovereignty was and is seriously threatened. "One could compare the country's gasoline supply to the circulation of the body," says Marian Bartecki, a member of the lobby and co-owner of Naftoprojekt, an employee-owned corporation.

The lobby's particular sensitivity to the question of sovereignty is largely due to its interest in national defense. Though the PLP's first public initiative was opposition to the privatization of the Gorazdze cement works, the movement's cradle and its support is still the armaments industry. The founding meeting was held in the headquarters of Rawar, which was the leading producer radiolocation device in the Warsaw Pact era.

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Representatives of Bumar-Labedy, the WSK, PZL Warsaw II, and PZL Okecie have taken part in the lobby's work. In addition to industrial enterprises, numerous research and development institutes, including the Military Technology and Arms Institute, the Industrial Institute of Automatics and Standards, and the Air Force Institute are represented in the lobby. Technical associations like the Association of Polish Engineers and Technical Mechanics and the Association of Polish Electricians have also made use of the lobby, as have trade unions of various orientations, including the union of electromachine industry workers and Rural Solidarity. The lobby, say its members, does not aspire to represent all industry. It intends to concentrate on sectors it considers to be strategic. As can easily be seen, strategic is meant in the more traditional sense: fuel, arms, planes. Nevertheless, other areas as well are appearing in the organization's sights as its provincial branches develop. When centers on the coast were created with the support of the Marine Engineering Center, the lobby's activity broadened to include the ship-building industry. The office in Jastrzebie is organized for the mining industry, and the Kielce office deals with ball bearings.

Different Optics

The PLP numbers about 100 active members, including factory directors, union leaders, and scientists from the polytechnics, the Polish Academy of Sciences, the Military Technical Academy, and the National Defense Academy. Above all, the lobby represents technical circles whose voice has been underestimated in recent years, says Dr. Soroka. Soroka himself is a political scientist with a doctoral dissertation on the theory of decisionmaking in the United States in international relations, an adjunct in the Warsaw School of Administration, and, by temperament, socially engaged. For many years, he was involved in the encouragement of work culture and culture in and of itself in the Worker Artists' Movement. He finds much to talk about with the captains of industry, like Rawar's Director Migdalski, a legend of the arms industry, thanks to his rich amateur knowledge about the Air Force.

"We do not have many economists," admits Dr. Soroka. "One can regard that as a weakness. But, on the other hand, purely economic approaches have dominated in the transformation process. With technicians and specialists in work organization, we want to broaden that point of view. People from the Institute of Defense Economics of the National Defense Academy supply the economic thought for us."

The PLP is a polymorphic, untypical organization. It has no formal positions, not even a formal board of directors. So far, this has prevented it from registering and gaining legal status. It should be a forum to agree on opinions and joint actions in order to exert influence on the planning and execution of industrial policy.

"History teaches us that a great force lies in spontaneous social movements," says Soroka. "We are just such a movement, with a clear identity, dealing with specific issues and problems."

Among other things, the lobby demands that the interest rates on investment credits be lowered, as well as the margin taken by banks; that the debt relief of enterprises be sped up; and that there be preferential credits for new technology. So far, the reaction of the government, including that of the present coalition, to the lobby's proposals has been far below expectations. The industries the PLP considers strategic—armaments, electronics, and telecommunications—are only to be monitored and not actively supported by the Ministry of Industry.

The lobby believes that "the multisector character of our economy must be acknowledged as its lasting trait." It is alarmed by the ongoing privatization, including the Total Privatization Program [PPP], which the PLP regards as a risky experiment. "We see no need to privatize prosperous, profit-making state factories," say the lobbyists.

In its programmatic declarations, the lobby consistently notes its ambivalence toward the market economy as such: "Microeconomics should be conducted by market mechanisms, but macroeconomics should be subject to a clear strategy of economic policy." "In the 'Strategy for Poland' program," laments Dr. Soroka, "we find nothing in particular for ourselves."

Former King Refused Entry to Country at Airport
AU0710134094 Paris AFP in English 1309 GMT 7 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bucharest, Oct 7 (AFP)—Former King Michael [Mihai] of Romania was barred from entering the country here Friday after flying in on an Air France flight from Paris, witnesses said. No passengers of the regular flight were allowed to leave the plane, correspondents at Bucharest's Otopeni Airport reported.

Romanian authorities earlier said the deposed monarch would be turned back on his arrival as he does not have an entry visa and his visit is considered "inopportune."

Government Explains Refusal

AU0710175194 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1410 GMT 7 Oct 94

[Communique issued by the Romanian Government in Bucharest on 7 October]

[FBIS Translated Text] Today at 1425 [1225 GMT] an Air France plane touched down at Otopeni International Airport having aboard as passengers, among others, the former sovereign of Romania Mihai of Hohenzollern, together with his spouse. Owing to the fact that the respective persons did not have the necessary visas to enter the country, nor did they have the authorization of the competent bodies, the border police denied them access to our national territory and invited them to leave Romania immediately.

In connection with this situation the Romanian Government makes the following remarks: As it has already been pointed out to the representatives of the foundations and associations that have invited the former sovereign to the country, the government does not consider his presence in Romania timely. As a matter of fact, this position is also shared by numerous representatives of various orientation of our political life.

During the duration of preliminary discussions that took place, the government has not received any official application from the former king requesting an entry visa to Romania. According to law, such applications should be handed in personally by the applicant.

The former sovereign was advised, both publicly and via other channels, that without a public declaration made by him explicitly stating that he acknowledges Romania's constitutional order, he would be denied access to the country.

The Romanian Government considers that a great part of the responsibility for the creation of this regrettable situation belongs to the leaders of certain political forces, who by irresponsible declarations, having an inciting nature, encouraged the idea of an illegal visit to Romania by the ex-king, thus challenging the public and legal order in our country.

The government regrets the fact that the former sovereign, together with his entourage, have let themselves be drawn into this attempt to enter the country forcibly. The responsibility for this unpleasant situation lies exclusively with the former king and the persons who promoted his visit to Romania without observing the current legal framework, concludes the communique sent to us a short while ago from government headquarters.

Police Arrest 4 Smugglers With 4.5 Kg of Uranium

AU0710195994 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 5 October 94 p 2

[Report by Horatiu Radulescu and Simona Ionescu: "An SPP Officer and an Army Officer Are Seized by Police Trying To Smuggle Uranium"]

[FBIS Translated Text] From our own sources we have managed to learn that a few days ago the police captured 4.5 kg of uranium 235-238. The uranium had been stolen for trafficking. So far the culprits in this case are Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Cimpinasu, an officer of the SPP (President Ion Iliescu's Guard and Protocol Service), Captain Alexandru Hauca, an officer on the payroll of the National Defense Ministry, and two other citizens, inhabitants of the village of Ciolpani.

On the night of 30 September-1 October, the villagers of Snagov Sat were awakened by the sound intense gunfire. Eventually the police managed to catch the four uranium smugglers red-handed.

Ministry on Smuggling Case

AU0710145394 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 0500 GMT 7 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] During a news conference yesterday at the National Defense Ministry, Colonel Simion Boncu, head of the Army Media Bureau, answered a question to the effect that the media report on the arrest of a Romanian sportsman in the military in connection with 2 kg [figure as published] of uranium, confiscated in Snagov, is correct.

The radioactive material was most likely in transit, as it has been excluded that its origin might be Romania. The case has been remanded to the courts, reports correspondent Dorel Cutus.

Details of Uranium Case

AU1110100994 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 8 Oct 94 p 12

[Report by Lidia Popeanga and Simona Ionescu: "The Uranium Trafficking Took Place on 28 September in Villa 23 in Snagov"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We can now provide further details on the uranium transaction in which, as has

already been reported, officers of the MAPN [National Defense Ministry] and the SPP [Guard and Protocol Service] were involved. The intervention of the IGP [General Police Inspectorate] took place at 1530 on 28 September at Villa 23 in Snagov. The squad that carried out the raid found three vehicles, two Dacia cars and a van, parked outside.

In one of the Dacias they found MAPN Captain Alexandru Halauca, aged 37, a former hockey player for the Steaua Club [MAPN sports club], while Lieutenant [rank as published] Vladimir Romulus Cumpanasu, aged 24, of the Ciolpani village commune, an SPP officer, was sitting at the wheel of the other Dacia. There were two civilians in the van, Dumitru Nicolae of Ploiesti, an employee of the Marylon company, and Gheorghe Florea, aged 52, of Ciolpani, the director of Romsuin Ltd. (He had previously been sentenced to 20 years in prison for embezzlement, part of which he served between 1983 and June 1989.) The four were caught trying to carry out a transaction. The police officers called out to them, the civilians tried to run, and two warning shots were fired into the air. A search of the car driven by Lieutenant Cumpanasau revealed a plastic bag containing four other bags filled with a total of 4.556 kg of uranium. According to an analysis at the Preventative Medical Center's laboratory, the substance in the bags was highly concentrated natural uranium powder. A check done on that occasion showed that its radioactivity exceeded safety limits by 50 percent. The radioactive substance was assessed as extremely dangerous, requiring special protective measures during handling, owing to contamination risks.

The four were seized on the spot and on the following day, 29 September, they were placed on remand for 30 days. Halauca and Cumpanasu are to be charged with violating laws regulating the possession of explosive and

radioactive materials and with narcotics smuggling (radioactive uranium is considered to belong to the category of toxic substances), while Gheorghe Florea and Dumitru Nicolae are being charged as accessories to these two crimes. On 30 September, Lieutenant Vladimir Cumpanasu of the SPP was transferred to the reserves.

Fuel Smugglers To Use Remote-Controlled Boats

AU1110085294 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 7 Oct 94 p 14

[Report by Radu Ciobotea: "The Smugglers on the Danube Have Designed Remote-Controlled Boats"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The intensity of fuel smuggling at the Danube straits has reached its zenith.

Dozens of boats propelled by powerful motors and equipped with radio communication equipment cross the Danube in just a few minutes. They carry gasoline or diesel fuel to the Yugoslav bank and return with thousands of [German] marks. In order to maintain their technical supremacy over the border guards, some of the smugglers are investing a great deal of money in a project that is almost completed: boats guided via radio remote control.

EVENIMENTUL ZILEI was absolutely the first to study the blueprints according to which such boats are to be constructed. The equipment works on the basis of a principle similar to that of remote-controlled toy cars. The equipment mounted aboard the boats consists of a 55 Ampere battery, two relays, and two metallic levers.

"If the border guards are equipped with speedboats, we will resort to remote-controlled boats," said some fishermen who wished to remain anonymous in the area of Moldova Veche.

Izetbegovic Demands Akashi Apology Over Mt. Igman

AU0710170694 Paris AFP in English 1632 GMT
7 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Oct 7 (AFP)—Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic on Friday [7 October] said Bosnian troops had the right to remain within a UN-monitored demilitarized zone around Sarajevo. And he demanded UN special envoy to ex-Yugoslavia, Yasushi Akashi, apologize for "slandering" the Bosnian Army over statements he made Thursday that Bosnian forces had mutilated Serbs killed in a commando raid.

The "Bosnian Army is not prohibited from being within this so-called demilitarized zone (DMZ)," Izetbegovic told a press conference here, called after the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] announced it had threatened to use force to evict Bosnian troops from the zone. The president said UN Bosnia commander Lieutenant-General Sir Michael Rose had no authority to threaten airstrikes against the Bosnian Army if they did not withdraw from DMZ on Mount Igman.

Bosnian commandos launched a raid on a Serb command post from within the zone Thursday, killing some 20 Serb soldiers, including four nurses. Akashi said Thursday some of the bodies showed signs of mutilation, a claim UNPROFOR withdrew Friday.

Izetbegovic said Akashi had "slandered very seriously the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in his hasty statement" on mutilation, and demanded an "an apology from Mr. Akashi for the slander."

Demands 'Impartiality' From UN

AU0710200494 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 7 Oct 94

[Report by Mediha Colo on a news conference by Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, in Sarajevo on 7 October]

[FBIS Translated Text] During their talks yesterday, Yasushi Akashi lodged a protest with President Izetbegovic over the incident on Mt. Igman in which he claimed that 20 Serbian soldiers were killed. Not understanding the reasons for Akashi's protest, President Alija Izetbegovic asked whether the incident had taken place in the demilitarized zone [DMZ], and whether the operation involved weapons of over 12.7-mm caliber. Akashi's answer was that the incident had not taken place in the DMZ, and that banned weapons had not been used. Akashi, nevertheless, insisted that the soldiers had been brutally killed. His allegations of a massacre of the soldiers, Izetbegovic said, were denied at this morning's news conference in the Sarajevo UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] headquarters. But General Rose even mentioned the possibility of air strikes against the Bosnian Army in connection with this incident.

At a meeting with Akashi and Rose, President Izetbegovic promised that our side would investigate this incident, and make the results public, which was what he did at today's news conference.

[Begin Izetbegovic recording] Yesterday morning, our commandos launched a lightning operation in which they destroyed the command post of the 3d Battalion of the so-called 2d Sarajevo Brigade of Karadzic's army near the village of (Proskok), outside the demilitarized zone, but within the exclusion zone. No massacre of soldiers took place, as was confirmed by the UNPROFOR representative at this morning's briefing. He stated that this was a lightning military operation, that one body was burned as a result of a fire that broke out, and also that six wounded soldiers had been found, which is crowning evidence that there had been no massacre. [end recording]

Because of this, President Alija Izetbegovic posed several open questions to Akashi and Rose.

[Begin Izetbegovic recording] First of all, have they forgotten that we are the ones who have accepted the peace plan, while it is Karadzic's Serbs who have rejected it? Is it not logical then that all the consequences and the responsibility for all that results from our acceptance of the plan, that is, their rejection of the plan, should be placed at their door? This, of course, includes responsibility for both our losses and theirs. The second question is: Why did they react so quickly—a few hours after the incident—whereas they have always managed to fail to react to the losses of our soldiers' lives? Since we accepted the peace plan, we have lost 123 soldiers. In one operation alone launched by the Serb army in one place on 24 August, we lost 15 men in one go. Neither Akashi nor Rose uttered so much as a squeak then. They watch every day as the Mt. Igman road is fired upon, people are killed, their own vehicles have been shot at, UNPROFOR's vehicles, and their people have been wounded. On 5 October Hrasnica was hit with six missiles of the banned caliber, and the Serb side is firing daily at Sarajevo with weapons of these banned calibers.

I have a special question for Gen. Rose: What does he base his mandate on to call for air strikes against the Bosnian Army? He has no mandate for this. As far as this operation is concerned, it was carried out outside the DMZ, and it did not involve banned weapons. It involved small-caliber weapons. We have to conclude that Gen. Rose is not using his mandate when he should, when he is authorized to do so, but he would like to use it when he does not have it. [end recording]

President Izetbegovic then said that, in his statement yesterday outside the Presidency building in Sarajevo, Yasushi Akashi had slandered the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, and smeared its reputation with an inaccurate statement.

[Begin Izetbegovic recording] Because of this, we demand a public apology from Mr. Akashi for this

slander. As for UNPROFOR, we demand that it operates in future with more impartiality. [end recording]

The question arises why all this took place. According to President Izetbegovic, there is only one explanation.

[Begin Izetbegovic recording] At a time when certain important issues concerning Bosnia-Herzegovina are being dealt with, such as the strangulation of Sarajevo, the lifting of the embargo [words indistinct], there seems to be a need to divert the world's attention in another direction. We think that this is a way of diverting attention from an important question, and that is: Is the blockade of the Drina being constantly violated? We have clear evidence that it is. We are gathering evidence, and we will soon make it public. I would like to mention the statement by U.S. Defense Secretary Perry, who has said that the United States has evidence that this border is porous and that equipment is getting through. There is also that statement by Bo Pellnas, who said that they, too, had evidence that a certain, not large, amount of weapons is getting through. [end recording]

President Izetbegovic then stated that the Western media has recently started a campaign against Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly stressing the article that recently appeared in Paris LE MONDE, and was carried in Sarajevo's OSLOBODJENJE. [Words indistinct] lies against Bosnia-Herzegovina. Since the LE MONDE article mentions the name of President Izetbegovic, he said a few words in connection with that.

[Begin Izetbegovic recording] I am a Muslim, thank God, and I think that I will die a Muslim. I will fight for Islam and the Muslims to survive here in this region. However, I have no intention of creating an Islamic state, nor do I intend to force anyone to believe in the things that I believe in. This article claims the contrary. Of course, the target here is not Alija Izetbegovic but rather Bosnia-Herzegovina. The intention is to undermine the confidence of the world in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and diminish the world's support for our country. [end recording]

1st Corps Announcement

AU0710134294 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 7 Oct 94

["Announcement" issued by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 1st Corps Information Service; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the occasion of the latest statement by Yasushi Akashi, special UN representative, on the events on the southern slope of the Mt. Igman and the implied accusations regarding the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the [words indistinct], the question of UNPROFOR's [UN Protection Forces] neutrality on this territory comes up for the umpteenth time.

What is UNPROFOR, who is UNPROFOR, and what is behind its peaceful Samaritan role and behind the smile of the little Japanese who is no longer capable of hiding his support for the heavenly people [the Serbs], for whom it has almost become a habit to kill Bosniaks and the people who share their fate? Why do Yasushi Akashi and his cronies try so conscientiously to equate victim and aggressor? Where does such a perfidious policy lead if not to yet another in a series of ways to exterminate the Bosniaks? From the very beginning of the establishment of the famous exclusion zone and the cease-fire, of artillery in particular, the Serbian side has continuously violated the agreement. Civilians and soldiers have been killed and UN forces have been humiliated and threatened by them, in most cases leading them to [word indistinct].

General Rose has promised to deploy observers on Spicasta Stijena from which many civilians have been killed, but nothing has come of this promise to date. With his own example in August, (?criminal) Ratko Mladic showed how the ban on civilian target actions is supposed to be respected, so he used a death sower to shoot at apartments in Marin Dvor.

(?The aggressor) [words indistinct] places, and before the eyes of UNPROFOR and international observers, steals heavy weapons and fires them at Sarajevo and other places. The Igman road is under constant enemy fire and humanitarian convoys rarely manage to enter the city untouched.

With all that, (?NATO) and UN forces react by destroying token tanks that they are not even sure weren't meant as decoys. [Words indistinct] one destroyed a UNPROFOR transporter and several wounded UN soldiers.

Who are the UN forces actually defending—the victim, the aggressor, or, as in the latest case, the blue helmets?

UNPROFOR Role Questioned

AU0710203294 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 7 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Events that have been coming thick and fast recently indicate that the UN forces are gradually but unquestionably siding with our enemy. The example of Mt. Cemer itself—where the aggressor's offensive has been under way for the last two months—would be enough to confirm this theory about the behavior of the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] beyond any doubt. A dozen letters sent by our Army to officials of this organization, saying that the enemy has been attacking our defense lines in the exclusion zone with the aim of severing the Visoko-Olovo road and capturing the heights from where they can control all the surrounding towns, were all ignored and not even given a hint that they had been received.

This arrogant behavior of UNPROFOR has also been displayed in connection with Spicasta Stijena [Serbian

sniper nest], from where 47 people have been killed so far, with over 200 wounded. There is still no observers post there, even though one has been promised to our president by General Rose as a guarantee that the citizens of Sarajevo will not continue to be killed from this place.

Finally, there is Mt. Igman, where the enemy attempted to close the encirclement of the Bosnia-Herzegovina capital, thus having it hermetically sealed and deprived of the basic essentials. In connection with this, 1st Corps Commander Brigadier Vahid Karavelic sent a letter on 30 September to UNPROFOR Commander (Goubier), saying that the aggressor was planning to launch an offensive operation with the aim of tightening the blockade of Sarajevo, and that—considering the strategic importance of Sarajevo for the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina—units of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 1st Corps would defend all the vital strategic points, and thwart the aggressor in achieving his aim. That some 20 aggressor soldiers were killed on the southern slopes of Mt. Igman—over which UNPROFOR and the UN special envoy have raised such a hullabaloo, not even stopping short of open threats—is only proof that this promise made in dry military terms and linked to the protection of the city, its population, and every member of the 1st Corps, was not given in vain.

According to General Karavelic, this was not a massacre, but an engagement between units, and the war against an enemy such as we have cannot be won with an olive branch.

This is contained in a statement from the 1st Corps Information Service.

'Astonishing' UN Version

AU0710210494 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 7 Oct 94

[Report by Erol Abdovic from New York]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Describing in detail the manner, place, and time of the killing of the soldiers of Karadzic's forces on Mt. Igman, it was astonishing to hear how Mr. Fred Eckhard gave this event an importance that has not been given to any other deaths in this war. It was astonishing since, here in the UN headquarters, there has never been mention in such a way of the deaths of Bosnia-Herzegovina Army soldiers from Souk Bunar to Velesici, from Vratnik to Butmir, who were defending the Bosnian capital, not attacking it. Fred Eckhard still owes us an explanation as to why such a small military unit happened to have as many as four nurses. His so-called argument that unarmed soldiers—as he put it—were found killed on the scene is simply absurd in the situation where the Bosnian arms embargo is being countered by capturing arms off the enemy for the war of liberation against the aggression that is still under way, as the United Nations is well aware. [passage omitted]

UN Spokesman Comments

AU0710184594 Paris AFP in English 1813 GMT 7 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Oct 7 (AFP)—The UN Protection Forces in Bosnia on Friday [7 October] firmly rejected Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic's bid to justify the deployment of his men in the demilitarised zone [DMZ] around Mount Igman outside Sarajevo.

UN spokesman Herve Gourmelon told AFP that "we very firmly deny his interpretation. The Bosnian soldiers do not have the right to be there." Izetbegovic had earlier called into question the application of the August 1993 accord on the zone, saying he believed it allowed his troops to be there. But Gourmelon said: "What Mr. Izetbegovic [said] was wrong. He signed the agreement knowing what it was, and is now committing a 'tactical error.'" Gourmelon added some 500 French troops in the zone were engaged in escorting the mainly Moslem Bosnian Government troops away from the zone.

He did not confirm whether the troops had left the area by the late afternoon, but said some 40 Bosnian soldiers had earlier fired over the UN soldiers' heads. The UN forces responded in kind, but there were no casualties according to Gourmelon, who said one way or another the Bosnians would have to leave, either of their own volition or by force.

Bosnian Government troops crossed the DMZ at dawn on Thursday, according to UNPROFOR, and killed 20 Bosnian Serb troops, including four female nurses.

Karadzic on World Reaction

LD0810050294 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2023 GMT 7 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 7 Oct (TANJUG)—Radovan Karadzic, president of the Srpska republic [RS], this evening expressed his "embitterment at the passivity of the international community" in its condemnation of the Muslim side for the massacre of 20 members of the RS army on Mt. Igman, SRNA reports. "The Serbs were appalled by the international community's subdued reaction to yesterday's crime on Mt Igman, which the Muslim army committed in violation of the demilitarized zone," Karadzic told SRNA.

Stressing that UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] bore "direct responsibility" for this crime, Karadzic added that the responsibility of the Muslim side belonged in "the category of war crimes" and for this reason the Serbs would "persevere in their demand for its punishment." "We demand of the international community to appropriately and sternly punish the Muslim side," the RS president said, warning that its failure to do so would compel the RS army to "take drastic steps very soon."

Karadzic believes the international community's attitude toward the Muslims after this crime "proves yet

again that it is not treating all the sides in the conflict equally." "The United States will not allow the same measures used against the Serbs to be applied against the Muslims. This is a disgrace for the international community and yet another reason why we should not be cooperating with the United Nations," Karadzic concluded.

French Unit Blamed

LD0810182794 Sarajevo Radio Republike Srpske Program for Abroad in Serbo-Croatian 1630 GMT 8 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Our reporter Vlado Popovic has visited the scene of the Igman massacre. [passage omitted]

[Popovic] According to official sources, the terrorists were very well informed about the exact position, number of people and the make-up of the logistics unit that was massacred. The only road leading to the position was through a zone controlled by UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces]. The command post of the 5th French Battalion is less than 1,000 meters away, and this is the reason for suspecting that UNPROFOR members informed the enemy side about these details because they were the only ones who knew them.

Serbs Warn UNPROFOR To Honor Promises

LD0810165994 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1505 GMT 8 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zvornik, 8 Oct (TANJUG)—The Serb side will review and determine its policy toward UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] as soon as possible, Milan Gvero, deputy commander of the main headquarters of the Srpska republic army said in Zvornik today. He said that the Serb side consistently implements its part of the agreement reached by the Srpska republic's political and military leadership and top level UN and UNPROFOR officials in Pale three days ago.

General Gvero recalled that, owing to a high degree of cooperation by the Serb side, the first part of the scheduled exchange of prisoners was completed, aid transport resumed and that other agreed projects are near the implementation stage. However, Gvero warned that UNPROFOR failed to fulfill its promise to the Serb side to "make Muslim units withdraw to the positions they held last June using all available means, including fighter planes."

Armed attacks by the Muslims on Serb positions within Sarajevo's protected zone have become increasingly frequent. On 6 October in the Cakle area on Mt. Igman a Muslim sabotage and terrorist group "killed or wounded several Serb fighters" having crossed "the protected zone under UNPROFOR control," Gvero recalled.

Because of the Muslim crime committed against Serb soldiers and nurses on Mt. Igman the Serb side is

expecting that "the international community should react not only by condemning the crime, but also by taking practical measures to punish the conduct of the Muslim side so far," said Gen. Gvero.

Failing this, the Serb side will be "forced to respond in an appropriate way," particularly as "UNPROFOR is failing to carry out the responsibilities it had undertaken," Gen. Gvero said.

Mladic Trusts UN To Restore Mt. Igman Peace

LD1010234394 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 2245 GMT 10 Oct 94

[Video report by Snjazan Lalovic]

[FBIS Translated Text] Talks between army General Ratko Mladic, commander in chief of the Srpska republic, and Gen. Michael Rose, UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] commander for former Bosnia-Herzegovina, lasted for a little more than an hour today. An agreement was reached on several important things and radical moves by UNPROFOR. Following the talks, the British general made the following press statement:

[Begin Rose recording, in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] Particularly, we discussed the withdrawal of all troops from the demilitarized zone on Mt. Igman, the implementation of the agreement on anti-sniper activities in Sarajevo, and the stabilization of confrontation lines surrounding the city. [end recording]

Here is what Gen. Ratko Mladic told journalists:

[Begin Mladic recording] First, I think that Messrs Generals Rose and Gaubillard have understood that UNPROFOR ineffectiveness caused this unwanted incident on Mt. Igman and the crude violation of the 14 August 1993 agreement. I received assurances that within 10 days they would bring the situation throughout the territory of Mt. Igman and Mt. Bjelasnica to the level it was on 31 July of last year. I believe them in that. As far as this is concerned, we shall allow them to implement the operation so Mt. Igman and Mt. Bjelasnica will become real exclusion zones where only UNPROFOR will be deployed, and nobody else. [end recording]

Delic Tells Rose To Act Over Serb Violations

AU0710200594 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 7 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Army General Rasim Delic, supreme commander of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, and Gen. Michael Rose, commander of the UN forces in our country, held talks in Sarajevo today. The talks were attended by Brigadier General Mustafa Hajralahovic and Brig. Gen. Vahid Karavelic, as well as by Gen. Goumelon, commander of the Sarajevo sector of the United Nations.

The talks concerned the situation in the demilitarized zone and the exclusion zone of Sarajevo. Gen. Delic

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stressed the problem concerning the Serbian aggressor's failure to observe the agreement. The aggressor has been launching offensive military operations for two months now in the Sarajevo exclusion zone, particularly in the region of Mt. Cemer, and in the demilitarized zone, where the Butmir-Pazarić road has been kept under constant fire by the Serbian aggressor.

Gen. Rose was presented with information supported by hard facts, and the UN command for Bosnia-Herzegovina was asked to react promptly when the representatives of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army indicate problems concerning violations of these two agreements.

Concrete activities to be undertaken by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the UN Protection Forces were agreed at today's meeting. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army has undertaken to observe the agreement on the demilitarized zone and the exclusion zone of Sarajevo consistently, as it has been doing so far in any case.

Serbs Deny Responsibility for Tram Attack

*LD0910173194 Sarajevo Radio Republike Srpske
Program for Abroad in Serbo-Croatian 1630 GMT
9 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] In order to divert the attention of the world public from the crime that took place on Mt. Igman within the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces]-controlled zone, Muslim authorities in Sarajevo staged an attack on a tram in the town center yesterday. One person was killed and another seven injured in the attack—we read in a statement today by the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps of the Srpska republic army.

The Muslim leadership has continued its policy of killing not only Serbs, but also their own people in front of the cameras which are brought to the scene in advance. After the massacre on Vasa Miskin Street [on 27 May 1992] and in Markale [on 5 February 1994], another Serb attack was staged yesterday—an attack on a tram near the technical college, we read in the statement.

The information service of the Srpska republic army warns that the Sarajevo fundamentalist leadership will continue—in the name of its insane ideas—to sacrifice innocent lives with the aim of shocking the world which would then justify fresh NATO attacks on Serb positions.

B-H Army Withdrawal From Mt. Igman Noted

*AU1010154094 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 10 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] The latest announcement issued by the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] command of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been made in the well-known manner of equating [words indistinct] and the attack on civilians in Sarajevo. Major General [rank as heard]

Michael Rose, UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Gen. (Ariel Ković), commander of the UNPROFOR Sarajevo sector, jointly condemned (?two) [word indistinct] incidents that took place in Sarajevo on 8 October as a serious threat to the civilian population and [words indistinct] both sides anti-sniping agreement from 14 August, the announcement says.

A UNPROFOR investigation has established that Karadžić's Serbs are responsible for the killing of one civilian and wounding 11 more when they shot at a Sarajevo tram from the Jewish Cemetery on 8 October.

Major (Cole Sole), UNPROFOR spokesman in Sarajevo, said today that the greatest part of soldiers of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina has withdrawn from the demilitarized zone on Mt. Igman. At the meeting between UNPROFOR and (?military) representatives of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serbian aggressor held yesterday, it was agreed that a joint commission should visit parts of Mt. Igman in the coming days and establish there whether soldiers of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army have withdrawn.

Maj. (Sole) said that after the sniper attack by Karadžić's Serbs on a tramway on 8 October, the situation in Sarajevo is calmer. Only some individual incidents in Vogosca, Ilidza, and Rajlovac have been registered. French blue helmets noticed aggressor's soldiers (?pulling) vehicles into a Lukavica [word indistinct], but after they lost track [words indistinct].

UN Planes Hit by Fire at Sarajevo Airport

AU0710194894 Paris AFP in English 1927 GMT 7 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Oct 7 (AFP)—Two UN planes were hit by small arms fire late Friday [7 October] at Sarajevo airport, the first aircraft to be hit since flights resumed Thursday after a two-week shutdown, UN officials said.

UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] spokeswoman Claire Grimes said the airport had gone onto orange alert after two Ukrainian cargo planes were struck around 4:00 p.m. [1500 GMT], one in the tail one in the cabin.

No one was injured in the incident and the airport remained open, she said, although UNPROFOR and the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees would study the security situation before going ahead with flights Saturday.

Nine UNHCR and eight UNPROFOR planes had earlier landed without incident.

Sarajevo Airlift Suspended

*LD0810153994 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 8 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] The humanitarian airlift to Sarajevo was suspended today after two planes were shot at

on the Sarajevo airport runway yesterday evening. The countries taking part in the humanitarian airlift are to decide this afternoon when the humanitarian drive will resume.

Nine planes carrying food landed at Sarajevo airport yesterday, prior to the suspension of the airlift. They have brought in some 100 tons of food—barely half Sarajevo's daily needs. Two weeks of regular supplies are needed to fill Sarajevo depots with sufficient quantities of food, Chris Janowski, UNHCR representative in Sarajevo, said today. He also said that the situation regarding Sarajevo's food supplies is extremely serious.

20 Aid Flights Expected 9 Oct

AU0810161094 Paris AFP in English 1554 GMT 8 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva, Oct 8 (AFP)—The humanitarian airlift to Sarajevo will recommence Sunday morning [9 October], with 20 flights scheduled across the day, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees spokesman Christiane Berthiaume said Saturday.

The aid flights had been suspended Saturday after two UN jets were fired on late Friday at Sarajevo airport. In Sarajevo, UNHCR spokesman Kris Janowski said 20 flights were due to arrive Sunday, the first landing at 8:00 AM (0700 GMT).

Airlift Resumes 9 Oct

LD0910120194 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1131 GMT 9 Oct 94

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Oct. 9 (TANJUG)—Sarajevo Airport was reopened Sunday after a suspension of humanitarian airlifts on Friday when two planes were hit while taking off, a United Nations official said Sunday.

The REUTER News Agency quoted a U.N. official as saying that "the first plane in was an American C-130 from Ancona, Italy, that landed at 0800 hours (0700 UTC). We have a full schedule today with 20 UNHCR (U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees) flights and two UNPROFOR (U.N. Protection Forces) flights expected."

Sarajevo Airport was closed on September 22 following a NATO air strike on Bosnian Serb positions around Sarajevo. The airport was reopened on October 6 under an accord reached between Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and UNPROFOR and was closed again on October 7.

UN: Serb Blockade Causing Serious Fuel Shortages

AU1010160094 Paris AFP in English 1521 GMT 10 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Oct 10 (AFP)—A Serb blockade of UN fuel tanker trucks has led to a

serious fuel shortage, forcing a cut in UN relief operations and setting back plans for building winter stockpiles, a spokesman said Monday.

UN Bosnia commander Lieutenant-General Sir Michael Rose was Monday to meet Bosnian Serb commander General Ratko Mladic in Jahorina, south of the Bosnian capital, to discuss the UN force's mounting fuel problems, said officials. Until the Serbs allowed 48,000 litres of petrol and diesel into Sarajevo Monday, no fuel had reached the UN Protection Force here since September 19, said UNPROFOR spokesman Lieutenant-Colonel Bernard Labarsouque. The convoy was authorized after UNPROFOR chief of staff Brigadier-General Jan Willem Brinkman contacted Mladic by phone over the weekend.

"The situation over the past few days has become very serious," said UNPROFOR spokeswoman Claire Grimes, adding that the civilian side of the UN operation had been forced to cut back its activities. Labarsouque said that since Saturday French UN troops had stopped refuse collection and street cleaning work, and cutback non-essential activities "without affecting peacekeeping operations."

Patrols in the UN-monitored demilitarized zone on Mount Igman have priority currently. They are monitoring the Bosnian Army's promised withdrawal of forces by Thursday. They also had first call on heating fuel, as night-time temperatures on Mount Igman plunge well below zero, said Labarsouque.

One UN official, who asked not to be named, said Monday's convoy would only provide enough fuel "to allow us to live for a week." French forces needed a one month fuel stock as a buffer because the bitter Bosnian winters made transporting fuel extremely difficult. Normally French forces maintain three month's supplies in fuel depots, but in Bosnia UN policy makers had opted to keep just one month's fuel in reserve, "so as not to leave too much fuel behind in case we have to get the hell out quickly," one source said.

UNHCR: Month Needed To Restore Sarajevo Stocks

AU1010105794 Paris AFP in English 0834 GMT 10 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Oct 10 (AFP)—Relief flights to Sarajevo proceeded smoothly Monday but a UNHCR official warned that at least a month of full airlift was needed to replenish seriously depleted stocks and avoid a city food crisis.

The office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) planned 20 flights Monday, mirroring the previous day's operation when more than 250 tonnes of food arrived on only the second full day of airlift in three weeks.

Aid flights were suspended September 23 when two planes were hit by small arms fire, and only resumed last Friday after the Serbs lifted a threat to aircraft which had closed the airport.

However, the airlift was again suspended Saturday when Bosnian and Serb machine-gunners targetted two Ukrainian UN transporters, sparking warnings by UNHCR spokesman Kris Janowski that the organisation's warehouse and the main city bakery had stocks for only three more days. "To build up a two-week stock we need at least a month of good airlift," Janowski said Monday, adding that the 20-flight a day regime would "go on for a while." Sunday's 20 flights shipped in mainly wheat flour for the bakery, sugar, vegetable oil and cheese, so-called nutritional "high-value items."

However, Janowski said the Serbs were still blocking overland aid convoys into the city and the besieged eastern Moslem enclave of Srebrenica, despite an October 1 pledge to allow free movement of convoys. "September 21st was the last time we had a land convoy in" to Sarajevo, said Janowski. UNHCR used to run two 100-tonne convoys into the Bosnian capital a week before the Serb obstruction began.

A convoy to Sarajevo was turned down Saturday as was another for Srebrenica, where some 44,000 people are crammed into a tiny pocket surrounded by the Serbs.

"They (the Serbs) said there would be free convoy movement and we have not had it except for convoys to Gorazde under the prisoner swap deal," he said, referring to a combined, prisoner exchange, medevac and convoy agreement completed early Thursday. The convoy obstruction has also hit the UN Protection Force, which has had to stop aid work in the city to conserve stocks for patrols.

Muslims Release 62 Serb Prisoners in Gorazde Area

LD0810182094 Sarajevo Radio Republike Srpske Program for Abroad in Serbo-Croatian 1630 GMT 8 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The first exchange of prisoners has taken place in the Serb part of Gorazde. This is a result of the implementation of the agreement between representatives of the Srpska republic and the Muslim authorities signed on 1 October at Sarajevo Airport. Under this agreement, 47 Serb civilians and 15 POW's were released from the Muslim-held part of Gorazde. The remaining 10 Serb POW's are still in the Muslim prison in Gorazde. It is expected that they will be exchanged by 10 October, by which time three more international aid convoys should reach Gorazde.

Helicopters Reportedly Violate Brcko No-Fly Zone

AU1110092294 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 11 Oct 94

[Report by Hamiz Deronjic from Brcko]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Brcko front last night was marked by intensified Serb aggressor operations. Following provocative fire for most of the day, the enemy started shelling the Brcko defense lines in the evening. The chetniks fired anti-aircraft machine guns and 82-mm mortars on the area around (?Klapanj). The aggressor also shelled the central parts of the Brcko defense line with 82-mm mortars, with simultaneous heavy anti-aircraft and machine-gun fire. On several occasions the aggressor from (?Bijelina Ravan) fired 82-mm mortars at Boderiste. These attacks had no effect on the defense lines.

The Serb aggressor has continued to fly transport helicopters along the air corridor over the temporarily occupied Brcko territory. At around 1600 [1500 GMT] yesterday the aggressor's helicopters flew along the Bijelina-Brcko-Pelagicevo route.

Sarajevo Water Supply Worsens; Gas Insufficient

AU1010102594 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 10 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The Water Works Information Service reports that, due to reduced inflow from the Bacevo Reservoir and Jahorina source, Sarajevo water supplies have worsened. The water accumulated so far will be delivered in the morning hours to Velesici, Gornji Pofalici, the Clinical Center, the district around the Zrak Enterprise, the Sokolje District, the left bank of the Miljacka in Stari Grad Commune, the Dobrinja District, and the districts above the city detour road up to (?Anektra). Citizens of Logavina and the central part of the city, that is, from Marijin Dvor to Bascarsija, will be getting water in the afternoon. The water works people warn that the water from Pivara Reservoir is chlorinated, but the water from Bacevo is not.

The city's supplies of natural gas is unchanged since yesterday. The quantities entering the city are insufficient to supply consumers for the whole day. The most difficult situation is the in Stari Grad and Centar. There are no indications that the situation is going to improve soon, Sarajevo Gas people report.

Pakistani UN Troops Close Croat School in Przici

LD0910181694 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosna in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 9 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] We have received a disturbing report from Vares. UN troops belonging to the Pakistani battalion, deployed in the Vares area, have closed down the primary school in Przici and banned classes. Despite protests nothing has been done. Listen to our correspondent:

[Correspondent] On 7 October 1994 at 1800 GMT, members of the Pakistani battalion closed down the Fra Filip Lasic primary school in Przici, an area held by the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] Vares units. They banned the classes, preventing 80 pupils from attending school. [passage omitted]

The school was opened on 3 October to the satisfaction of pupils, teachers, and parents, but this irritated the Bosniak authorities in Vares who used the presence of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] troops from Islamic states—in this case troops from Pakistan—who side with Muslims.

That is why we protest in the sharpest terms such behavior by the Pakistani battalion and their openly siding with the Muslims. We ask all Croat organizations in Bosnia-Herzegovina to undertake certain resolute steps to protect the Croat population of the Vares municipality and do everything they can to enable the classes in the Przici school to resume. [passage omitted]

Radio Reports Croats Being Ill-Treated in Tuzla

*LD0910182094 Sarajevo Radio Republike Srpske
Program for Abroad in Serbo-Croatian 1630 GMT
9 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] The position of the Croat population in the Tuzla region has become intolerable, especially since the setting up of the so-called Tuzla Canton, Croatian Radio Herceg-Bosna, Studio Zepce, reported today.

Croats are being forcibly drafted into the Muslim army and sent to the harshest battlefields to face Serb forces. Their homes have been plundered and they have been excluded from all positions of authority in the canton. All this indicates that they are not wanted in the Tuzla region, the news points out.

The situation has deteriorated, particularly in the last few days in the wake of the arrival of a large number of Muslim refugees from Metkovic, who demand that the Tuzla authorities expel Croats from the Tuzla region so

that they can move into their houses and apartments. There is great danger that the emigration of Croats from the Tuzla canton—by individuals or groups—could soon turn into a mass exodus, because it is obvious that the recent visit to Tuzla of Kresimir Zubak and Egup Ganic, the president and vice president of the Croat-Muslim Federation, failed to achieve any results, Radio Zepce points out.

Croats Reportedly Planning To Leave Usora

*LD0910204094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in
Serbo-Croatian 1955 GMT 9 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 9 Oct (TANJUG)—The Croat population is preparing to leave Usora, local Croat Radio Usora reported this evening in a broadcast picked up in Teslic. Tension between Muslims and Croats is reaching a climax after last night's murder of three Croats by Muslims on the Jelah-Tesanj road. According to the radio, the Croat authorities in Usora have declared a state of emergency in this area which runs from Tesanj to Teslic and Doboj.

Radio Usora says that Croat representatives in this area and the 110th Brigade of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] today made contact with the authorities in Doboj, to seek permission for the population of Usora to be allowed to cross into Croatia via the territory of the Srpska republic. Those to be moved would be mainly women, children, the elderly, the sick and the weak—as happened over a year ago with Croats from Travnik, Vares, Kakanj, and other places. The Srpska republic authorities have not yet confirmed or denied what local Croat Radio Usora has said.

As announced some time earlier, the Croat population is gathering in the village of Sivsa, out of fear of Muslim terror tactics, while the 110th and 111th Brigades of the HVO have prepared their defenses.

Granic Addresses Assembly on UN Resolution 947

LD0710145994 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 7 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Addressing the [Croatian] Assembly, Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and minister for foreign affairs, recalled the circumstances surrounding the negotiations [with UNPROFOR] in the run-up to the [UN Security Council] resolution. In this context, Minister Granic said that the Croatian delegation's entire activities consolidated and improved Croatia's reputation in its capacity as an important and active factor for stability and peace in our part of Europe.

The Croatian delegation's main task concerned the renewal or cancellation of the UNPROFOR mandate in the territory of the Republic of Croatia, Granic said. During these [negotiations] we found strong support in the stand of the Croatian Assembly. Speaking about the importance of [UN Security Council] resolution 947, the foreign minister said it stressed the need to secure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the countries in the area of former Yugoslavia within their internationally recognized borders and, in this context, the need for mutual recognition among all the countries in this area, Granic said. He added:

[Begin Granic recording] Resolution 947, as well as the other UN resolutions so far, confirm that the UN Protected Areas [UNPA's] are indisputably an integral part of sovereign Croatian territory, while the population of these areas are Croatian citizens. Specifically, in Operational Article 5 there is mention of opening road and rail links between the UNPA's and the rest of the Republic of Croatia. There is also mention of restoring water and power supplies in all areas of Croatia to the shared benefit of all its citizens. The resolution confirms the right of every refugee to return voluntarily to their homes in a safe and dignified way.

For the first time the importance was emphasized of returning refugees to the so-called blue zones. The need is also underscored for restoring the authority of the Republic of Croatia in the pink zones. Resolution 947 also calls for compliance with all the UN Security Council resolutions relating to the situation in former Yugoslavia, stressing in particular full implementation of the UNPROFOR mandate in the Republic of Croatia, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mate Granic said.

Martic Warns Zagreb Against 'War Ambitions'

AU0710144994 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 3 Oct 94 p 13

[Interview with Krajina Serb leader Milan Martic by Srdjan Radulovic; date and place not given: "I Am Not Forming a 'Parallel Government'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Krajina Serbs have experience of four years of war and politics, but it is considered that they are now approaching the most important examination of their political maturity—they are confronted not only with the unanimous attitude of the international community that the status of the republic of Serbian Krajina has to be solved within the internationally recognized borders of Croatia, but also with the causes and consequences of the inter-Serbian conflict between Belgrade and Pale. So there are enough reasons to ask the number one man of the republic of Serbian Krajina, Milan Martic, for his opinion on these political problems.

[Radulovic] What is your opinion of the present position of Krajina?

[Martic] It is indisputable that the latest pressure exerted by the international community has additionally affected the position of the Serbs west of the Drina, especially because there are attempts to split the Serbs. It is logical that we feel the consequences of the pressure exerted on the Serbian people and its leadership. As far as the republic of Serbian Krajina is concerned, its position is specific, since peace was achieved after an agreement on the suspension of hostilities had been signed with Croatia. We started a negotiating process that should solve all the controversial issues between the republic of Serbian Krajina and the Republic of Croatia. This is the reality that the international community must respect, and I do not see why impulsive decisions should be taken that could affect the peace process. A stable peace in this region can only result from patient negotiating; anything else would turn a delicate truce into a new war with unforeseeable consequences.

Aim—To Merge

[Radulovic] Can the Serbs west of the Drina (and west of the Una) formulate their own policy, or is it too late to take such a step?

[Martic] Our global determination is clear and unambiguous. It is not our aim to create two or three Serbian states. Our strategic, political, and national interests remain the creation of a unitary Serbian state. It is normal that the position of the Serbs west of the Drina is different from the position of our brothers in Serbia and Montenegro. This position also makes it necessary to take different political steps in certain situations. I still think that in the long run these differences cannot change the basic national interest of the Serbs.

[Radulovic] If the international community offered certain guarantees to the Srpska republic concerning its confederation with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and perhaps certain territorial concessions, what would be enough for Pale to accept the Contact Group plan? In such a case, would the position of Krajina deteriorate, and what would happen with the oft-announced merger with the Srpska republic?

[Martić] If the relevant international protagonists granted the Serbs in the Srpska republic the right to merge with Serbia this would be the first sign of a serious change in the international attitude toward the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. I am convinced that such a development would only speed up the process of unifying all Serbian states.

[Radulović] Croatia would certainly oppose that option. Apart from that, there is an international consensus that the position of Krajina should be solved within the "internationally recognized borders of Croatia."

[Martić] Croatia is constantly on the look-out for sponsors for a military adventure, since it does not want to accept having to negotiate with us as an equal partner. That is why Croatia is trying to undermine the continuation of the peace process. It is also buying weapons. It seems, however, that their closest sponsors are not ready to support them in their war ambitions. It is still to be expected that Croatian "sponsors" will, in future negotiations, try to grant unilateral concessions to the Croatian side. For this reason we are expecting even more powerful pressures on us under the pretext that we are opposed to peace. This attitude, however, can only make the situation worse and bring us back into the difficulties that we barely managed to overcome.

[Radulović] Do you know anything about the attempts of the international community to solve the relations between Krajina and Croatia within "a global plan for Croatia," which should be completed by 15 October?

[Martić] Mr. Kai Eido [name as transliterated], the envoy for the Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, denied the rumors spread by Croatian politicians about the existence of a "mini Contact Group" which is supposed to solve the status of the republic of Serbian Krajina.

Negotiations Between Krajina and Croatia

[Radulović] Croatia wants the sanctions imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to remain in effect until the status of the republic of Serbian Krajina is resolved. This is supported by both Germany and the United States. The international community is at the same time exerting pressure on Belgrade to recognize the borders of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as drawn up after World War II.

[Martić] The international community has so far consistently ignored the legitimate right of the Serbian people to self-determination. I do not believe that this attitude can prevail because it does not lead to a peaceful solution to the crisis. I do not see why the peace process, which has already begun between Croatia and Krajina, should be affected by imposing such a solution. On the other hand, the Serbian and Yugoslav political leadership has repeated its attitude several times that all controversial issues should be solved in negotiations between Knin and Zagreb. Apart from that, the recognition of Croatia

by Yugoslavia cannot only be connected to a solution to the status of Krajina, but also to other unresolved issues, such as Prevlaka, for example.

[Radulović] How will the negotiating process develop if Croatia insists on a parallel search for economic and political solutions?

[Martić] The Croatian leadership is obviously becoming impatient because the reputation that it has in its own country is diminishing. They pushed their people into war and promised them the impossible, so it is quite natural for them to be in a hurry now, but in spite of that they are not showing any serious intentions to solve controversial issues through negotiations. That is why the dilemma over whether negotiations should be first about economic and then about political issues or simultaneously about both is a spurious one. The negotiations on economic issues should prepare for the third stage of the peace process. I do not see how we and the Croats could reach an agreement on political issues if they are not even ready to negotiate about humanitarian and economic issues.

[Radulović] What do you expect from the UN Protection Force in this respect, since it will probably be remaining here for the next six months?

[Martić] I do not expect anything but for it to remain consistent with its mandate. The contribution of the UN peacekeeping force to the present truce is very important, but, although some UN units in the field are impartial, the influence that the authors of Yugoslavia's collapse have on the UN leadership is still very strong. In trying to justify mistakes already made, they are making new ones and are not anticipating their unforeseeable negative consequences.

Separatism, Babic, Government...

[Radulović] Experience has shown that at crucial moments for Krajina there arise political rifts. Why is this so and who is behind them?

[Martić] Behind them are those who cannot accept that the republic of Serbian Krajina is a state with legitimate institutions, so they try to profit from crises, hoping that their personal interests can be imposed on the Krajina population. There have been many such situations, but I have to stress that Krajina is now stronger than ever following the last elections and, more than anything else, because of the people's wish to defend the state that they have created with blood.

[Radulović] You have been accused by Milan Babic, chairman of the Krajina SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] Main Committee and a member of the government—whose party rejected the attitudes of the Supreme Defense Council—of blocking the legal system and forming a parallel government. How do you interpret this?

[Martić] I cannot believe that the Krajina government opposes measures that should improve the functioning of the legal state throughout its territory, because this would mean that someone's private interests were affected. I expect that the government will assume an attitude after it has discussed Minister Pijic's report. As far as the Krajina SDS Main Committee's attitudes are concerned, there seems to be a contradiction between newspaper reports and official conclusions. This problem should be solved by the Krajina SDS, and I do not want to argue with journalists. I have to point out, however, that the Supreme Defense Council is a legal institution that carries out the tasks envisaged by the constitution, and it is not my intention to usurp the powers of someone else or to form a parallel government. If there are ministries that do not carry out their tasks as they should, I cannot compensate for this with parallel ministries; on the contrary, I expect the government to discuss these problems.

[Radulović] Before the elections in Krajina you were supported by the Belgrade media and political institutions. There are no commentaries about your attitudes now. Can this be explained by your support for Karadžić?

[Martić] I have not changed my attitudes since the election campaign. I support consistent policies that result from the joint interests of the Serbian nation to create its state on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. I do not think that any serious Serbian politician can reject such an aim. There are certain differences in the methods and dynamics of realizing it, but they are understandable and should not be any reason for serious altercations.

[Box, p 13]

People Are Not Profiteers

[Martić] It is understandable that there are various interpretations of the Contact Group plan for the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, but the opinion that that plan is opposed by war profiteers and the supporters of war is, to say the least, malicious and it overshadows the heart of the problem. Can the complete Serbian nation, which has rejected this plan in a referendum, be called war profiteers and supporters of war? It is understandable that people in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have a opinion about the war different from those who have been directly involved in it. It is clear, too, that without the support from our brothers in Serbia and Montenegro, the struggle for our legitimate rights would be much more difficult and uncertain.

Organizers of Kidnapping

[Radulović] Why has the Supreme Defense Council connected the kidnapping of Ilija Pijic, the minister of internal affairs, in Borovo Naselje with "the policy of separatism" and with "centers of power in Belgrade"?

[Martić] There are groups in Krajina who have profited from the war, who have become rich and influential in society. The organizers of Pijic's kidnapping are exponents of these criminals, but I do not consider them politically important. The assessment of the Supreme Defense Council was misinterpreted. It is not political separatism, because it is not supported by the population of the eastern part of Krajina; it is rather an attempt to hide crimes behind a policy of separatism and behind allegations that the poor south of Krajina is being exploited by the rich east. It is a fact that war profiteers—who have even bribed some people in official institutions in order to achieve their aims—are not happy with the establishment of the legal system.

Martić Views Dispute Between Pale, Belgrade

LD1010190994 Sarajevo Radio Republike Srpske
Program for Abroad in Serbo-Croatian 1630 GMT
10 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Commenting on the situation in the republic of Serb Krajina, President Milan Martić says the following:

As regards the causes of the inter-Serbian disputes and their effect on Krajina's political scene, the bottom line is a dispute between Belgrade and Pale, i.e. Knin has come under pressure to side with Belgrade in this conflict. Regrettably, one gets the impression that even some members of the government are acting along the lines of—the worse things get the better—as if someone is trying to take control of the army and police.

I advocate the consolidation of our defense, the law-governed state, economic revival, and good relations with Serbia, Montenegro, and the Srpska republic, regardless of whether or not someone likes me. Hence, I am not going to tolerate chaos in the country even if the price is the measures I am entitled to take as president.

RSK's Mikelić: UNPROFOR May Remain

LD0910144094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in
Serbo-Croatian 1340 GMT 9 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kragujevac, 9 Oct (TANJUG)—Borislav Mikelić, prime minister of the republic of Serb Krajina, has said he does not believe that the focus of the Yugoslav crisis will shift toward Serbian-Croatian relations after the easing of sanctions against Yugoslavia and the latest international community's stand on the Srpska republic.

Speaking today on Kragujevac Radio's "The Seal of the Times" program, Mikelić spoke of a wave of recent reports regarding the stand of the mini contact group. "Officially, we received no document from the contact group and we did not learn of its stand. I think it's a form of Croatian trick and a deterrent directed against the republic of Serb Krajina."

Mikelić also said the Serbian side fulfilled its responsibilities regarding the cease-fire.

The republic of Serb Krajina even adopted a platform on economic talks with Croatia. "Foreign Minister Milan Babic and I tried with Sarinic and Pasalic on the Croatian side to establish some priorities for the talks. The Croatian side stands no chance in wanting to disarm the Serbs, or chase UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] out of the present protected zones. True, Croatia can chase it away, but only from the Zagreb headquarters. As far as we are concerned UNPROFOR can stay here a year or two, as long as it likes, if peace is at stake," Mikelic said.

As far as the reopening of the Zagreb-Belgrade highway is concerned, Mikelic said that the Serbian side is asking Croatia to return to it their territories in the area around the highway. "The world will finally realize that Serbs from the republic of Serb Krajina are in favor of peace, and not war," Mikelic said.

RSK Official Denies 'Plan' To Rejoin Croatia

LD0910213694 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2054 GMT 9 Oct 94

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Oct. 9 (TANJUG)—A republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] official denied Sunday a Croatian radio report on existence of secret plan for Krajina's "reintegration" into Croatia within the next six months.

Presidential adviser Slobodan Jarcevic was quoted by the Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA as saying: "It is an illusion created by Croatia in order to appease its people."

"There is no return to how things were," said Jarcevic. He said: "All such calculations are absolutely out of question."

SRNA reported the Zagreb-based Croatian Radio as quoting on Sunday "a ranking U.N. Protection Force [UNPROFOR] official, who asked not to be named," as saying that Krajina might territorially disintegrate in the next six months.

The U.N. Security Council recently extended UNPROFOR's mandate for six months.

According to the same source, "the plan for the division of Krajina" was agreed on last year between Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, and the then republic of Serb Krajina President Goran Hadzic.

Croatian Radio said that the plan called for eastern Slavonija and Baranja to be joined to the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia and western Slavonija to Croatia, while the Knin Krajina, Lika, Banija, and Kordun would get local autonomy within the Croatian state.

"We have a state, the republic of Serb Krajina, which has existed for five calendar years, and there is no executive

authority, the one in Knin today or the one which will take over tomorrow after possible elections, which can put its signature on and agree to anything of the kind," said Jarcevic.

The republic of Serb Krajina was proclaimed in 1991 in response to Croatia's unilateral secession from the former Yugoslavia and the removal of the Serb national rights from the Croatian Constitution.

It was proclaimed a United Nations Protected Area in 1992, but Croatia has nevertheless carried out aggression on it four times.

The Krajina population has twice said no to a return under Croatia's authority.

"The Croatian Army, regardless of a few fanatical and professional brigades, is not a force which could be a threat to the republic of Serb Krajina," Jarcevic told SRNA.

RSK Council Views Political, Security Issues

LD1010201594 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1746 GMT 10 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin, 10 Oct (TANJUG)—At its session today the Supreme Defense Council of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] described the political and security situation in Krajina as extremely complex.

A statement from the session, presided over by Mile Martic, president of the republic of Serb Krajina, stresses that this situation is considerably compounded by the lack of political unity and the ever more evident party activities, "which are not in the service of consolidating the internal stability of the state."

In this connection "all the tendentious accusations—made by individual parties and laid at the door of the Supreme Defense Council as the constitutional organ of authority—that it is in no way a parallel authority are rejected." Such assessments are designed to score political points, the statement stresses, and an appeal is made to all political parties "to subordinate their party interests to those of the state for the sake of the people and to make their full contribution to the strengthening of the state's internal stability and defensive power."

The council concluded that the army of the republic of Serb Krajina now has full control of the Bojna region in Banija, where at the beginning of September there was fighting with the 5th Corps of the so-called Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

As a result of these events, the statement says, and after a comprehensive analysis of their causes and consequences, personnel changes have been carried out in the command of the Banija Corps.

The large number of refugees from western Bosnia and the smuggling between Cazin Krajina and Kordun have

had an additional unfavorable impact on, and have made more difficult, the overall political and security situation in the RSK.

The Supreme Defense Council of the RSK believes that, although significant results have been achieved in thwarting the smugglers through joint activities of the police and the military police, unless the judicial authorities involve themselves in an appropriate way it will be difficult to eliminate smuggling.

The Supreme Defense Council believes the RSK cannot alone bear the burden of accommodating the refugees.

Krajina Denies Reports of Bosnian Offensive

LD1010155094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1312 GMT 10 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin, 10 Oct (TANJUG)—In a statement to TANJUG, Colonel Dusan Loncar, chief of general staff of the army of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], has denied news agency reports about a powerful offensive by forces of the 5th Corps of the so-called army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the direction of Dvor na Uni.

According to him, this is "yet another calculated piece of disinformation from the arsenal of psychological and special warfare and pressure being exerted on the RSK and on the Srpska republic."

For a month now, Colonel Loncar claims, not a single bullet has been fired in these parts.

Our forces remain in their unchanged positions and are carrying out their normal duties. There is no question of there having been any military actions in the region of the responsibility of the Dvor brigade, Colonel Loncar said categorically.

Krajina Serbs Suffer 'Heavy Losses'

AU1010171394 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 10 Oct 94 p 32

[Report by Trajko Grkovski: "Soldiers of Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 5th Corps Closing on Korenica and Plitvice"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Karlovac—According to reliable sources from the regions of Bihac and the UN Protected Areas, the units of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 5th Corps have been engaged in fierce battles in the areas of Licko Petrovo Selo and Licka Pljesivica, Skocaj. The rebel Serbs of Kordun and parts of Lika have suffered heavy losses in these clashes.

On one part of the occupied Kordun, around Slunj, and Licko Petrovo Selo, the soldiers of the 5th Corps are now holding positions previously occupied by the Serbs, while the regions of Plitvice and Korenica are also within their range. There is no doubt that the members of the 5th Corps have infiltrated sabotage groups in Licka Pljesivica, Zeljava, and Novo Selo, and damaged the TV transmitter on Licka Pljesivica. That is why the Serb radio stations have frequent disruptions in their programs, and the people in Kordun and a part of Lika have been complaining that they no longer receive the Banja Luka TV picture.

The UN Protection Force, particularly the members of the Czech Battalion stationed in Plitvice, Borje, Jezerac, and Korenica speak of new migration of the Serb population following the clashes and operations by the 5th Corps. The members of the Polish and French battalions have said semiofficially that the Korana Bridge near Plitvice, on the border of Bihac and Licko Petrovo Selo, has been badly damaged in the 5th Corps operations.

The shortage of fuel, the snow that has appeared in Korenica, Plitvice, and Vrhovine, and the fear of the Muslim attacks have interrupted the school in Korenica and Vrhovine. School buses do not drive, so the children have to organize their own transport to school. In one village near Plitvice, the local people have to transport the children in a horse-drawn carriage. The Serbs are asked not to move along the border toward Bihac unarmed.

PDP Leader Alleges Electoral 'Manipulation'

AU0710211294 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in
Macedonian 6 Oct 94 p 4

[Interview with PDP leader Abdurahman Aliti by Panta Dzambazoski; place and date not given: "Perhaps We Shall Be in Opposition"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Dzambazoski] After some announcements about an election coalition of the Albanian parties and after all the negotiations among the parties, the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] has decided to run for the elections independently. Why is that?

[Aliti] Let me correct you—there have not been any particular negotiations, but there have been some previous announcements, particularly by some of the leaders of the NDP [People's Democratic Party], that they would run in the elections independently. This did not provide any opportunities for negotiations. It is absolutely normal for the Albanians' parties to measure their power, and that can be only done through elections. Concrete agreements on particular constituencies will be possible in the second round of the elections.

[Dzambazoski] Are you here referring only to agreements with other Albanian parties or also with the parties that make up the Alliance for Macedonia?

[Aliti] All combinations are possible and I will not just restrict this to Albanian parties. Parties with similar programs or common interests can also be taken into consideration.

Who Is Guilty

[Dzambazoski] Nevertheless, you have agreed with the NDP and the ADS-LP [Albanian Democratic Union-Liberal Party] to boycott the elections if what the Ministry of Justice and Administration claim is true, that there are about 145,000 Albanians with unsettled status of citizenship. Why?

[Aliti] Let me comment on this with an example: Out of 126,000 voters in Tetovo there are only 71,000 Albanians on the new voting lists. If there is a similar situation in other communes where Albanians are the majority, then we really will have nothing to do with the elections. We were upset by this information and the Albanian parties reached a common conclusion spontaneously. We have informed all the authorities in the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] about this in order to avoid misunderstandings or wrong interpretations. I will now give you the arguments against the claims that there is such a great number of people without citizenship. According to some data issued by the Interior Ministry, out of 36-38,000 applications for citizenship only 4,800 were denied. So, there is either a lack of information or a crooked wish to omit the names of people with citizenship from the voting lists so as to prevent them from voting. Now in some mountainous villages the number of people in this category is high, although there has not

been any migration. If there are no corrections, it means that someone wants to exclude us from the elections, and in this case it is the authorities. Even so, I cannot see why this should be in their interests.

[Dzambazoski] Journalists have said that the meeting of the parties was secret. However, your headquarters denied this.

[Aliti] It was not secret, because we signed a joint statement and we sent it to almost all the diplomatic offices in the Republic of Macedonia, to international organizations and associations, to the government and to President Gligorov. I want to stress that it is not true that we want people who are not citizens of Macedonia to be on the lists. It is absolutely not true. I do not have any reason not to trust the data issued by the Interior Ministry. In addition to the mentioned figure of 4,800, there were another 800 people who applied for citizenship, which means that the total was about 5,600. We do not demand that these people vote, because we know that people who are not citizens cannot vote in any European country. The laws are explicit. However, in our country every citizen must prove his citizenship, while it is the other way round everywhere else. There is another thing that is very ambiguous. The general election list is made by the Ministry of Justice and Administration according to the law. It was updated on 31 August 1994, but I do not know about any regulation that says that it has to be presented to the Republican Department of Statistics. The explanation is that it needed elaboration. That is not true, because we know what elaboration means. If the Tetovo list enters the Department with 126,000 voters and then comes out with 71,000, then it is not elaboration but manipulation. Why is that so if there is a law, although some will say that this law was passed in 1974. I can accept this, but who is guilty?

[Dzambazoski] After that, you had discussions with President Gligorov and with the CSCE representatives. Have you been promised any adjustments?

[Aliti] Yes, only I do not know how much the president of the republic can help if the state bodies are not functioning.

[Dzambazoski] What has become of the 800,000 Albanians in Macedonia, which is the figure that some PDP leaders have claimed to be true? Certain unofficial information reveals that there are 400,000 Albanians according to the census.

[Aliti] I have never made such a statement, and I would ask you to put this question to those who are engaged in issuing numbers. I have never cared about calculations, but about the quality of life and human rights.

[Dzambazoski] Do you not think that a possible boycott of the elections will mean destabilization for Macedonia, especially with the PDP presenting itself as a factor of stability?

[Aliti] We are and we want to be a factor of stability. However, why should we agree to something that is not to our, but rather to other parties' benefit? We have no

reason to be a greater factor of stability than the other Macedonian political parties.

[Dzambazoski] Although you are not now in an election coalition with the parties of the Alliance for Macedonia, you were a member of the government coalition. Will you make a coalition with these parties again if the results of the election make it possible?

[Aliti] We have never been in coalition with the parties that you have mentioned. At the very beginning we said that we shall support the government that these parties form and that we shall take part in it. Some say that this is an ambiguous situation—we take part in the government although we are not happy with the status of the Albanians. But it is true.

[Dzambazoski] You are saying that you will make your continued participation in the government dependent on a different constitutional definition of Macedonia, in which the Albanians would be a constituent nation.

[Aliti] We know how Macedonia has been defined and there can be no misunderstandings. Some may claim that we have a civic constitution, but this is not true, and I can state this professionally. We, the PDP, have a political program and we put it forward as is our right and duty. There is nothing unknown or unclear in this respect. Therefore, I cannot understand why some people are annoyed when we say that Macedonia is a multinational state.

[Dzambazoski] So, you will strive for another constitutional definition....

[Aliti] That is our political view on the political matters in Macedonia for the future and there is nothing ambiguous there.

[Dzambazoski] Let us go back: Will you make your future participation in the government dependent on this?

[Aliti] I think that the PDP will win the elections over the other Albanian parties. However, the presidency of the party is considering being in opposition in the next parliament, or as some say, in a constructive opposition. We think that if we are in a position of a critic on duty, we can extract a greater benefit for the Albanians. However, there is the possibility that power will pass to some political groupings that will work miracles in Macedonia overnight.

[Dzambazoski] Have you achieved any results while you were in government?

[Aliti] Of course we have, in the area of information, education, and so on. But these are normal achievements that would have happened even without the PDP, as a result of democratic processes that do not involve restrictions.

Some Concepts Cannot Be Achieved

[Dzambazoski] We can hear some different concepts on the settlement of inter-ethnic relations in the election

campaign of the Democratic Party and the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Movement for Macedonian National Unity]. What is your comment?

[Aliti] I have been following the statements made by those people, future prime ministers and presidents of the state. Some see Macedonia as a "Macedonia for the Macedonians," and that is some progress, but in quotation marks, compared with the earlier promise for a "clean Macedonia." The explanation is that everybody in Macedonia is a Macedonian, but with a different origin—Albanian, Serbian, Turkish, etc. This concept is not new and it is known in some countries as the concept of one state-one nation. I do not reprimand these people; it is their right to speak and make promises. The important thing is that such a concept cannot be applied here. Can anyone believe that the Albanians will be trained to present themselves as Macedonians abroad, and to explain in some further discussions that they are of an Albanian origin? Does any Albanian from Kosovo say that he is a Serb? These are our circumstances, which are perhaps different from any other country's. I really do not see how Mr. Ljubisa Georgievski [VMRO-DPMNE leader] intends to accomplish this.

On the other hand, Petar Gosev [Democratic Party leader] says that the present authorities are bargaining with the minorities. He wants to suggest that if he comes to power, he will not bargain with them. I say that there has not been any bargaining, because if there had been, I would have been a direct participant in some kind of deal. Gosev will not "bargain"; he will not give any concessions to the Albanian, the Turks, or the Serbs. So, what will he do?

If some people think that the Albanians will agree to be second-class citizens and bow their heads to Gosev or Georgievski, then they are as wrong as their views. Perhaps Gosev and Georgievski are planning to open prisons of great capacity in each town, expecting scientists to tell them the period that is necessary for prisoner rehabilitation, after which consciousness about freedom and democracy will be wiped out, so as to be able to govern them. I agree that the individual, that is the citizen, must be the center of interest. However, there are certain things that the individual simply cannot do. If a Macedonian is striving for a national television network, or some other national institution, how can an Albanian, as an individual, achieve this if the other one also does it? Will Barus Mlaku [Albanian director] be able to be director of the Macedonian National Theater? Now it is impossible for him even to be a manager. We must now address the painful point—loyalty. It does not depend on the individual, but on the general climate. If an Albanian has no reason to object to the government, he will automatically be loyal to the state.

If someone shouts: "We shall not allow federalization," he automatically pushes the Albanians into federalization, into Ilirida [name for desired Albanian autonomous region in FYROM]. So, it is not true that some

love Macedonia a lot, some less, and others do not love it at all, meaning the Albanians. Results will be only achieved with a rational policy.

[Dzambazoski] Does it mean that the PDP has not presented a candidate for president of the state for these reasons and that it is actually supporting the current president's candidacy?

[Aliti] We have not stated our support. The PDP decided to put forward a candidate after some discussions with the other Albanian parties with the aim of presenting a common candidate, if possible. We had joint meetings but we could not reach an agreement on a common candidate, and that is why we did not put one forward. We give the Albanians the liberty to vote by free choice.

PDP Calls For Autonomy for Albanians

AU1010212394 Skopje MIC in English 10 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Party for Democratic Prosperity [PDP] asks again for autonomy of Albanians again at the meeting at Debar (which started with the Albanian hymn). The president, Aburahman Aliti said that the Macedonian politicians, together with the current President Kiro Gligorov, were wrong in believing that the option for autonomy of the Albanians in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] was overthrown. The settling of the Albanian question is possible, if it is solved also on Kosovo, beside Macedonia, namely, with the gaining of the status of the Republic of Kosovo. "We are for dialogue, however, our options, which are derived from the Declaration, which was signed by 11 political parties of the Albanians foresee other options for the settling of the Albanian problem." Aliti stated that "it sounds cynical when there are calls for the Albanians not to listen to PDP at the election meetings, but to listen to the treadors of the Macedonian politics, such as Ljubisa Georgijevski, the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] presidential candidate, with whom, behind the back, the Albanian political deceased, the so-called patriots, are allied."

Presidential Candidate Elaborates Platform

AU0510191394 Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 30 Sep 94 pp 50-51

[Interview with Ljubisa Georgijevski, Macedonian opposition presidential candidate, by Slobodan Jokovic; place and date not given: "Gunfire Before the Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Theater director Ljubisa Georgijevski is the candidate for the opposition VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization] in the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] presidential elections that will take place in October.

Georgijevski is a director who directed plays throughout former Yugoslavia. He took part and won prizes at all the

Yugoslav theater festivals. His play Mara's Wedding performed by the Bitolj Theater was banned, he was in charge of programming at the Sterija Theater festival in the year the play Golubnjaca caused an uproar throughout Serbia and Yugoslavia, so he got out of trouble by leaving an entire day void of performances in the middle of the festival, saying: "Had there not been political obstacles, Golubnjaca would have been shown today."

[Jokovic] How is it that you became engaged in politics, and what is the purpose of your engagement?

[Georgijevski] That is a question I have been asking myself over the past several months too, and I am not sure that I have found the correct answer. When we were still working in the infamous political theater that wreaked chaos in former Yugoslavia, we used to say that the destiny of the 20th century appears dressed up as politics.

My decision to get involved in politics and to accomplish the highest degree of honor is an intellectual engagement. All the time I had in mind Vaclav Havel, as well as the book "Fish Left High and Dry" by Maria Vargas Llosa, who led the five-year-long campaign in Peru, only to lose in the end. The involvement of intellectuals these days is absolutely necessary, because political insanity has gripped the Balkans.

My personal reasons are also of a moral and intellectual nature, because I am really sick of living in such a corrupt and nepotistic country, because I am really sick of the mafia and the hypocrisy of the intellectual state leadership that covers that mafia, and because I am really sick of the aspirations of the ethnic Albanian minority here in Macedonia, which now wants to become a nation with the blessing of Kiro Gligorov. I am sick of seeing clearly the fate of Macedonia if it should become a federal state. I am sick of promises that the indivisible state territory will be divided among several nations, and in that case I can clearly see the fate of Bosnia happening to Macedonia. If we partition Macedonia between Macedonians and ethnic Albanians, then a war is imminent.

[Jokovic] Do you, as presidential candidate, and your party have any solution for such a problem?

[Georgijevski] In order to prevent such a course of events, I have come out with the concept "Macedonia for Macedonians," certainly organized in a civil and democratic way, where there will be no first or second class citizens, and where national minorities will remain political parties that, in accordance with their participation in the parliament, will have as much political influence on events in our state. I do not think that ethnic Albanians should be deprived of already given rights, but I really resent their current aspirations. If I become president, not a member of the ethnic Albanian minority will be able to declare himself of herself ethnic Albanian in their passport. Only Macedonian citizens can have Macedonian passports.

[Jokovic] Are Macedonians living in a kind of deceptive half-sleep, and have they gotten rid of the old apprehension that they are surrounded by four nations that have pretensions on Macedonian territory?

[Georgijevski] That is an attitude developed by Mr. Gligorov, so he can appear as the only savior, in accordance with the formula that either he will be president of Macedonia, or those four imaginary enemies will destroy us. I do not see any such enemy, and my first task would be to develop friendly relations with all our neighbors, nonaggressive relations, but any attempt to harm the dignity of Macedonia, to lay claim to its territory or national status would provoke a very aggressive response. I would not intimidate Macedonian citizens with war, I would not invoke any alternative such as: either me or war. War is the most stupid thing in the world. The real issue is how to wage peace. I would not conclude peace, just as I would not wage war. I would wage peace.

[Jokovic] You represent the democratic right wing. How would you establish peaceful and friendly relations with neighboring countries where socialists rule?

[Georgijevski] Socialists are currently in power in Serbia, Macedonia and Greece. Which means that Gligorov should sit down at the negotiating table with Milosevic and Papan-dreou, his socialist friends, and settle everything. Consequently, if I were the head of the Macedonian state, I should talk with the right wing, the democratic one. But we would very soon establish friendly relations with any authentic government in the Balkans. I do not understand the actions of the socialist Papan-dreou, who sacrifices the entire business in the northern Greece, which we rightfully call Aegean Macedonia. No rightist government would permit the economic death of Salonika because of the blockade of Macedonia.

[Jokovic] What about your northern neighbor? At the election rallies it is being said that some people call Macedonia southern Serbia....

[Georgijevski] There is no reason for us to have bad relations with Serbia. On the contrary! We have certain territorial problems regarding borders, but only 100 or 200 meters are being disputed. In other words, we have minor problems with Serbia. As far as I can see lately, I am convinced that no authentic and democratic government in Serbia would start a new war, because Serbia, you have to admit, has had enough of war.

[Jokovic] You stand for peace and friendship, for a Macedonia without borders, a sort of Balkan customs union and cultural cohabitation in the Balkans. You say that you have no problems with Serbia, that you would not wage war or shoot, so would you then comment on the reasons for gunfire along the Serbian-Macedonian border recently?

[Georgijevski] I have already very clearly and decisively given my opinion on the issue in my campaign speeches. It is generally known that the Macedonian state leadership is smuggling oil to Serbia, at very high prices. It so happens now that major oil smugglers are killing petty smugglers at the border, Serbian peasants carrying a couple of containers with oil or gasoline just to provide

for their families. That is cynical. I am sure that presently, the gunshots at the Macedonian-Serbian border are connected with the elections.

For a long time many officials of the Macedonian state leadership played the card of Yugoslavia's remaining devotee, even when it was clear to Serbs that Yugoslavia had collapsed, here, in Skopje, the Izetbegovic-Gligorov platform was being proposed. Gligorov wasted too much time attempting to preserve Yugoslavia, and he missed some great opportunities. He missed the opportunity to save a certain part of the capital, because Ante Markovic [former Yugoslav prime minister] came here and, according to my estimates, he took with him 2 billion German marks. He ruined many depositors, imported bananas, and appeared in the election campaign with his protégé Stojan Andov. Also, Gligorov could have more reasonably negotiated with the Yugoslav People's Army and saved something somehow.

So now in the electoral campaign Serbia is being fired upon because my party has severely criticized the state leadership for underhanded dealings with Milosevic, so they want to demonstrate by gunfire that their relations with Serbia are in no way friendly. The people have seen through Gligorov's policy because it is known that, on the one hand, they deal with the Serbs, while on the other hand, they deal with ethnic Albanians. Our people say: "He who sits on two chairs soon falls down."

[Jokovic] If the Americans, Europe and the rest of the world already know what is to be done with the Balkans, and how to do it, why are they negotiating with the same people who destroyed Yugoslavia and who are—some more, some less—guilty for the existing war?

[Georgijevski] This phenomenon falls under my theory: They do so in order not to determine the actual cause. It is very sad that those people are still in power. I did not cause Yugoslavia to collapse and what I thought about that country is my own business. I shall list the people who finally destroyed Yugoslavia: Slobodan Milosevic—Communist, Milan Kucan—Euro-Communist, Franjo Tudjman—Tito's general, Kiro Gligorov—pragmatic Communist, Alija Izetbegovic—fundamentalist, Momir Bulatovic—an extra. Bulatovic and Montenegro are probably in the best position, because for everything that happened they are least to blame and should be given the least credit.

Those people have liquidated one country, and now they demand that trust be placed in their new countries.

[Jokovic] With whom could you cooperate in Serbia?

[Georgijevski] I do not want to name the people in Serbia with whom I could cooperate. Besides, they are my friends, and I am convinced that in Serbia there exists a strong democratic core able to establish peace and good relations with all the surrounding states. In the end, I would most like to cooperate with a Serbia as conceptualized, as far as I can remember, in 12 points by Mihiz [not further specified] several years ago in NIN.

Ministry Replies to Croatian Protest on Boundaries

AU1010212094 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1800 GMT 10 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The Slovene Foreign Ministry handed a reply to Croatia's protest note regarding adoption of the Law on Formation of Municipalities and Their Boundaries to the Croatian Ambassador in Slovenia [Miljenko Zagar] today.

The Foreign Ministry in its reply voices a stance adopted by the Slovene Government at its 6 October session. At the same time the ministry expresses the belief that the sides should avoid unilateral actions which would complicate relations between the countries.

The Foreign Ministry explains that the border running through the area of controversial hamlets south of the Dragonja River has not been clearly defined and thus one could not speak of only one side having sole administration over it.

The Foreign Ministry also emphasizes that the final drawing of the state border can only be a subject of negotiations and future interstate agreement.

Martino, Peterle End Talks in 'Warm Atmosphere'

AU1110093994 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 2100 GMT 10 Oct 94

[Report by Nadja Pengov]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Martino-Peterle talks in Aquileia lasted exactly eight hours. After reporters received absolutely no information as to what was going

on behind closed doors the entire day, [Italian and Slovene] Foreign Ministers Martino and Peterle made statements for the public. First Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Martino:

[Begin Martino recording in Italian, with superimposed Slovene translation] The meeting was very friendly, cordial, and constructive. This is a step forward in the process that started with the Slovene Government decision of 31 September. The options are a lot clearer now. We will continue our work and I am convinced that today we have done some good work for the benefit of Europe and our mutual relations. [end recording]

And now Slovene Foreign Minister Peterle:

[Begin Peterle recording] During the seven [number as heard] hours' work in a warm atmosphere we had constructive discussions about issues in our relations. We paid great attention to the present, the past, and above all the future. I believe that the emphasis was placed on the last of these. I believe that we have made pleasing progress. We will now have to convince our governments of what we have accomplished. Today's meeting was in the spirit of preparations for the prime ministers' summit. I believe that we have created a sound basis for their final blessing. [end recording]

Minister Martino was convinced that a considerable step forward had been made toward the summit of the two prime ministers, which he hopes will take place by the end of the month, although a lot of work is still required in the meantime.

Foreign Minister Peterle, just like his Italian colleague, did not wish to give a more detailed assessment of the meeting, because, he said, what has been sown must be nurtured and watered.

Federal

Churkin on 'Russia-Belgrade-Podgorica Coalition'

LD0910095494 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0753 GMT 9 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Podgorica, 9 Oct (TANJUG)—The main hope that the crisis in the region of former Yugoslavia will be resolved can be found in the fact that a Moscow-Belgrade-Podgorica political alliance has emerged, Vitaliy Churkin, Boris Yeltsin's outgoing special envoy for former Yugoslavia says in a statement published in today's Podgorica POBJEDA.

He goes on to say that "In the future the course of events will be dictated by the Russia-Belgrade-Podgorica coalition." Churkin thinks that the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will be lifted quickly.

According to him, the intransigence displayed by the Bosnian Serbs "is a considerable obstacle to achieving a lasting peace."

In reference to relations between the Croats and the Serbs, Churkin says that "in view of the importance of [words indistinct]," he always carries in his briefcase "The agreement signed in the Russian Embassy in Zagreb by the governments in Knin and Zagreb."

Churkin stresses that "Other outstanding problems need to be resolved in the same way that the issue of Prevlaka was settled."

Official Criticizes U.S. Decision on Refugees

LD1010165194 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1609 GMT 10 Oct 94

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Oct 10 (TANJUG)—Serbian Commissioner for Refugees Bratislava Morina said Monday that a U.S. State Department decision not to aid refugees in Yugoslavia constituted discrimination.

The United States recently budgeted 28.5 million dollars for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross for refugees in Bosnia and Croatia only.

Morina said "such a decision is an inappropriate, as well as undemocratic and cynical act of a country otherwise committed to democracy and justice"

She said the United States alone had failed to acknowledge that there were nearly half a million refugees in Yugoslavia.

Morina quoted U.S. State Department Spokesman Michael McCurry as having said on Oct. 4 that the U.S. Government had pledged 20.5 million dollars for relief aid programs in Bosnia, Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia, and an additional eight million for the International Red Cross to finance programs for Bosnia and Croatia.

Morina said she nevertheless hoped that the UNHCR would set aside a portion of the money for refugees in Yugoslavia, saying she had also asked the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry to file a protest with the U.S. Government.

Belgrade's Association of Serbs From Krajina and Croatia said Friday that the State Department decision was deplorable and offensive because it discriminated against the Serbs who had suffered the most in the civil war in the former Yugoslavia.

Lilic Urges Unity, 'Policy of Peace'

AU0710142294 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 7 Oct 94

[Report by Aleksa Djuric—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Djuric] In the Vojvodina Assembly, FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] President Zoran Lilic was greeted by the speaker of the provincial parliament, Milutin Stojkovic, and the president of Vojvodina Executive Council, Bosko Perošević, with his assistants.

At the beginning of talks, they briefly informed him about the work of the assembly, the political and security situation in the province, and interethnic relations, as well as the results achieved in the implementation of economic stabilization and the reanimation of production. President Lilic emphasized that we must exploit to the maximum all the advantages that Yugoslavia, Serbia, and Vojvodina have in the geostrategic sense. In connection with this he emphasized:

[Lilic] I would like to emphasize, here in Vojvodina in particular, that as the basis of our policy we have primarily chosen a policy of peace, that is, a path of peace and cooperation. I would even use a term that many dislike, however, I believe that it is the correct one—a path of unity.

When I say the path of unity and not a path of divisions, I do not refer or speak of ideological unity, which is neither achievable nor necessary in the times in which we live. However, we need the other kind of unity, which is, at least the way I understand it, a lot more important at this moment, namely, (?active) unity aimed at strengthening our state and its positions in international contacts and on international scene in general. All this, especially now that the first step, which the assembly speaker has mentioned, has been made, a very significant step toward the lifting of the sanctions that were forcefully imposed on us by the international community and that we no longer speak about, but which have, I believe, contributed greatly to the situation in which we are now.

[Djuric] Lilic expressed his satisfaction with the fact that there are no serious differences and discords between the members of various ethnic groups in Vojvodina.

[Lilic] Such mutual relations—at least this is my opinion, and even though you do not want my opinion (?you have

to hear it)—are the fundamental cohesive force that guarantees prosperity for Vojvodina, the Republic of Serbia, and the FRY alike. What is important, this also guarantees peaceful future to our grandchildren. I would like to say the following—I have recently said it in Novi Pazar and I would like to repeat it here—he who would try to seize somebody else's land and try to build a home on it is risking building an uncertain future for his grandchildren, and I am not sure if he is not digging a grave precisely for those same grandchildren. [words indistinct]. For this reason, we should hail the positive tendencies in this region, especially because an atmosphere of solidarity and understanding exists here, which is, I would say, also strong proof in favor of a fact that has been repeated on numerous occasions, namely, that the policy of ethnic equality is the only correct policy and that we must insist on this policy by observing the rights that the Constitution guarantees to all FRY citizens.

[Djuric] President Lilic did not speak separately of our economic situation. As he said, he will leave this for his talks with businessmen. He merely warned that it will be very difficult to overcome the crisis without a new investment cycle.

Foreign Minister Jovanovic Interviewed on UN

AU1010141594 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1908 GMT 9 Oct 94

[Interview with Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic by Dusan Cukic; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Cukic] Mr. Foreign Minister, you have just returned from New York. The session in the United Nations, particularly the General Assembly, has always been a chance for international diplomats to meet, agree on new relations, new meetings, and foster a better mutual understanding. Did the same apply this time to the Yugoslav delegation?

[Jovanovic] Of course, and this time more so than in the past. I would even venture to say that it was close to what is otherwise normal in relations between countries; meetings between politicians, scheduling of bilateral events. This time, we had this with several countries, neighboring countries, and those farther away, and this time it was at the initiative of these countries and not always at our initiative. Therefore, these meetings anticipate better times, a time when such meetings will primarily focus on the necessity of developing cooperation, improving this cooperation, and not solely on the Yugoslav crisis and what it means to all those following it.

[Cukic] From what we were able to gather here in Belgrade, you had over 30 meetings with foreign ministers of various international countries. On the basis of what you have just told us and what we have heard, it is obvious that the door is opening for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's real return to the international scene.

[Jovanovic] It is not opening; I believe it is already open. We now only need to pass through it and, if possible, at a

swift pace. The pace, unfortunately, does not depend solely on us, because if things depended solely on us, we would already have made a comeback. However, it also depends on other factors in the Bosnian—that is, Yugoslav—crisis and on the pace of resolving the other aspects of the entire Yugoslav crisis. We believe that the opening of this door and the reception of Yugoslavia, which has practically already passed through it, on the part of practically all participants in meetings with us will be a swifter process than can perhaps be assessed at first glance. Perhaps because this expresses the interest and the strong need of practically all countries to finally end the Yugoslav crisis and establish normal relations with us as soon as possible. As much as this crisis is pressuring us, it is also pressuring the rest of the world, financially, materially, and strategically, and in a good number of cases [words indistinct] psychologically, since it is evident that they have had enough of the crisis, the war, the images of war, and that they want this page finally turned.

[Cukic] You were in New York when we here greeted the first international flight; the information that the UN Security Council [UNSC] has eased the first package of sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia reached you in New York. How was this interpreted in the circles on the East River?

[Jovanovic] This was not perceived as being a great event due to its dimensions [sentence as heard]. However, the event was perceived and stressed as an event that has put an end to an earlier development and that has opened the way for new developments. Everyone has invested great hopes in these new developments. Very few countries still insist on turning back the wheel of progress, or stalling further progress for as long as possible. The countries that are doing so are increasingly isolated, and I believe that soon they will find reason to stop stalling, because this is beginning to directly damage themselves, their reputations, and their interests in this part of the world.

[Cukic] The heads of various, even great states—Russian President Yeltsin, for example—say that all the sanctions should be lifted. Did you get this impression in New York?

[Jovanovic] The greatest number of the people we spoke to, if not all, understand the need to lift the sanctions completely, since they are already gradually being lifted. Everyone is aware that without the complete lifting of the sanctions there can be no comprehensive resolving of events in this part of the world, and therefore, no comprehensive peace, stability, or prosperity. Therefore, no one is contending that the sanctions should be completely lifted. Moreover, no one contends that this should be implemented as soon as possible; some of those we spoke to believe that it should be done immediately, others believe that it should be done as soon as more progress is accomplished or evident in the solving of other aspects of the Yugoslav crisis. The toughest ones believe that this should be left until the very end. However,—as I have already said—there are very few of

these. It is true that they are influential—the United States, or Germany, for example—but it is evident that their influence is influenced by others, primarily their partners, and that is the reason why these two countries have agreed to an initial adjustment of their stance. It can, however, be felt and deduced that they are ready to seriously reexamine the wisdom of maintaining a tough stance regarding the lifting of the sanctions.

[Cukic] The countries that you claim still maintain a tough stance, countries like the United States or Germany, have, it seems, lately been attempting to solve the whole Yugoslav crisis outside the framework of the already signed international documents, and to establish a link between the lifting of the sanctions and the whole Yugoslav crisis. Can they accomplish this? Our country will probably not agree to this variant?

[Jovanovic] They are attempting to do this, but that does not mean that they are convinced that it can be accomplished. They are attempting it because they have until now maintained a mild, somewhat irresponsible attitude towards principles and law in the case of a solution for the Yugoslav crisis. They have been extensively playing with both law and principles. In this case, they are attempting to cloud the issue, and in this way influence others to accept this reasoning and this approach, in the same way as they were influenced to take a negative attitude toward Yugoslavia through a well measured out, negative image promoted by the media. However, we can say that they will not have much success with this, primarily because everyone can read, and Resolution 575 makes the connection between the Bosnian crisis and the sanctions perfectly clear. Any other additions could always cause doubt in the countries at whom this appeal [words indistinct] is aimed. On the other hand, Europe as a whole, with only minor exceptions, has a greater need than the United States or certain [word indistinct] countries, to see peace established and an end to the instability in our region. That is why it will certainly be unwilling to involve itself in yet another cycle of complications for the sake of some unclear, controversial issues. On the other hand, Yugoslavia has a completely unambiguous legal position, it has been called upon by the highest executive body of the international organization to meet a certain number of conditions, and in turn, this executive body has directly obliged itself to immediately revoke the decision on the sanctions. Yugoslavia has met the conditions, has even gone a step further, and we now have every right to expect the UNSC to honor its obligation.

[Jovanovic] The resolution does not specify that our country has an obligation to bring peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina, it simply has to meet a certain number of conditions. In this moment, any insistence to first establish peace and then to (lift all sanctions), represents a very vague interpretation that borders on the arbitrary. Setting new conditions, linking the issue with new problems—recognition of the Krajina, for example, and so forth—would mean that the UNSC has renounced its authority

and reputation and that it is beginning to implement the policy of one specific power, or several powers, that have already compromised the Yugoslav crisis.

[Cukic] Minister, the new and old warmongers in former Yugoslavia seem to have experienced a fiasco when they voted in the UNSC to extend the UN Protection Force mandate in the region. Moreover, it seems that the Americans are having no success in pushing through their idea of lifting the arms embargo for Alija Izetbegovic's Muslim government?

[Jovanovic] These are two events that have certainly significantly thwarted the attempts of the advocates of tougher options, advocates of a continuation of the war. The extension of the [UNPROFOR] mandate constitutes a defeat for Croatia, which insisted on a much shorter period of time and under certain conditions. If we disregard this political [word indistinct] that has been incorporated into the text in order to make it easier for Croatia to accept the fact that the mandate has been extended for another six months, then we must say that the international organization has the matter firmly under control and that it does not wish the honoring of its obligation, namely, the maintenance of peace and the guaranteeing of the safety of the Serbian people in Krajina [changes thought] will insist on this until the very end, for as long as there is reason for it. The lifting of the arms embargo is a demand that is in complete opposition with the trends and interests of the majority of states to end the crisis as soon as possible, rather than to have it flare up. That is why putting off the lifting of the embargo is a gentle way of killing the whole idea. Six months is a long time in politics, and a decisive breakthrough in the peace process is expected to take place in this period. Moreover, it is well known that when there is no accord as regards the acceptance of an idea, the best way to either kill it or deactivate it is to put it off until some later date. I believe that this is what they have done this time. I believe that these two events have essentially strengthened the peace process, they have also strengthened the authority of the United Nations that had begun to wane under the weight of some of its unsuccessful moves. At the same time, it gave the peace forces enough time to use the remaining six-month period to fully realize the chances for achieving political solutions and to definitely channel the entire Yugoslav crisis towards its final outcome.

[Cukic] If you agree, I would now address the issue of lifting the sanctions. Some people assess the events of a few days ago—this new window into the world via international flights, international maritime traffic, science, culture, sports—as being a small step. How was this, for us, after all, great step interpreted in the United Nations, among your colleagues, the ones you spoke to, regardless of the fact that no one—not even we here—made a big thing of it?

[Jovanovic] Although everybody is aware that this is only the modest beginning of a great task—the task of peace that lies before us—everybody has been paying tribute above all to Yugoslavia for its invaluable contribution, the biggest contribution made in this peace

process to raise its quality to a higher level. Everybody asserted that this beginning, although modest, in fact represents an end to the negative stage, and that is not a modest result, that is a great result as it pushes this negative stage into the past, making it history. Therefore, it is opening the line along which, in the very nature of things, movement should be faster and results greater. I would add here something I said on an earlier occasion—that such a process reminds me of unraveling knitted socks or a sweater. Once the process is begun, the article can hardly be kept whole again. This is why we are justified in hoping and expecting that that road will be faster and more fruitful and therefore not cause delays or longer waits for encouraging new results.

[Cukic] Of course, you also spoke with the UN secretary general about the very topics you are mentioning now, but could you tell Television of Serbia viewers about the way Butrus-Ghali sees the peaceful Belgrade policy, but unofficially, during conversation with you?

[Jovanovic] It was an absolutely encouraging conversation, in terms of tone, topics, and conclusions. The secretary general himself several times highly estimated and hailed Yugoslavia's moves and our side's constant effort to expand the peace process and finally impose it at an unstoppable pace. He is also aware of the problem and agrees with us that lifting the sanctions alone can make that process meaningful and remove the causes that have been endangering peace and stability in the region. He was not talking about the beginning of the process, but about the need completely to lift sanctions. In that context he pointed out that a parallel positive development in moving toward political solutions in other spheres of the Yugoslav crisis would help bring about such a successful outcome in having the sanctions lifted.

[Cukic] What are then the next moves, particularly by diplomats?

[Jovanovic] First of all, it is most important for us that the work commenced be completed, so that this final just and lasting peace is brought to the former Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and therefore the process of lifting the sanctions completed. Then, one should make use of the positive effects of such a move and the completion of the process, to help support and accelerate the solving of the other elements of the Yugoslav crisis on the same principles of equal rights and respect for all former Yugoslav (?constitutive) peoples.

We expect that our policy of building and developing bilateral relations with several states, and later, the first aspects of cooperation with certain international forums should progress parallel to these positive efforts and processes. There are already hints that the same thing could be accomplished with the European Parliament and the Council of Europe; we believe that we shall also be able to talk to the CSCE about certain initial forms of contact and cooperation. This progress should gradually bring us closer to the regular bodies of the international organization in which we are currently not actively participating. We also

have the Nonaligned Movement in mind, in which there is growing conviction that a unilateral and wrong decision was made regarding us, and that this movement—primarily for its own sake, its credibility and authenticity—should examine this decision as soon as possible and thus enable us to reclaim our rights within the movement.

[Cukic] We need to be cautious, but we also need self-confidence on the road we have followed so far.

[Jovanovic] One thing is certain, and that is that this road is the right one and it is unique. It is the only one leading to certain results. Any other road would be riskier and full of pitfalls and dangers, yet its results would not be as certain or evident. Therefore, this road has already yielded the first results. It has opened the space for our action, it has gained us significant sympathy, and it has implied that a great number of countries will be ready to quickly establish links with us and facilitate our return into the international community. These are elements that a policy must always take into consideration and hail as very useful for its further successful implementation.

[Cukic] Federal Minister Jovanovic, thank you for the interview.

[Jovanovic] Thank you.

Evaluates Peace Process

AU0910163794 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 9 Oct 94

[Interview with Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic by Dragan Colovic; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Jovanovic] It is clear from all the meetings I had in New York that our policy of peace, our contribution to the peace process, and particularly our latest moves have been assessed as extremely positive, good, timely, and pointed in the right direction. Therefore, what follows from this is both support and encouragement and, at the same time, convictions that this process will speed up the lifting of all the burdens from us and our quicker reintegration into the international community. This is the message we received from everyone, even those who practically until yesterday did not want to have any political contact with us. On the other hand, there is increasing conviction that this will facilitate and speed up the process of lifting the sanctions and the resolving of the remaining problems within the context of the Yugoslav crisis. We have concluded from these reactions that Yugoslavia—probably for the first time after the several traumatic years of the Yugoslav crisis—is seen, respected, and accepted as not only an unavoidable, but also entirely equal partner in the further process of establishing peace, stability, and prosperity in our region. I say equal partner, although this implies that it should be freed of all the burdens—primarily the sanctions—as soon as possible. This is very present in the reasoning of our collocutors, so it will certainly be an accelerating, stimulating factor in the further resolving of the crisis.

[Colovic] The first decisive step in [words indistinct] sanctions towards the lifting of the two and a half year blockade has been achieved thanks to the decisive and peaceful policy of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY]. Our citizens are expecting—with reason—the continuation and speeding up of this process to the final lifting of the sanctions. What should all the interested parties, particularly the international community, do in order to ensure that the next phase, which would lead to the complete deblockade, is surmounted as easily and as quickly as possible?

[Jovanovic] First, the most important thing is that the ice has started to melt, that a negative trend has been stopped, and that a positive trend has taken over. The international community should and must remain consistent to itself, its principles and demands, and particularly respect its own decisions that are, at the same time, decisions of international significance. This means that it should block all attempts at maintaining as long as possible this burden on our back, or, if possible, to have it increased by linking it to certain entirely different problems from the one that led to the imposing of the sanctions. Therefore, this consistency, this balance between the cause and the consequence is present here; the United Nations' highest representatives made this clear to us, but so did all our other interlocutors, although some of them are still trying to prove that it is necessary to make more progress in the peace process, or until the positive results of the progress so far are more widely evident in the Yugoslav crisis. In any case, it is the international community's—or to be precise, the Contact Group and the UN Security Council's—turn to make a move. For the sake of their own credibility and responsibility that they have for the peace process in which we have invested the most, they should respond more quickly in line with the magnitude of our contribution.

Confident of International Reintegration

AU0910212894 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 9 Oct 94

["Excerpt" of interview with Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic by Dusan Cukic; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Cukic] Mr. Foreign Minister, you have just returned from New York. The session in the United Nations, particularly the General Assembly, has always been a chance for international diplomats to meet, agree on new relations, new meetings, and foster a better mutual understanding. Did the same apply this time to the Yugoslav delegation?

[Jovanovic] Of course, and this time more so than in the past. I would even venture to say that it was close to what is otherwise normal in relations between countries; meetings between politicians, scheduling of bilateral events. This time, we had this with several countries, neighboring countries, and those farther away, and this time it was at the initiative of these countries and not always at our initiative. Therefore, these meetings anticipate

better times, a time when such meetings will primarily focus on the necessity of developing cooperation, improving this cooperation, and not solely on the Yugoslav crisis and what it means to all those following it.

[Cukic] From what we were able to gather here in Belgrade, you had over 30 meetings with foreign ministers of various international countries. On the basis of what you have just told us and what we have heard, it is obvious that the door is opening for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's real return to the international scene.

[Jovanovic] It is not opening; I believe it is already open. We now only need to pass through it and, if possible, at a swift pace. The pace, unfortunately, does not depend solely on us, because if things depended solely on us, we would already have made a comeback. However, it also depends on other factors in the Bosnian—that is, Yugoslav—crisis and on the pace of resolving the other aspects of the entire Yugoslav crisis. We believe that the opening of this door and the reception of Yugoslavia, which has practically already passed through it, on the part of practically all participants in meetings with us will be a swifter process than can perhaps be assessed at first glance. Perhaps because this expresses the interest and the strong need of practically all countries to finally end the Yugoslav crisis and establish normal relations with us as soon as possible. As much as this crisis is pressuring us, it is also pressuring the rest of the world, financially, materially, and strategically, and in a good number of cases [words indistinct] psychologically, since it is evident that they have had enough of the crisis, the war, the images of war, and that they want this page finally turned.

[Cukic] We need to be cautious, but we also need self-confidence on the road that we have followed so far.

[Jovanovic] One thing is certain, and that is that this road is the right one and it is unique. It is the only one leading to certain results. Any other road would be riskier and full of pitfalls and dangers, yet its results would not be as certain or evident. Therefore, this road has already yielded the first results. It has opened the space for our action, it has gained us significant sympathy, and it has implied that a great number of countries will be ready to quickly establish links with us and facilitate our return into the international community. These are elements that a policy must always take into consideration and hail as very useful for its further successful implementation.

Justice Minister Receives War Crimes Prosecutor

LD0710163594 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1410 GMT 7 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 7 Oct (TANJUG)—Uros Klikovac, federal deputy prime minister and federal justice minister, received in the Palace of the Federation today the Richard Goldstone, prosecutor at the international penal tribunal, and his associates, the Federal Secretariat of Information announced today.

"In the course of lengthy and open talks, Uros Klikovac presented our government's policy regarding the setting up and functioning of the international tribunal which is to try war criminals for crimes committed on the territory of the former SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia].

It was stressed that the federal government remains true to its policy on which it briefed the UN secretary general.

Our principled stand is that a permanent, not an ad hoc, international criminal tribunal should be set up, whose jurisdiction will cover all countries and perpetrators of crimes against humanity and the international humanitarian law.

The FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] policy, as Deputy Prime Minister Klikovac said, is that all persons who have committed crimes and violated international humanitarian law should be prosecuted and punished. This should be the primary obligation for relevant state bodies in accordance with valid laws.

As far as the FRY is concerned, these laws have been coordinated in every detail with international conventions, i.e. with international law, and have been consistently implemented in practice. The establishment of the international penal tribunal for the former SFRY alone represents an act of discrimination, even more so because the international community has not acted in the same or in a similar way in a number of situations which have happened elsewhere, the statement says.

Richard Goldstone stressed that the international penal tribunal should have credibility, based on the principle of impartial justice, if it is to operate successfully. Following this professional principle, he expects help from all state organs and organizations that have an interest in bringing every perpetrator of war crimes to justice. This is the motive behind his visit to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, so that his team can gain an insight into possible forms of cooperation with Yugoslavia's relevant bodies. Richard Goldstone fully supports our view on the establishment of a permanent international penal tribunal whose powers will extend to all states to the same degree.

Uros Klikovac, federal deputy prime minister and federal justice minister, expressed the Federal Government's readiness to maintain contacts and cooperate with the relevant bodies of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in line with our legislation relating to the identification, prosecution, and penalization of those individuals who have committed crimes against humanity and against international humanitarian law.

In the course of his visit to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Richard Goldstone, prosecutor at the international penal tribunal, also spoke with Federal State Attorney Milomir Jakovljevic, and with Zoran Stojanovic, chairman of the committee for gathering data on crimes against humanity and international humanitarian

law, and Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Radoslav Bulajic," the statement says in conclusion.

Avramovic Outlines Economic Development Plan

AU1010095394 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 9 Oct 94

[Interview with FRY National Bank Governor Dragoslav Avramovic by Dusko Petrovic; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Studio announcer] In an interview for today's Dnevnik program FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] National Bank Governor Dr. Dragoslav Avramovic expresses optimism regarding the further implementation of the economic recovery program. The governor also claims that expert groups—formed with the aim of preparing a comprehensive and complete program of the country's economic development for the period from 1995 to 1997—have already started work.

[Petrovic] Governor, some eight months ago, when we first talked in this place, this cup of coffee cost 1 dinar. Today, it still costs 1 dinar. Allow me to say that this is a kind of metaphor for the stability of the entire program, the stability of prices, and the, after all, stable dinar.

[Avramovic] You see, salaries increased everywhere, and it was evident that this would have an effect. However, there is no catastrophe. The green produce market has already settled down. After the excitement of some 10 days ago, the prices at the green produce market are stable again. The market is the main gauge here, therefore, all the excitement was just a storm in a teacup. There is no reason or basis for any fear that everything will just suddenly collapse in one go.

[Petrovic] About a month ago, you were appointed coordinator of three working groups [Avramovic interrupts him]....

[Avramovic] Main coordinator.

[Petrovic] which have been formed with the aim of analyzing and coming up with appropriate solutions, so that by the beginning of next year we should have a comprehensive economic development program. How (?is the work going)?

[Avramovic] They started work last week and will continue working to the end. The atmosphere in these groups is very democratic and the beginning was very successful. We already have a definite work plan, at least in a part of these groups. At the suggestion of several members of these groups—this was a unanimous stance, truly impressive—we are going to add a fourth group of companies—this encompasses the small companies, under 1 million dinars—for which people claim that they have immense potential and that the benefits are also immense [sentence as heard]. They provide new jobs, particularly in villages, and as far as banks are concerned, we are going to concern ourselves with the issue

of why we still have queues in front of banks, why limits on cash withdrawals [Petrovic interrupts]....

[Petrovic] Why some banks have no foreign currency....

[Avramovic] why some banks have no foreign currency, who is now ruling the banks; is the control of loans selective, or is there no control of loans; to what extent do the banks decide, and to what extent does the state decide, to what extent does the central bank decide. We are going to deal with all these issues.

[Petrovic] We have learned that the members of these working groups are distinguished academicians?

[Avramovic] We have Mr. Mihajlo Markovic, university professor and academician, and Ivan Maksimovic. Sociologists will include Mrs. Mirjana Markovic [Serbian President Milosevic's wife], while in Group 2—assigned to banking—we have Kosta Mihajlovic [words indistinct], and Professor Milos Macura, so that we are entering a period of continued economic growth and maintenance of the monetary stability that we have achieved, and where simultaneously you have elements of [words indistinct] and social justice.

[Petrovic] Does your vision of this new Yugoslav society incorporate a higher degree of social justice, free people, a modern market economy?

[Avramovic] You have precisely defined everything we are hoping for, both the method and the aim.

Lilic on Measures To Oppose Hyperinflation

AU0710213894 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 7 Oct 94

[Report by Mirjana Jevtic]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yugoslavia has opted for a policy of national equality. This is the only correct policy.

This was stated by FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] President Zoran Lilic in Novi Sad during his talks with Vojvodinan Assembly Chairman Milutin Stojkovic and Vojvodina Prime Minister Bosko Perosevic. It is encouraging that there are no ethnic rifts in this region. The policy of peace and cooperation are the guarantee for prosperity, not only in Vojvodina, but throughout the republic, he said.

[Begin Lilic recording] I would like to emphasize, here in Vojvodina in particular, that as the basis of our policy we have primarily chosen a policy of peace, that is, a path of peace and cooperation. I would even use a term that many dislike, although I believe that it is the correct one—a path of unity.

When I say the path of unity and not a path of divisions, I do not refer or speak of ideological unity, which is neither achievable nor necessary in the times in which we live. However, we need the other kind of unity, which is, at least as I understand it, much more important at this moment, namely, unity in action aimed at strengthening of our state and its position in international

contacts and on the international scene in general. All this especially now that the first step, which the assembly speaker mentioned, has been made, a very significant step toward the lifting of sanctions. [end recording]

Lilic stressed that all citizens in our country have equal rights. This is why they must equally meet their obligations to the state. If they do not do that, they should not live in it.

Milutin Stojkovic, chairman of the provincial assembly, reminded those present that national minorities in Vojvodina are treated democratically. Novi Sad Radio and Television broadcasts news programs in five languages. Is this not the best proof of the respect and equality of the national affiliation of all citizens?

The Vojvodina Assembly is made up of deputies from several parties, and its sessions are held in a cultural and dignified manner appropriate for such a prominent body, Stojkovic said. The security situation in the province is good. Extremist parties and nationalists have realized that Serbia is a rule-of-law state and that they must behave in line with its laws.

Vojvodina's Prime Minister Bosko Perosevic briefed the Yugoslav president on key investment projects that the province plans to implement in the period ahead. The construction of a major irrigation system will commence in a couple of weeks. A consortium of producers of equipment and banks has been set up. Support from the National Bank of Yugoslavia and the government to the tune of 30 million dinars is also expected. He also presented a project of the so-called Danube highway, the construction of ports and tax-free zones, and the completion of the Belgrade-Subotica highway. A hail-protection project is equally important.

President Lilic stressed that all these projects deserve support, especially when one knows that only 7 percent of arable land is irrigated in our country and that farmers are still looking to the sky wondering whether they are going to have a good harvest. With some investment and order we could treble our crop.

In a cement factory in Beocin, Lilic held talks with the directors of leading Vojvodinan companies on current economic and financial problems. On this occasion the businessmen were again unanimous in their support for the program of economic recovery. They stressed that this was undoubtedly in the interest of all entities in the economy. President Lilic commented on these statements by saying that businessmen's verbal and moral support was not sufficient, and concrete support was needed.

[Begin Lilic recording] I would like to say—especially to you here today, and I believe you feel this, too—that the program is being destabilized by, above all, those whose aim is to undermine the FRY's economic system, cause chaos on the market, and in this way most directly to destabilize the general situation in the FRY. I think that none of us would like to see again the time when we had

inflation of several hundred million percent, or hyperinflation, or if there is a name at all for such an economic phenomenon that happened last year.

There are attempts to weaken the dinar exchange rate. This refers to the so-called sticung [unofficial rate of exchange] that you mentioned here. What is not good is that some enterprises are even taking part in these activities, and I would use an even more liberal term, crimes. This is no secret and these enterprises will have to bear certain consequences.

The National Bank of Yugoslavia, and the Federal and Republican Governments must put a stop to this phenomenon, and be sure that they will do so very soon, because this is in fact where monetary chaos starts, chaos that directly leads to inflationary waters, let alone hyperinflation. I think that you clear about it, and that this should be prevented with all means, by you and by all relevant organs, primarily by the National Bank of Yugoslavia, that is, with the mechanism that the financial police have to deal with the payments system. I do not want to talk about these expert matters to you who know this better than I do.

The undermining of the program must, and I will again use a severe term, be treated as a serious criminal act, and be assured that I will strive for this to be done. [end recording]

At the end of the working visit to Vojvodina, FRY President Zoran Lilic visited the Novi Sad Garrison. The officers in the Command of the Novi Sad Corps briefed President Lilic on the conditions of work and living of the professional military personnel and other members of the Army of Yugoslavia.

The conclusion was that, despite financial and especially accommodation problems, the units of the Novi Sad Corps, with their combat readiness, are providing successful defense of the FRY in their zone of responsibility.

Addressing the officers of this corps, President Lilic, supreme commander of the Army of Yugoslavia, stressed that it was of the paramount importance for the combat readiness and morale of the Yugoslav Army that all of its members, without exception, act according to the established norms, that every soldier and officer is accountable for the tasks given to him. We must allow anyone to harm the dignity of our army's officers with arbitrary assessments. The state has been investing in the army, equipping it, and training its staff for years. The army's duty is to care for this great potential responsibly, to protect it, and to continue modernizing it, FRY President Zoran Lilic concluded.

Economy Suffers Significant Losses in Key Areas

95P20033 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
29 Sep 94 p 11

[Article by B. Jager: "Growing Production-Growing Losses"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Doing business under the conditions of the current stabilization program with growing production and retail sales that have increased 26 percent, the Yugoslav economy as a whole shows bad results for the first half of the year. They are bad quantitatively because total expenditures exceeded total income by 7.32 million dinars and qualitatively because the level of return in business was lower by 20 percent. According to the data most recently published by the Yugoslav Payment System Service, an extremely modest profit of 630 million dinars was achieved. The share for allocations is less than half of that figure, and all figures together indicate that there was no significant increase of owners' assets during that period. On the other hand, great losses were recorded in the first half of the year. They amount to 7.95 million dinars, representing a reduction of owners' equity mainly in the public sector of the economy.

Specifically, every fourth company recorded negative results in the first half of the year, and the losers employ 932,000 people, or 54 percent of the work force. Most of these losses, 74 percent, were concentrated in industry. The hardest hit areas were the following: electronics, 2,314,000; ferrous metallurgy, 1,277,000; aviation, 487 million; vehicles, 422 million; chemical industry, 382 million; coal production, 356 million; oil and gas 309, million; farming, 206 million, wholesale trade, million; utilities, 239 million. This list clearly shows the difficulties associated with increased production and its driving forces.

Even if gross salaries were to account for 14.4 percent of expenditures, it would be clear what role paychecks played in creating economic losses. There is evidence to show that a good part of them were not covered by production or justified by efficiency. On the average, a net salary in the public sector in the first half of the year was 114 dinars per month; in the private sector 84 dinars, in the combined sector 113 dinars, and in cooperatives 124 dinars.

The six-month balance sheet shows that the economy lacks liquid assets from practically all sources, that growth of reserves is sometimes listed as growth of working capital, that investments have stopped, and that creditor-borrower relations are not suitable for the economy, whose obligations are greater than its assets. It is interesting to note that private companies participate in the economy with only 6 percent of the work force, that their share of total revenue is 29 percent, while their share of profit, as modest as it may be, is 67.3 percent.

Yugoslav Airlines Reopens Flights to Athens

LD0810112294 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1110
GMT 8 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Athens, Oct. 8 (TANJUG)—A Yugoslav Airlines (JAT) Boeing 737 landed at Athens airport early Saturday.

This was the first Yugoslav plane to take off for Athens after 28 months of sanctions against Yugoslavia.

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The flight officially reopened air traffic between Belgrade and Athens after United Nations Resolution 943 suspending selected sanctions against Yugoslavia took effect October 5.

The resolution reopened air traffic, a ferryboat line between the Montenegrin Adriatic Port of Bar and the Italian Port of Bari and restored cultural and sports cooperation.

The Boeing 737 crew and passengers were warmly welcomed with banners and flowers at Athens airport.

The Geneva-based Swiss airlines SwissAir confirmed Friday it would restore flights to Belgrade. The first SwissAir plane is to land at Belgrade's Surcin airport on October 17.

SwissAir said it would fly from Zurich to Belgrade on Mondays, Thursdays and Fridays until October 30 including Wednesdays as of November.

The first foreign airliner to have landed at Belgrade airport was Russia's Aeroflot on October 5.

The first international JAT flight since the imposition of the sanctions was for Moscow on October 6.

Resumption of Maritime Links With Italy Postponed

LD0910194694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1813 GMT 9 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Rome, 9 Oct (TANJUG)—The official resumption of the regular maritime link between Italy and Yugoslavia, scheduled for tonight, has been postponed for a certain period "due to procedural reasons."

According to competent ministries in Rome, the same or similar procedure used when links and relations were suspended after UN sanctions were imposed against Yugoslavia must be used when establishing them again.

Even though the UN Security Council adopted a resolution on lifting the sanctions in this area, the EU [European Union] also has to adopt a formal decision, and subsequently so do all individual states, i.e., they should suspend special laws on the implementation of the sanctions adopted after they were imposed. [passage omitted]

Commentary Views 'Rift' in Krajina Leadership

AU110112394 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 7 Oct 94 p 7

[Commentary by Radovan Kovacevic: "What Is Happening to the Krajina Leadership?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The analysis of Krajina developments over the last couple of months shows that rifts and confusion in the republic of Serbian Krajina always cause anxiety in Serbia, or rather the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Milan Martić-Milan Babić

duo has imposed itself on the Krajina political scene. Apart from personal differences between the two, there are also differences in political aims. The fact that something is rotten in Krajina was confirmed after the rather bizarre case of Ilija Prijic, chief of the republic of Serbian Krajina police. He was kidnapped at the end of August in Borovo Naselje by members of a paramilitary group, one of whom later turned out to be his deputy!

The supreme defense council of the republic of Serbian Krajina reacted promptly though rather clumsily, saying that "the Belgrade power centers were behind the incident," but without any elaboration as to the reasons for such a claim. The claim about helping the secession of northern parts of the republic of Serbian Krajina remained equally unexplained.

Party Offensive

Martić's presence was obvious at the session of the supreme defense council, but not that of Prime Minister Borislav Mikelic. The government had, to be truthful, discussed the "Prijic affair" some 10 days after it had happened, but the discussion was rather reserved. Hence the assessment that the government's (and Mikelic's) primary interest is to solve the issues concerning the status and functioning of Krajina, such as the opening of the Belgrade-Zagreb highway. His ideas concerning the possibility of Serbs expelled from western Slavonija returning home should be seen in this light, regardless of the fact that this UN Protected Area, Sector West, is under the control of the Croatian Army and police.

The other critical point occurred when a Muslim [Bosnia-Herzegovina Army] sabotage group penetrated into the territory of Krajina in the Bojnan region. According to official reactions, "a number of the republic of Serbian Krajina troops were killed," but the actual figure was not given. The supreme defense council was forced to sit urgently in session again, and to indicate the removal of several commanders in Banija as soon as their responsibility was established.

These must have been the main reasons for Milan Babić to decide that the time had come for more robust party intervention.

One should remember that he won the parliamentary elections at the helm of the Serbian Democratic Party of Krajina, but since he did not get the majority in the assembly, he formed a coalition with the Radicals.

He got the foreign ministry in Mikelic's government of national unity, but he still kept his opposition stance toward Martić. At the beginning of this month, the main committee of his party in Topusko came up with some very serious accusations against Martić, alleging that he was forming a parallel government, that he was illegally influencing the ministries of the army and the police, and that he was even concentrating power in alliance with the headquarters of the Serbian army of Krajina. To everyone's surprise Martić ignored these accusations, saying that he would react only when he received the complete minutes from that meeting.

Redistribution One More

It is interesting, though, that in Topusko Babic supported the Mikelic government, proving that he was distancing himself from the Radicals as coalition partners. His moves became even more interesting when he expressed sharp dissatisfaction with the conclusions of the meeting of the supreme defense council of the republic of Serbian Krajina in connection with the alleged links between the "Prijić affair" and the Belgrade power centers. Because of individual interests and events that are yet to be investigated, one should not tolerate an arrogant attitude toward the mother-country Serbia—this is Babic's basic message.

One could have followed even earlier the evolution and different levels of political maturity of Martić and Babic, the two key men on the Krajina political scene. At the referendum in the Srpska republic, Martić voted against the Contact Group plan in Drvar. "With this I show the commitment of the Serbs in the republic of Serbian Krajina," he said at the beginning of August in Drvar. At the same time, Mikelic's statement that "peace has no alternative" did not go unnoticed. Some short-term speculation in Krajina circles showed at that time a wish to see Babic's firm support for Martić, because the former was known for his hard-line views toward Belgrade, particularly in crucial times, such as the time of the adoption of the Vance Plan. Babic, however, seems to be establishing coalition ties with Mikelic, in the sense of respecting the authorities and the people in state functions. Also one should not ignore Seselj's recent statement that, unfortunately, Babic "has crossed to the ranks of Slobodan Milošević."

According to all this, it is again time for the redistribution of power in Krajina. Babic and Martić are probably both equally committed to the achievement of the interests of the Serbian people in Krajina, but their strategies are different. As far as the chroniclers of political developments are concerned, Babic is more convincing in his commitment to the promotion of the state interests of the republic of Serbian Krajina through maintaining good relations with Belgrade, which was the subject of his recent talks with Slobodan Milošević.

Serbia**SPS Official Sees Stand Toward FRY Changing**

LD0910205394 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2015
GMT 9 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kragujevac, Oct. 9 (TANJUG)—The partial suspension of sanctions against Yugoslavia [FRY—Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] marks a positive change in the international community's stand, said a Serbian governing party official Sunday.

Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] Vice President Goran Percevic said the easing of the sanctions reflected a change in the international community's stand towards the peaceful

and constructive role Yugoslavia had played from the start in the quest of a solution to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.

Percevic said on Radio Kragujevac [town in central Serbia] that it had become even more obvious how unjust and absurd the sanctions were when Yugoslavia lent support to the "Contact Group" plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions on Yugoslavia in late May 1992, alleging the country's involvement in the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

U.N. Resolution 943 on a partial suspension of the sanctions took effect on October 5, after Yugoslavia supported the Contact Group plan for the territorial division of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"Serbia and Yugoslavia are a factor of peace and stability on the territory of the former Yugoslavia and the Balkans as a whole, and the sooner this is realized and politically affirmed in the world, the sooner the sanctions will be lifted," said Percevic.

He said Yugoslavia needed no praise and acknowledgement but to have the sanctions lifted and to resume its place in the international community.

Splinter Group Emerges From SRS

LD0710162594 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1336 GMT 7 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 7 Oct (TANJUG)—Jovan Glamocanin, a Serbian Radical Party [SRS] deputy to the Federal Assembly Chamber of Citizens, stated today that seven SRS deputies have officially set up a new club of deputies under the name SRS - Nikola Pasic [former Serbian foreign minister and prime minister between 1904-1926, founder of the People's Radical Party in 1881].

At a press conference in the federal parliament, Glamocanin said that the new club was formed so that the SRS deputies to the Chamber of Citizens will not be obstructed in the performance of their duties as parliamentarians. The club of deputies led by Vojislav Seselj is not providing the elementary conditions for it and all our efforts are reduced to provoking incidents in the Federal Assembly, Glamocanin said.

Not ignoring the badly conducted session of the Chamber of Citizens by its chairman Radoman Bozovic, whom he holds responsible for the latest incident in the parliament, Glamocanin said that the work of the assembly has been blocked.

"In our future activities we will oppose incidents and take a constructive part in the chamber's sessions, we will fight for parliamentarism and for the SRS program of principles," Glamocanin stressed. He underlined that the seven SRS deputies who make up the new club of deputies SRS - Nikola Pasic are not abandoning the Serbian Radical Party and its program.

"We are not setting up a new party, we are dissociating ourselves from Seselj," the head of the new SRS club of deputies, Glamocanin specified, but said that their club is preparing the election of SRS bodies.

The addition to the name of the new club of deputies, he stressed, should express our devotion to Nikola Pasic's radical tradition. In addition to Glamocanin, the newly formed SRS club includes: Milorad Crnjanin, Djordje Tanic, Danilo Golubovic, Miroslav Jovanovic, Dragan Arsic, and Zoran Tesovic. [passage omitted]

SRS Deputies Expelled

LD1010191294 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1747 GMT 10 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 10 Oct (TANJUG)—The central homeland administration of the Serbian Radical Party [SRS] adopted a decision today on the expulsion of seven SRS federal deputies who left the SRS club of deputies on 7 October 1994.

The decision was adopted at the proposal of the SRS club of deputies to the FRY Assembly's Chamber of Citizens and the SRS club of deputies to the People's Assembly of the Republic of Serbia.

The decision was adopted unanimously. The session was not attended by the above-mentioned deputies, although they had been invited, the party headquarters said.

Kosovo

Rugova Hails International Concern Over Kosovo

AU0810195894 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 7 Oct 94

[Telephone report by Shaban Arifaj from Prishtina]

[FBIS Translated Text] At today's news conference, Republic of Kosovo President Ibrahim Rugova praised the discussion on the Kosovo issue in the U.S. Congress' Committee for Eastern Europe two days ago. Rugova also greeted the discussions by the French, Austrian, and Albanian foreign ministers at the 49th session of the UN General Assembly, demanding a solution to the Kosovo issue. He supported President Berisha's initiative to approve the Albanian constitution through a referendum. For more details on this conference, here is Shaban Arifaj:

[Arifaj] The U.S. Congressional Committee for Eastern Europe held a meeting organized by Congressman (?Engel) that dealt with the Kosovo issue. Hailing this meeting, Dr. Rugova informed correspondents that the meeting voiced a great concern over the situation in Kosovo. It demanded that the repression be stopped and a fair solution be found for Kosovo.

President Rugova illustrated the internationalization of the Kosovo issue and the interest shown by the world community to resolve it with statements by French

Foreign Minister Alain Juppe, Austrian Foreign Minister Alois Mock, and Albanian Foreign Minister Alfred Serreqi at the 49th UN General Assembly session. In their speeches, they expressed concern over the present situation in Kosova, demanding a just solution to this issue as a condition to achieve stability in the Balkans.

President Rugova added that the Leading Committee of the Geneva Conference also discussed the Kosovo issue. On this occasion, the German party stressed the European Union's stance that Kosova be included in the global solution to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. This stance was also maintained by Lord Owen in Geneva.

Dr. Rugova demanded international protection for Kosova and reiterated his option of a confederal relationship with Albania, since the Bosnian Serbs would be allowed to have confederal ties with Serbia.

President Rugova hailed President Berisha's initiative that the Albanian constitution be approved through a referendum and added that this is carried out in the framework of applying the democratic norms of the Albanian state regarding this fundamental act. He demanded from political parties, particularly the Socialist Party, to show understanding on a most successful and solemn accomplishment of the referendum.

Rugova devoted part of his comments to the present situation, which is burdened with the most brutal forms of repression in various parts in Kosova, such as in Istog, Kamenice, Vushtrri, Gjakove, Prishtine, Podujeve, and so forth, as well as the violence that is being exerted against political activists, thus repeating his demand that magistrate Ukshin Hoti and other prisoners be released.

Another form of repression, Rugova continued, are the raids on money and commodities, which were increased after Avramovic's visit to Kosova. For this reason, he asked the World Bank to open an office there to observe the course of Albanian capital and economic public activities.

He rejected the charges that were made against Albanians for arms and drug trafficking, stressing that the largest amounts of drugs are circulating in Serbia and Belgrade. However, these charges against Albanians aim to discredit their peaceful and democratic movement.

Mr. Rugova rejected the idea on the division of Kosova, which seeks to attach the Rrafsh i Dukagjinit [the Plain of Dukagjin] to Montenegro, put up by the Montenegrin Popular Party Chief (?Keli Baza).

At the end of today's conference, Rugova called for unity among Albanian political parties in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, especially now on the eve of elections, regardless of the present difficulties and those related to nationality.

President Rugova answered numerous questions put forth by correspondents.

Police Raid 214 Gjakove Homes in Nine Months

*AU0810210494 Tirana TVSH Television Network in
Albanian 1635 GMT 8 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] From January to September, the Serbian police raided 214 Albanian homes in the Gjakove Commune, mainly under the pretext of searching for arms.

The Kosova Information Center reports that during the raids in this commune, the Serbian police physically maltreated 930 Albanians and robbed 46 people. Some 1,070 Albanian citizens have been summoned by the police to hand over all weapons and 71 have been arrested.

During July, the Serbian Army killed two Kosovar Albanians on the Kosovar-Albanian border.

During this nine-month period, 2,789 Albanian citizens in the Gjakove Commune have been subjected to the Serbian repression.

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